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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Supreme Court Case No. 41668 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Respondent. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
MICHAEL R. JONES 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
HONORABLE ERIC J. WILDMAN 
JANA B. GOMEZ 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
000002
Date: 2/18/2014 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 10:48 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 2 Case: CV-OC-2013-07673 Current Judge: Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Jayo Development Inc vs. Ada County Board Of Equalization 
Jayo Development Inc vs. Ada County Board Of Equalization 
Date Code User Judge 
4/30/2013 NCOC CCHEATJL New Case Filed - Other Claims Michael McLaughlin 
PETN CCHEATJL Petition For Judical Review Michael McLaughlin 
5/3/2013 CHGA CCHEATJL Judge Change: Administrative Richard D. Greenwood 
NOTC TCWEGEKE Notice of Assignment G. Richard Bevan 
5/6/2013 CHGA CCNELSRF Judge Change: Administrative G. Richard Bevan 
CCNELSRF Notice of Reassignment G. Richard Bevan 
5/7/2013 ORDR TCPAANMR Order of Assignment ( Hon. Eric J. Wildman) G. Richard Bevan 
CERT TCPAANMR Certificate Of Mailing G. Richard Bevan 
CHGA TCPAANMR Juqge Change: Administrative Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
5/9/2013 ORDR TCPAANMR Order Setting Status Conference with Certificate Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
of Mailing 
NOTC TCPAANMR Notice of Lodging of Transcript and Agency Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Record 
5/20/2013 AMEN CCVIDASL Amended Notice of Status Conference Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
HRSC CCVIDASL Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
05/30/2013 01 :30 PM) 
5/24/2013 NOTC CCHEATJL Notice Of Filing Settled Agency Record Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
6/13/2013 ORDR TCLYCAAM Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Initial Pretrial Order 
HRHD TCLYCAAM Hearing result for Status by Phone scheduled on Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
05/30/2013 01:30 PM: Hearing Held 
HRSC TCLYCAAM Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 12/09/2013 Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
09:00 AM) 5 day court trial 
7/24/2013 MOSJ TCHOLLJM Ada County Board of Equalization's Motion For Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Summary Judgment 
AFSM TCHOLLJM Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Summary Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Judgment 
MEMO TCHOLLJM Memorandum In Support of Motion of Summary Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Judgment 
STMT TCHOLLJM Statement Of Facts In Support of Motion of Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Summary Judgment 
7/30/2013 NOTC TCLYCAAM Notice of Telephonic Hearing on Respondent's Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
7/31/2013 HRSC TCLYCAAM Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/28/2013 01 :30 Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
PM) To be Heard in 5th District. 
MOSJ CCMARTJD Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
AFFD CCMARTJD Affidavit Of Michael R. Jones Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
MEMO CCMARTJD Memorandum In Support Of Petitioner's Motion Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
For Summary Judgment 
MISC CCMARTJD Statement Of Facts In Support Of Jayo Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Development lnc.'s Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
000003
Date: 2/18/2014 Fourth Judicial District Court -Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 10:48 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of2 Case: CV-OC-2013-07673 Current Judge: Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Jayo Development Inc vs. Ada County Board Of Equalization 
Jayo Development Inc vs. Ada County Board Of Equalization 
Date Code User Judge 
7/31/2013 MEMO CCMARTJD Jayo Development's Memorandum In Opposition Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Ada County's Motion For Summary Judgment 
8/8/2013 NOTH TCLYCAAM Notice Of Telephonic Hearing on Petitioner's Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
8/15/2013 MEMO CCMART,IO Memorandum In Response To Petitioner's Motion Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
For Summary Judgment 
8/21/2013 REPL CCSWEECE Reply Memorandum on Petitioner Jayo Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Developments Motion for Summary Judgment 
8/22/2013 REPL CCNELSRF Reply Memorandum in Support of Ada County Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Bourd of Equalization's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
9/12/2013 ORDR CCMEYEAR Order on Motions for Summary Judgment Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
JDMT CCMEYEAR Judgment Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
HRVC CCMEYEAR Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
12/09/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 day 
court trial 
HRVC CCMEYEAR Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
08/28/2013 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated To be 
Heard in 5th District. Parties to call 
1-215-446-0193 
CDIS CCMEYEAR Civil Disposition entered for: Ada County Board Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Of Equalization, Defendant; Jayo Development 
Inc, Plaintiff. Filing date: 9/12/2013 
STAT CCMEYEAR STATUS CHANGED: Closed Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
9/24/2013 MOTN CCOSBODK Motion For Reconsideration Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
10/3/2013 NOTH TCLYCAAM Notice Of Hearing Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
HRSC TCLYCAAM Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/24/2013 01 :30 Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
PM) Telephonic Motion for Reconsideration 
Hearing. parties to call 1-215-446-0193 and enter 
the code 406128 followed by # when promted 
STAT TCLYCAAM STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
action 
10/8/2013 MEMO CCHOLMEE Memorandum in Support of Motion for Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Reconsideration 
10/17/2013 MEMO CCSCOTDL Memorandum in Response to Petitioners Motion Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
for Reconsideration 
10/22/2013 REPL CCNELSRF Reply Motion for Reconsideration Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
10/31/2013 ORDR TCEDWAAM Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
12/6/2013 NOTA TCRUDZES NOTICE OF APPEAL Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
APSC TCWEGEKE Appealed To The Supreme Court Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
1/2/2014 ORDR CCTHIEBJ Order Remanding to District Court - Supreme Eric J Wildman (SRBA) 
Court Docket No. 41668 
000004
Michael R. Jones 
Michael R. Jones, PLLC 
508 N. 13th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 385-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9103 
ISB No. 2221 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Jayo Development, Inc. 
:~-----:_ ... _ .. _=_= _= _',a'!Fl:LE •• 'li!"'~.-~,~ar"'-J-3:-
APR 3 O 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JERI HEATON 
OEPU1Y 
MiOhAEL McL\UGHL\N 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Respondent. 
17 0 7 6 7--3· Civil No. CV OC ;, 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(Class: L.3 - Filing Fee $96) 
TO: The above named Respondent, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, and its 
attorneys, Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorneys Jana Gomez and Nancy Werdel, 
Ada County Courthouse, 200 W. Front Street, Rm. 3191, Boise, Idaho 83702, and to the 
Clerk of the above entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN PURSUANT TO J.C. § 63-3812, AND RULE 84 OF 
THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THE IDAHO APPELLATE RULES 
THAT: 
1. The above-named Petitioner, JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., appeals against the 
above-named Respo1:1dent to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
from the Final Decision and Order entered on April 04, 2013, by the Idaho Board of Tax 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -PAGE 1 
000005
Appeals. 
2. This petition for judicial review shall be determined upon a trial de novo, as 
provided by LC.§ 63-3812(c). 
3. The record presented to the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals, in proceedings 
conducted on October 25, 2012, shall be filed with the clerk of the district court as provided by 
LC. § 63-3812(d). 
4. The proceedings before the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals were (recorded or 
reported) and that record is. in the possession of the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals (LR.C.P. 
84(d)(4)). 
5. A transcript of the proceedings before the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals is 
requested (LR.C.P. 84(d)(6)). 
6. The following is a preliminary statement of the issues for judicial review: 
Whether certain site improvements qualify for a property tax exemption 
pursuant to LC. § 63-602W(4)? 
7. I certify (LR.C.P. 84(d)(7)): 
a. That service of this petition for judicial review has been made upon the 
Idaho Board of Tax Appeals. 
· b. That the clerk of the agency has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the transcript, if one has been requested. 
c. That the clerk of the agency has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record. 
d. That the required filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
\ 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -PAGE 2 
000006
• - . 
to 1.R.C.P. 84(b)(l). 
DATED this 30th day of April, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 30th day of April, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following in the manner described below 
Idaho Board of Tax Appeals 
3380 Americana Terrace, Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Jana Gomez 
Nancy Werdel 
Ada Co1:1nty Prosecuting Attorney 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 3191 
• Boise, Idaho 83702 










NO.~~:--~~----J t '{A FILED A.M. 'l P_M ___ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ~AY O 9 2012 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA . . 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Petitioner, 
VS. 




CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MICHAEL PAANANEN 
O!PUTY 








NOTICE OF LODGING OF 
TRANSCRIPT AND AGENCY 
RECORD 
The Board of Tax Appeals' decision in certain appeals (see Attachment A) has been 
appealed to the Fourth Judicial District Cou~ in Ada County. The agency record connected 
I - • 
with the above referenced court case has now been prepared for review by the parties. 
This will serve as notice that a copy of the agency record is included with the notice 
of lodging sent to the parties' representatives. Parties have fourteen (14) days from the 
date this notice is mailed to file with the Board of Tax Appeals any objections to the record. 
The Board of Tax Appeals has no fee for Petitioner for preparation of the record. 
The Board has a digital recording of its hearing. The fee for any transcription work would 
be handled directly through the court reporter. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have on May 7, 2013, I mailed a copy of the within and 
foregoing document by sending the same by United States mail, postage prepaid, in 
envelopes addressed to: Michael R. Jones, PLLC, 508 N. 13th Street, Boise, ID 83702; 
Jana Gomez and Nancy Werdel, Ada County Prosecutor, Civil Division, 200 W. Front 
Street, Rm. 3191, Boise, ID 83702; and Clerk of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 200 W. 




Aggeal No. Parcel No. 
Clear Creek Crossing 
1. 12-A-1094 R1471950020 
2. 12-A-1095 R1471950040 
3. 12-A-1096 R1471950640 
4. 12-A-1097 R1471950710 
Hacienda 
5. 12-A-1098 R3369320170 
6. 12-A-1099 R3369320180 
7. 12-A-1100 R3369320420 
8. 12-A-1101 R3369320430 
9. 12-A-1102 R3369321070 
Boise Heights 
10. 12-A-1104 R1013520065 
Somerset Ridge 
11. 12-A-1105 R8037540070 
12. 12-A-1106 R8037540100 
13. 12-A-1107 R8037540110 
14. 12-A-1108 R8037540170 
15. 12-A-1109 R8037540220 
16. 12-A-1110 R8037540230 
17. 12-A-1111 R8037540270 
18. 12-A-1112 R8037540290 
19. 12-A-1113 R8037540570 
20. 12-A-1114 R8037540590 
Stonehouse l 
21. 12-A-1115 R8177360070 
22. 12-A-1116 R8177360080 
23. 12-A-1117 R8177360100 
24. 12-A-1118 R8177360110 
Winters Run No. 1 
25. 12-A-1119 R9473780210 
26. 12-A-1120 R9473780230 
27. 12-A-1121 R9473780560 
000009
• ' . 
Attachment A (continued) 
Aggeal No. Parcel No. 
Winters Run No. 2 
28. 12-A-1122 R9473790020 
29. 12-A-1123 R9473790030 
30. 12-A-1124 R9473790180 
31. 12-A-1125 R9473790200 
32. 12-A-1126 R9473790210 
33. 12-A-1127 R9473790230 
34. 12-A-1128 R9473790240 
35. 12-A-1129 R9473790250 
36. 12-A-1130 R9473790260 
37. 12-A-1131 R9473790470 
38. 12-A-1132 R9473790480 
39. 12-A-1133 R9473790490 
40. 12-A-1134 R9473790500 
41. 12-A-1135 R9473790510 
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GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
JANA B. GOMEZ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 West Front Street, Rm. 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 287-7700 
Idaho State Bar No. 8186 
NO., ___ ~iii=n--'"""'~--
FILED f\13~ A.M. ____ 1P.M ~ 
\ 
JUL 2 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHELSIE PINKSTON 
D!:PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 





ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. · ) 
) 
Case No. CV-OC-2013-7673 
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Respondent, Ada County Board of Equalization, by and through its 
attorney of record, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Division, and moves this 
Court for an order granting summary judgment against Jayo Development, Inc. upon the grounds 
and for the reasons that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and Respondent is entitled 
to Jµdgment as a matter oflaw. 
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PAGE 1 OF2 
g:\jbg\jayo - boise heights\district court pleadings\motion for summary judgment.doc 
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J 
This Motion is based upon Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the record artd file herein, 
and the Affidavit of Jana B. Gomez, Statement of Facts, and Memorandum in support thereof, filed 
in this matter. 
DATED this a4~day of July 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: 
Jan~'B. Gomez 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /) q/J-, day of July 2013, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to the following persons by the following methods: 
Hon. Eric J. Wildman 
. Twin Falls County Courts 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Michael R. Jones 
508 N. 13th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Petitioner 
____ Hand Delivery 
-""""><~- U.S. Mail 
____ Certified Mail 
____ Hand Delivery 
~><-- U.S.Mail 
Certified Mail ----
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PAGE2 OF2 
g:\jbg\jayo - boise heights\district court pleadings\motion for summary judgment.doc 
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GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
JANA B. GOMEZ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 287-7700 
Idaho State Bar No. 8186 
NO.-----z:/!:1::-=LE::-.t.--fL\-½?"~..-. -"'t)-
A.M. ___ _. I;----," 
JUL 2 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHELSIE PINKSTON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 





ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-OC-2013-7673 
AFFIDAVIT OF JANA B. 
GOMEZ, ESQ., IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OFADACOUNTYBOARDOF 
EQUALIZATION'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JANA B. GOMEZ, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and says: 
1. I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge. 
2. I am an attorney licensed by the Idaho State Bar. I am a Deputy Prosecuting 
\. 
Attorney in the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Division. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JANA B. GOMEZ, ESQ., IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARYJUDGMENT-PAGE1OF3 
g:\jbg\jayo - boise heights\district court pleadings\affidavit ofjbg.doc 
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3. On October 25, 2012, I signed the attached "Stipulation of Facts" on behalf of the 
Ada County Board of Equalization. Michael Jones, attorney for Petitioner, also signed the 
"Stipulation of Facts" on the same day. The "Stipulation of Facts" was admitted in evidence 
before the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals in appeal numbers 12-A-1094 through-1102 and 12-A-
1104 through-I 135. A true and accurate copy of the "Stipulation of Facts" is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 
DATED this /tY~ day of July 2013. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this J l/~ay of July 2013, before me, a Notary Public, personally appeared Jana B. 
Gomez, known or identified to me to be the person that executed the instrument. 
N~tary Public for Idah6 6 
Commission Expires: · lo,, /18 /cQ016 
I , 
AFFIDAVIT OF JANA B. GOMEZ, ESQ., IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 2 OF 3 
g:\jbg\jayo - boise heights\district court pleadings\affidavit ofjbg.doc 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this !) Lfl-'day of July 2013, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JANA B. GOMEZ, ESQ., IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the 
following persons by the following methods: 
Hon. Eric J. Wildman 
Twin Falls County Courts 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Michael R. Jones 
508 N. 13th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Petitioner 
____ Hand Delivery 
_....;.......;;. __ U.S. Mail 
Certified Mail ----
____ Hand Delivery 
----'---- U.S. Mail 
Certified Mail ----
AFFIDAVIT OF JANA B. GOMEZ, ESQ., IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 3 OF 3 
g:\jbg\jayo - boise heights\district court pleadings\affidavit of jbg.doc 
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f:'. • • ' 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
JANA B. G6MEZ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
. Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 287-7700 
Idaho State Bar No. 8186 
BEFORE THE IDAHO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 
IN THE MATTER OF TIIE APPEALS 
OF JAYO DEVELOP1\,1ENT, INC. 
(BOISE HEIGHTS, CLEAR CREEK 
CROSSING, HACIENDA, SOl\,fERSET 
RIDGE, STONEHOUSE, WINTERS 
RUN NO. 1, AND WINTERS RUN NO. 
2) 
From the Board of Equalization of Ada 
. County for tax year 2012. 
I 
) Appeal Nos. 12-A-1104 (Boise Heights), 
) '12-A-1094 through 12-A-1097 (Clear Creek 
) Crossing), 12-A-109~through 12-A-1102 
) (Hacienda), 12-A-1105 through 12-A-1114 
) (Somerset Ridge), 12-A-f 115 through 12-
; 
) A-1118 (Stonehouse), 12-A-1119 through 
) 12-A-1121 (Winters R.un No. 1), and 12-A-,. 




COME NOW, the Ada County Board of Equalization, by and through its counsel of 
record, Jana B. G6mez, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Civil Division, Ada County 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and Appellant, Jayo Development, Inc., by and through its 
counsel of record, Michael Jones, Michael R. Jones, PLLC (collectively ''the Parties"), and 
hereby request that, pursuan~ to Idaho Board of Tax Appeal Rule 55, the above-captioned 
STIPULATION OF FACTS- PAGE 1 
g:\jbg\Jayo - boise heights\pleadings\jayo - stipulation - final.doc 





cases be consolidated because these cases involve the same or substantially similar issues. 
Additionally, the Parties hereby stipulate and agree to the following facts: 
1. That these appeals arise from the interpretation and applicability of the 
provisions of the newly-enacted Site Improvements exemption, set forth in Idaho Code 
section 63-602W(4), and IDAPA Rule 35.01.03.620 ("Rule 620"), a temporary rule 
promulgated by the Idaho State Tax Commission, which was made effective on January 1, 
2012. 
2. That Jayo Development, Inc. timely applied for Site Improvement exemptions 
with Ada County for the following parcels: R1013520065, R1471950020, R1471950040, 
R1471950640, R1471950710, R3369320170, R3369320180, R3369320420, 
R3369320430, R3369321070, R8037540070, R8037540100, R8037540110, 
R8037540170, R8037540220, R8037540230, R8037540270, R8037540290, 
R8037540570, R8037540590, R8177360070, R8 l 77360080, R8177360100, 
R8177360110, R9473780210, R9473780230, R9473780560, R94 73 790020, 
R94 73 79003 0, R9473790180, R9473790200, R94 73 790210! R9473790230, 
R94 73 790240, R9473790250, R9473790260, R9473790470, R9473790480, 
R9473790490, R9473790500, and R9473790510 ("the Parcels"). 
3. That Ada County's denial of Jayo Development, Inc.'s applications for site 
improvement exemptions was based, in part, on the requirements of Rule 620. 
4. That the valuation of the Parcels is not in dispute. 
5. That, on January 1, 2012_, Jayo Development, Inc. owned the Parcels. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS- PAGE 2 
g:\jbg\jayo - boise heights\plcadings\jayo - stipulation - final.doc 
000017
,i 
6. That, on January 1, 2012, Jayo Development, Inc. held the Parcels for sale 
or consumption in the ordinary course of its business. 
7. That, as of January 1, 2012, site improvements had been made on the 
Parcels. 
8. That Jayo Construction, Inc. made or caused to be made the site 
improvements on the Parcels on or before December 26, 2008. 
9. That Jayo Construction, Inc. was the initial land developer of the Parcels. 
10. That Jayo Development, Inc. is in the business of land developing. 
11. Th0:t Jayo Construction, Inc. was an Idaho corporation formed on November 
14, 1979, and that Jayo Construction, Inc. was dissolved on December 26, 2008. 
· 12. That Jayo Construction, LLC was an Idaho corporation formed on December 
26, 2008, and that Jayo Construction, LLC was dissolved on February 12, 2010. 
13. That Jayo Development, Inc. is an Idaho corporation that was formed on 
February 1, 2010. 
14. That Jayo Construction, Inc., Jayo Construction, LLC, and Jayo 
Development, Inc. are separate legal entities. 
15. That titles to the Parcels were conveyed from Jayo Construction, Inc. 
following the installation of the site improvements. 
16. That the specific dates as to when titles to the Parcels were conveyed from 
Jayo Construction, Inc. are as follows: 
STIPULATION OF FACTS-PAGE 3 




a. Title to the Boise Heights parcel (Rl013520065) (hereinafter "the 
Boise Heights Parcel") was conveyed from Jayo Construction, Inc. to Douglas Jayo, and 
then to Jayo Construction, LLC, on December 31, 2008. 
b. Title to the Boise Heights Parcel was conveyed from Jayo 
Construction, LLC to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo Development, Inc., on August 19, 
2010. 
c. Titles to the Clear Creek Crossing parcels (Rl471950020, 
R1471950040, R1471950640, and R1471950710) (hereinafter "the Clear Creek Crossing 
Parcels") were conveyed from Jayo Construction, Inc. to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo 
Construction, LLC, on December 31, 2008. 
d. Titles to the Clear Creek Crossing Parcels were conveyed from Jayo 
Construction, LLC to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo Development, Inc., on August 19, 
2010. 
e. Titles to the Hacienda parcels (R3369320170, R3369320180, 
R3369320420, R3369320430, and R3369321070) (hereinafter "the Hacienda Parcels") 
were conveyed from Jayo Construction, Inc. to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo 
Construction, LLC, on December 31, 2008. 
f. Titles to the Hacienda Parcels were . conveyed from Jayo 
Construction, LLC to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo Dvelopment, Inc., on August 19, 
2010. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS-PAGE 4 




g. Titles to nine (9) of the Somerset Ridge parcels (R8037540100, 
R8037540110, R8037540170, R8037540220, R8037540230, R8037540270, 
R8037540290, R8037540570, and R8037540590) (hereinafter ''the Nine Somerset Ridge 
Parcels") were conveyed from Jayo Construction, Inc. to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo 
Construction, LLC, on December 31, 2008. 
h. Titles to the Nine Somerset Ridge Parcels were conveyed from Jayo 
Construction, LLC to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo Development, Inc., on August 19, 
2010. 
i. Title to Somerset Ridge parcel number R8037540070 was conveyed 
from Jayo Construction, Inc. to J. Holland on November 22, 2005. 
J. Title to Somerset Ridge parcel number R8037540070 was conveyed 
from J. Holland to Jayo Construction, LLC on May 1, 2009. 
k. Title to Somerset Ridge parcel number R8037540070 was conveyed 
from Jayo Construction, LLC to Douglas Jayo, and then.to Jayo Development, Inc., on 
August 19, 2010. 
1. Titles to the Stonehouse parcels (R8177360070, R8177360080, 
R8177360100, and R8177360110) (hereinafter "the Stonehouse Parcels") were conveyed 
from Jayo Construction, Inc. to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo Constru?tion, LLC, on 
December 31, 2008. 
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m. Titles to the St<?nehouse Parcels were conveyed from Jayo 
Construction, LLC to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo Development, Inc., on August 19, 
2010. 
n. Titles to the Winters Run No. 1 parcels (R9473780210, 
R9473780230, and R9473780560) (hereinafter "the Winters Run No. 1 Parcels") were 
conveyed from Jayo Construction, Inc. to Douglas Jayo, and then Jayo Construction, 
LLC, on December 31, 2008. 
o. Titles to the Winters Run No. 1 Parcels were conveyed from Jayo 
Construction, LLC to Douglas Jayo on January 15, 2009 and January 27, 2009. 
p. Titles to the Winters Run No. 1 Parcels were conveyed from Douglas 
Jayo to Jayo Construction, LLC on January 27, 2009. 
q. Titles to the Winters Run ~o. 1 Parcels were conveyed from Jayo 
Construction, LLC to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo Development, Inc., on June 3, 2010. 
r. Titles to the Winters Run No. 2 parcels (R9473790020, 
R9473790030, R9473790180, R9473790200, R9473790210, R9473790230, 
R9473790240, R9473790250, R9473790260, R9473790470, R9473790480, 
R9473790490, R9473790500, and R9473790510) (hereinafter "the Winters Run No. 2 
Parcels") were conveyed from Jayo Construction, Inc. to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo 
Construction, LLC, on December 31, 2008. 
s. Titles to the Winters Run No. 2 Parcels were conveyed from Jayo 
Construction, LLC to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo Development, Inc., on June 3, 2010. 
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,, • 
WHEREFORE, the parties jointly request that the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals 
consolidate the above-captioned cases and accept the statements contained herein as 
uncontested facts. 
DATED ·IOI ~5 / Id-. 
DATED /o/2.rj"),qlk 
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Case No. CV-OC-2013-7673 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Respondent, the Ada County Board of Equalization, by and through its 
attorney of record, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Division, and submits this 
Memorandum in Support of Ada County Board of Equalization's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c). To 
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meet this burden, the moving party must challenge in its motion and establish through evidence 
that no issue of material fact exists for an element of the nonmoving party's case. Smith v. 
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). The nonmoving 
party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56], must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." IDAHO R. Crv. P. 56(e). 
"Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the 
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." 
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 769, 215 P.3d 485, 489 (2009). The nonmoving party must 
submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a 
genuine issue. Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). 
"A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a 
genuine issue for the purposes of summary judgment." Id. 
Additionally, appeals from a decision of the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals are to be 
"determined by the [district] court without a jury in a trial de novo .... " LC. § 63-3812(c). The 
petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the decision made by the Board of Tax 
Appeals was erroneous, and such burden is sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 
The burden going forward then shifts "as in other civil litigation." Id. 
Finally, "[s]tatutes granting tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the 
taxpayer and in favor of the state." Hous. Sw., Inc. v. Wash. County, 128 Idaho 335, 337-38, 913 
P.2d 68, 70-71 (1996) (citing Owyhee Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 962, 964, 
855 P.2d 47, 49 (1993)). Exemptions from taxation "are never presumed," and "a statute 
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granting a tax exemption [cannot] be extended by judicial construction to create an exemption 
not specifically authorized." Id. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Petitioner's Parcels1 are not exempt from property taxation pursuant to former Idaho 
Code section 63-602W(4) (2012) ("Site Improvement Exemption statute") because Petitioner is 
not the land developer that made or caused to be made the site improvements on the Parcels. 
Additionally, in this case, the only land developer that would have qualified for site improvement 
exemptions pursuant to the Site Improvement Exemption statute, Jayo Construction, Inc. ("Jayo 
I"), would have lost such exemptions when the Parcels were conveyed from Jayo I, either in 2005 
or 2008. 
A. Legislative History of the Site Improvement Exemption Statute 
During the 2012 legislative session, the Idaho Legislature declared site improvements, 
such as roads and utilities, exempt from property taxation under certain circumstances. The 
newly enacted sub-section to Idaho Code section 63-602W exempted from property taxation 
[s]ite improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and utilities, on 
real property held by the land developer for sale or consumption in the ordinary 
course of the land developer's business until other improvements, such as 
buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or title to the land is 
conveyed from the land developer. 
1 Forty-one parcels are at issue in this case. The parcels are subdivision lots located in seven different developments. 
The parcel numbers at issue are: Rl013520065, Rl471950020, Rl471950040, Rl471950640, Rl471950710, 
R3369320170, R3369320180, R3369320420, R3369320430, R3369321070, R8037540070, R8037540100, 
R8037540110, R8037540170, R8037540220, R8037540230, R8037540270, R8037540290, R8037540570, 
R8037540590, R8177360070, R8177360080, R8177360100, R8177360110, R9473780210, R9473780230, 
R9473780560, R9473790020, R9473790030, R9473790180, R9473790200, R9473790210, R9473790230, 
R9473790240, R9473790250, R9473790260, R9473790470, R9473790480, R9473790490, R9473790500, and 
R94 73 790510 ("Parcels"). 
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I.C. § 63-602W(4) (2012) (ameflded 2013). The Legislature made the Site Improvement 
Exemption statute retroactiv~ to January 1, 2012.2 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws 519. 
Following enactment of the Site Improvement Exemption statute, the Idaho State Tax 
Commission, pursuant to its statutory mandate and powers, promulgated a temporary rule that 
further explained the req~ements of such statute. See IDAHO ADMIN. CODER. 35.01.03.620 
(2012) ("Rule 620"); see also I.C. §§ 63-105A(6), (14) (enumerating the powers and duties of the 
Idaho State Tax Commission, including the power and duty "[t]o make administrative 
construction of property tax law"). Rule 620 was also made retroactive to January 1, 2012. 
Idaho State Tax Comm'n Open Meeting Minutes of meeting held April 10, 2012, available at 
http://tax.idaho.gov/pubs/EPB00700_05-31-2012.pdf. 
Rule 620 outlined four conditions that a land developer was required to meet in order for 
such land developer's parcels to be eligible for property tax exemptions pursuant to the Site 
Improvement Exemption statute. Pursuant to Rule 620, the land developer was required to 
provide the county assessor and county commissioners sufficient proof that the land developer: 
(1) "[held] the land upon which the site improvements [had] been made," (2) "made or caused to 
be made the site improvements on the land," (3) held the real property "for sale or consumption 
in the ordinary course of the land developer's business," and (4) was "the owner or [was] in 
possession of the land under a land sale contract." IDAHO ADMIN. CODE R. 35.01.03.620.03.c 
(2012) ( emphasis added). 
2 Petitioner applied for site improvement exemptions for the Parcels for the 2012 tax year. Thus, the determination 
of whether the Parcels are exempt from taxation is to be assessed as of January 1, 2012. See J.C. § 63-205(1) ("All 
real, personal and operating property subject to property taxation must be assessed annually at market value for 
assessment purposes as of 12:01 a.m. of the first day of January in the year in which such property taxes are levied, 
except as otherwise provided."). 
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Rule 620 went on to address situations whereby a site improvement exemption can be 
lost. Rule 620 stated that a site improvement exemption 
shall be lost when construction of any buildings or structural components of 
buildings is begun or when title to the land is conveyed from the land developer at 
any time following the installation of the site improvements. 
Id. at 35.01.03.620.04. Further, Rule 620 provided that "[a]ny change in ownership conveying 
title to land by deed or court order shall be considered a conveyance and result in loss of this 
exemption." Id. at 35.01.03.620.04.a. 
B. The Parcels are not eligible for site improvement exemptions because 
Petitioner did not make or cause to be made the site improvements on the 
Parcels. 
Read together, the plain language of the Site Improvement Exemption statute and Rule 
620 require that a land developer applying for a site improvement exemption have made or 
caused to be made the site improvements on a parcel. In this case, although Petitioner meets 
three of the four requirements of Rule 6203, Petitioner's Parcels are not eligible for site 
improvement exemptions because Petitioner did not make or cause to be made the site 
improvements on the Parcels. Instead, Jayo I, not Petitioner, is the land developer that invested 
the necessary capital to make the site improvements on the Parcels. Petitioner, on the other hand, 
is merely a land developer that, through a series of conveyances, purchased the already-improved 
Parcels. Consequently, Petitioner does not meet the eligibility requirements of the Site 
Improvement Exemption statute, and Petitioner's Parcels are not eligible for site improvement 
exemptions. 
3 Petitioner meets the first, third, and fourth requirements of Rule 620-Petitioner held the Parcels on which the site 
improvements had been made; Petitioner held such Parcels for sale or consumption in the ordinary course of 
Petitioner's business; and Petitioner owned the Parcels. See IDAHO ADMIN. CODER. 35.01.03.620.03.c (2012). 
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Further, statutory law requires entities acting under Idaho property tax law to follow and 
abide by the rules promulgated by the Idaho State Tax Commission unless and until such rules 
are judicially overruled. LC. § 63-105A(14) (conferring upon the Idaho State Tax Commission 
the power and duty "[t]o make administrative construction of property tax law" and declaring 
that "until judicially overruled, such administrative construction shall be binding upon . . . all 
others acting under such laws"). Although eventually allowed to expire, Rule 620 was never 
judicially overruled.4 
Here, the Ada County Board of Equalization, as a governmental entity acting under Idaho 
property tax laws, was bound to abide by the requirements set forth by the Idaho State Tax 
Commission in Rule 620. The Rule was never judicially overruled and was applicable to 
Petitioner's applications for site improvement exemptions. As such, the Ada County Board of 
Equalization was compelled by law to deny site improvement exemptions for Petitioner's Parcels 
because Petitioner did not make or cause to be made the site improvements on the Parcels, as 
expressly required by Rule 620. 
Finally, any attempt by Petitioner to argue that Petitioner is essentially the same entity as 
Jayo I would be without legal basis. It is well-established that, "as a general rule[,] a corporation 
will be regarded as a legal entity" separate and apart from its shareholders. Jolley v. Idaho Sec., 
Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 387, 414 P.2d 879, 887 (1966). Therefore, it is of no legal significance that 
Douglas Jayo claims to have been the sole shareholder of both Jayo I and of Petitioner 
4 In November 2012, the Idaho State Tax Commission voted to allow Rule 620 to expire. Idaho State Tax Comm'n 
Open Meeting Minutes of meeting held Nov. 28, 2012, available at http://tax.idaho.gov/pubs/EPB00700_l l-28-
20l2.pdf. 
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corporation. As the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals recognized, "to look past the actual ownership 
(i.e. record owner) of the subject parcels and to grant exemptions because [Douglas] Jayo was the 
one constant individual throughout the subjects' relevant ownership period ... would ignore the 
recognized legal separation between a corporation and its shareholders, and a limited liability 
company and its members." In re The Appeals of Jayo Development, Inc., Idaho Board of Tax 
Appeals, Appeal Nos. 12-A-1094 through -1102 and 12-A-1104 through -1135, p. 5 (April 4, 
2013). Jayo I was a legal entity wholly and completely distinct from Petitioner corporation. 
Additionally, a case from the District of Columbia, Columbia Realty Venture v. District 
of Columbia, 433 A.2d 1075 (D.C. 1981), highlights the risk that would be run by a court 
attempting to look beyond the legal separation of two distinct business entities. In that case, a 
realty transfer tax was imposed statutorily when a document was recorded "whereby ... any 
interest [to real property in the District of Columbia was] conveyed, vested, granted, bargained, 
sold, transferred or assigned." Id. at 1076 n.2. A limited partnership transferred property to a 
trust and alleged that the transfer was merely a change in the form of ownership. Id. at 1077. In 
support of its argument, the limited partnership cited similarities between the two business 
entities, including the fact that "the shareholders of the trust and the holders of the partnership 
interests ... [were] essentially the same people." Id. The court refused to look beyond the fact 
that there were two distinct business entities involved and pointed out the "endless dispute over 
how similar or dissimilar the characteristics of two enterprises must be before a transaction 
between them is viewed as one between two parties rather than a change in business 
organization." Id. at 1078. 
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Utilizing a strict construction of tax exemption statutes, as is required in Idaho, this Court 
should likewise find that Jayo I and Petitioner corporation are two distinct business entities. The 
court should not extend by judicial construction the site improvement exemption to Petitioner's 
Parcels, as an exemption to the parcels of a land developer that did not make or cause to be made 
site improvements is not specifically authorized by either the Site Improvement Exemption 
statute or Rule 620. 
Accordingly, Petitioner's Parcels are not eligible for site improvement exemptions, and 
the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of 
such Board denying the site improvement exemptions on Petitioner's Parcels. 
C. The exempt status of the Parcels would have been lost when titles to the 
Parcels were conveyed from the land developer, Jayo I, in either 2005 or 
2008. 
As explained above, Jayo I is the only land developer in this case that would have been 
eligible for site improvement exemptions for the Parcels. The exempt status of the Parcels would 
have been lost when Jayo I conveyed title to the Parcels after installing the site improvements. 
Both the Site Improvement Exemption statute and Rule 620 explain that a site 
improvement exemption is lost when title to the land is conveyed from the land developer. Rule 
620 slightly elaborates by adding that the exemption is lost when title to the land is conveyed 
from the land. developer "at any time following installation of the site improvements." IDAHO 
ADMIN. CODE R. 35.01.03.620.04 (2012). Additionally, Rule 620 defines "conveyance" as 
"[a]ny change in ownership conveying title to land by deed or court order" and mandates that a 
conveyance following installation of site improvements "shall . . . result in loss of this 
exemption." Id. at 35.01.03.620.04.a (emphases added). Importantly, Rule 620's definition of 
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"conveyance" does not specify any separate guidelines or make any exceptions for legally distinct 
business entities, such as corporations and limited liability companies, that might be owned by 
the same shareholders or members. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the site improvements on the Parcels were made 
sometime before December 2008. Further, it is undisputed that title to each of the Parcels, 
except outlier Parcel number R8037540070, was conveyed from Jayo I to Douglas Jayo on 
December 31, 2008 following installation of the site improvements. As to Parcel number 
R8037540070, it is undisputed that Jayo I made the site improvements on such Parcel, and that 
such Parcel was conveyed from Jayo I to J. Holland on November 22, 2005, following 
installation of the site improvements. Consequently, pursuant to the requirements of the Site 
Improvement Exemption statute and Rule 620, the Parcels would have lost their exempt status 
either in 2005 or 2008 when title to each Parcel was conveyed from Jayo I following installation 
of the site improvements. 
Additionally, as explained above, it is of no legal significance that Douglas Jayo was the 
sole shareholder of Jayo I. Jayo I was the land developer that made the site improvements, and 
title to the Parcels was conveyed from Jayo I to separate and distinct legal entities following 
installation of the site improvements. Because neither the Site Improvement Exemption statute 
nor Rule 620 provides any special exception for conveyances between entities owned by the 
same shareholders or members, the transfers of titles to the Parcels by deed from Jayo I to 
Douglas Jayo and to J. Holland were "conveyances" under the definition promulgated by the 
Idaho State Tax Commission. 
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The Ada County Board of Equalization was required by law to apply the State Tax 
Commission's definition of "conveyance" to this case and, in doing so, find that the exempt 
status of the Parcels would have been lost when Jayo I conveyed title to the Parcels after 
installing the site improvements. Therefore, the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the decision of such Board denying the site improvement 
exemptions on Petitioner's Parcels. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the decision of such Board denying the site improvement exemptions on 
Petitioner's Parcels. 
!h-
DATED this~ day of July 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: Oonv- fo. GoiY'R 'L 
Jan~B. Gomez 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;JL{ day of July 2013, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following persons by the following methods: 
Hon. Eric J. Wildman 
Twin Falls County Courts 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Michael R. Jones 
508 N. 13 th Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Petitioner 
--,----- Hand Delivery 
_)< __ U.S. Mail 
Certified Mail ----
____ Hand Delivery 
-~K-- U.S. Mail 
Certified Mail ----
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Case No. CV-OC-2013-7673 
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN 
SUPPORT OF ADA COUNTY 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Respondent, Ada County Board of Equalization, by and through its 
attorney or record, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Division, and submits this 
Statement of Facts in Support of Ada County Board of Equalization's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Petitioner, Jayo Development, Inc., contends that, in tax year 2012, forty-one parcels owned 
by Jayo Development, Inc. were exempt from property taxation pursuant to former Idaho Code 
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- PAGE 1 OF 6 
g:\jbg\jayo - boise heights\district court pleadings\statement of facts.doc 
000034
section 63-602W(4), which section governs exemptions for site improvements. See I.C. § 63-
602W(4) (2012) (amended 2013). 
There is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this case. The following Statement of 
Facts is based upon the "Stipulation of Facts" signed by both Parties and admitted into evidence by 
the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals. See Gomez A.ff. ,r 3, Ex. A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Jayo Construction, Inc., not Petitioner, Jayo Development, Inc., made or 
caused to be made the site improvements at issue in this case. 
In November 1999, Jayo Construction, Inc. ("Jayo I") came into existence as an Idaho 
corporation. Id at Ex. A, ,r 11. At varying periods of time between November 1979 and December 
2008, Jayo I owned each of the Parcels1 at issue in this case. Id at Ex. A, ,r 16. It is undisputed that 
Jayo I made or caused to be made all of the site improvements on each of the Parcels. Id at Ex. A, 
,r 8. Accordingly, Jayo I was the initial land developer of the Parcels. Id. at Ex. A, ,r 9. Jayo I 
dissolved on December 26, 2008. Id at Ex. A, ,r 11. 
Jayo Construction, LLC ("Jayo II") was formed on December 26, 2008. Id at Ex. A, ,r 12. 
Jayo II owned each of the Parcels at varying periods of time between December 31, 2008 and 
August 19, 2010. See id at Ex. A, ,r 16. Jayo II dissolved on February 12, 2010. Id at Ex. A, ,r 12. 
Finally, Jayo Development, Inc. ("Petitioner") was incorporated on February 1, 2010. Id_at 
Ex. A, ,r 13. As of January 1, 2012, Petitioner owned each of the Parcels, was in the business of 
1 The forty-one parcels at issue in this case are subdivision lots located in seven different developments. The parcel 
numbers at issue are: R1013520065, R1471950020, R1471950040, Rl471950640, R1471950710, R3369320170, 
R3369320180, R3369320420, R3369320430, R3369321070, R8037540070, R8037540100, R8037540110, 
R8037540170, R8037540220, R8037540230, R8037540270, R8037540290, R8037540570, R8037540590, 
R8177360070, R8177360080, R8177360100, R8177360110, R9473780210, R9473780230, R9473780560, 
R9473790020, R9473790030, R9473790180, R9473790200, R9473790210, R9473790230, R9473790240, 
R9473790250, R9473790260, R9473790470, R9473790480, R9473790490,· R9473790500, and R9473790510 
(''Parcels"). 
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land developing, and held the Parcels for sale or consumption in the ordinary course of its business. 
Id at Ex. A, ,r,r 5-6, 10. 
B. The Parcels were conveyed from Jayo I following the installation of the site 
improvements. 
Jayo I, the initial land developer, made or caused to be made the site i~provements on the 
Parcels sometime before flecember 2008. Id at Ex. A, ,r 8. Title to each Parcel was subsequently 
conveyed from Jayo I following installation of the site improvements. Id at Ex. A, ,r 15. 
1. Boise Heights 
Title to the Boise Heights parcel (R1013520065) was conveyed from Jayo I to Douglas 
Jayo, and then to Jayo II, on December 31, 2008. Id at Ex. A, ,r 16.a. Title to the Boise Heights 
parcel was then conveyed from Jayo II to Douglas Jayo, and then to Petitioner, on August 19, 
2010. Id at Ex. A, ,r 16.b. 
2. Clear Creek Crossing 
Titles to the Clear Creek Crossing parcels (R1471950020, R1471950040, R1471950640, 
and R1471950710) were conveyed from Jayo I to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo II, on 
December 31, 2008. Id at Ex. A, ,r 16.c. Titles to the Clear Creek Crossing parcels were then 
conveyed from Jayo II to Douglas Jayo, and then to Petitioner, on August 19, 2010. Id. at Ex. A, 
,r 16.d. 
3. Hacienda 
Titles to the Hacienda parcels (R3369320170, R3369320180, R3369320420, 
R3369320430, and R3369321070) were conveyed from Jayo I to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo 
II, on December 31, 2008. Id at Ex. A, ,r 16.e. Titles to the Hacienda Parcels were then 
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conveyed from Jayo II to Douglas Jayo, and then to Petitioner, on August 19, 2010. Id. at Ex. A, 
if 16.f. 
4. Somerset Ridge 
Titles to nine (9) of the Somerset Ridge parcels (R8037540100, R8037540110, 
R8037540170, R8037540220, R8037540230, R8037540270, R8037540290, R8037540570, and 
R8037540590) ("Nine Somerset Ridge parcels") were conveyed from Jayo I to Douglas Jayo, 
and then to Jayo II, on December 31, 2008. Id. at Ex. A, ,r 16.g. Titles to the Nine Somerset 
Ridge parcels were then conveyed from Jayo II to Douglas Jayo, and then to Petitioner, on 
August 19, 2010. Id. at Ex. A, ,r 16.h. 
Title to Somerset Ridge parcel number R8037540070 was conveyed from Jayo I to J. 
Holland on November 22, 2005. Id at Ex. A, ,r 16.i. Title to Somerset Ridge parcel number 
R8037540070 was then conveyed from J. Holland to Jayo II on May 1, 2009. Id. at Ex. A, ,r 16.j. 
Title to Somerset Ridge parcel number R8037540070 was then conveyed from Jayo II to Douglas 
Jayo, and then to Petitioner, on August 19, 2010. Id. at Ex. A, ,r 16.k. 
5. Stonehouse 
Titles to the Stonehouse parcels (R8177360070, R8177360080, R8177360100, and 
R8177360110) were conveyed from Jayo I to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo II, on December 31, 
2008. Id. at Ex. A, ,r 16.1. Titles to the Stonehouse parcels were then conveyed from Jayo II to 
Douglas Jayo, and then to Petitioner, on August 19, 2010. Id. at Ex. A, ,r 16.m. 
6. Winters Run No.1 
Titles to the Winters Run No. 1 parcels (R9473780210, R9473780230, and 
R94 73 780560) were conveyed from Jayo I to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo II, on December 31, 
2008. Id. at Ex. A, ,r 16.n. Titles to the Winters Run No. 1 parcels were then conveyed from 
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Jayo II to Douglas Jayo on January 15, 2009 and January 27, 2009. Id. at Ex. A,~ 16.o. Titles to 
the Winters Run No. 1 parcels were then conveyed from Douglas Jayo to Jayo II on January 27, 
2009. Id. at Ex. A, ~ 16.p. Titles to the Winters Run No. 1 parcels were then conveyed from 
Jayo II to Douglas Jayo, and then to Petitioner, on June 3, 2010. Id. at Ex. A,~ 16.q. 
7. Winters Run No. 2 
Titles to the Winters Run No. 2 parcels (R9473790020, R9473790030, R9473790180, 
R9473790200, R9473790210, R9473790230, R9473790240, R9473790250, R9473790260, 
R9473790470, R9473790480, R9473790490, R9473790500, and R9473790510) were conveyed 
from Jayo I to Douglas Jayo, and then to Jayo II, on December 31, 2008. Id. at Ex. A,~ 16.r. 
Titles to the Winters Run No. 2 parcels were then conveyed from Jayo II to Douglas Jayo, and 
then to Petitioner, on June 3, 2010. Id at Ex. A,~ 16.s. 
DATED this~ day of July 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: 
J;;B.G6mez 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
rfa 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J1.!{__ day of July 2013, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following persons by the following 
methods: 
Hon. Eric J. Wildman 
Twin Falls County Courts 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Michael R. Jones 
508 N. 13th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Petitioner 
____ Hand Delivery 
----KE-"-- U.S. Mail 
Certified Mail ----
____ Hand Delivery 
-~><~- U.S. Mail 
Certified Mail ----
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CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Ol@fk. 
By AMY LYCAN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs 
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Respondent. 
) Case No. CV-OC-2013-7673 
) 
) 
) NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING 
) ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 






NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a telephonic hearing on the Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the above-captioned matter is set for August 28, 2013, at 1:30 p.m. 
(Mountain Time), at the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court, 253 3nl Avenue 
North, Twin Falls, Idaho. Parties may participate by telephone by dialing the number 1-215-
446-0193 and when prompted entering participant code 406128, followed by the # sign. If you 
have trouble connecting telephonically for any reason please call 1-208-736-3011. 
DATED :;sv.)f 'J..~ a.on . 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 -
S:\ORDERS\Civil Cases\Jayo Develop v. Ada Cty Bd ofEqualization\Notice of Hearing (MSJ).docx 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of July, 2013, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
Michael R. Jones 
508 North 13th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jana Gomez 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Certificate of Mailing 
CHRISTOPHER p.,ruuH,, 
Clerk of the~~~~,;•,,,, 
Ada Coun~'1~i..'::.•••••... ./. .,, ·.r, ~Wl!P •. ~ ~ I~... OF 1'1f. ••• ~ \ 
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Michael R. Jones 
MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7743 
508 North 13th Street 
Boise,. Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 385-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9103 
ISB No. 2221 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Jayo Development, Inc. 
~•v·----~---,,-~_,--,._ 
A.M ____ FILED.,r;,M ,. ~
JUL 3 '1 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STACEY LAFFERTY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 













CASE NO. CV OC 2013-7673 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, Jayo Development, Inc., by and through its attorney of 
record Michael R. Jones of the firm Michael R. Jones, PLLC, and moves this Court for an 
order granting summary judgment against Respondent, Ada County Board of 
Equalization upon the grounds and for the reasons present before the Court. There exists 
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and Petitioner is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw. 
This Motion is based upon I.R.C.P. Rule 56(a) the record and file herein and the 
Affidavit of Michael R. Jones, Statement of Facts In Support of Jayo Development Inc.'s 
PETITIONER.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAGE 
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Motion For Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion For 
Summary Judgment, filed in this matter. 
Dated: July 31st 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31st day of July, 2013, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT upon the Respondents by the method indicated and addressed as follows: 
Jana Gomez 
Nancy Werdel 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Rm 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7719 
Email: j gomez@adaweb.net 
nwerdel@adaweb.net 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Ada County Board of Equalization 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Other ______ _ 
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:ii.. · Michael R. Jones ,.. 
,_,.. MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7743 
508 North 13th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 385-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9103 
ISB No. 2221 . 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Jayo Development, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 











CASE NO. CV OC 2013-7673 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL R. JONES 
MICHAEL R. JONES, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney for the Petitioner in the above-captioned action, am over the age of 
majority, am competent to testify, and make this affidavit upon personal knowledge. 
2. Attached to this affidavit are copies of the session laws of the Idaho Legislature, 




:which under the Idaho Constitution, Art. III, § 1, constitute the official exercise of the legislative 
power of the Idaho Legislature, as published by the Idaho Secretary of State, LC.§ 67-904. LC.§ 
9-101.3 provides that the Court can truce judicial notice of the public and private acts of the Idaho 
Legislature. 
3. Attached to this affidavit are copies of certain other legislative records, as maintained 
through the office of Legislative Services, which constitute matters concerning which this court can 
ta1ce judicial notice. See e.g., Crawford v. Department of Correction, 133 Idaho 633, 636 n. 1, 991 
P.2d 358,361 n. 1 (1999) ("We ta1cejudicial notice ofHouse Bill 73, which was not submitted as 
part of the record on appeal, but is contained in the public records maintained by the Office of 
Legislative Services located in the State Capitol Building. I.R.E. 201(f)"). 
· 4. Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is a copy of Chapter 192 of the Laws of2012, 
Idaho Session Laws, by which LC. § 63-602W(4) creating the Site Improvement Property Tax 
Exemption was originally enacted. 
5. Attached as Exhibit B to this Affidavit is a copy of Chapter 276 of the Laws of 2013, 
Idaho Session Laws, by which LC. § 63-602W( 4) was amended in clarifying the original legislative 
intent in creating the Site Improvement Property Tax Exemption in 2012. 
6. Attached as Exhibit C to this Affidavit is a copy of the Statement of Purpose to H.B. 
519, by which legislation the Site Improvement Property Tax Exemption codified at LC. § 63- · 
602W(4) was originally enacted in 2012. 
7. Attached as Exhibit D to this Affidavit is a copy of the Statement of Purpose to H.B. 
242, by which legislation the Site Improvement Property Tax Exemption that was first enacted in 
2012 was amended in 2013. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAELR. JONES-PAGE 2 
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· 8. Attached as Exhibit E to this Affidavit is a copy of the "Minutes" of the Senate Local 
Government & Taxation Committee relevant to that Committee's consideration of H.B. 242, by 
which I.C. § 63-602W(4) was amended in 2013. 
9. Attached as Exhibit F to this Affidavit is a copy of the "Minutes" of the House 
Revenue and Taxation Committee relevant to that Committee's consideration of H.B. 242, by which 
I.C. § 63-602W(4) was amended in 2013. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
. ?jV.-SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of July, 2013. 
NO~f!ci~ 
Residingat ~. ~o 
My commission expirds: 2J "J:lt, 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this .J/..,,,ffiay of July, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL R. JONES upon the plaintiffs by the method 
indicated and addressed as follows: 
Jana Gomez 
Nancy Werdel 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Rm 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7719 
Email: jgomez@adaweb.net 
nwerdel@adaweb.net 
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the repair and cleaning of a retailer's draught beer equipment and 
may furnish or sell the necessary equipment and repair parts and 
cleaning supplies required in the performance of such services . 
(5) A wholesaler may assist a retailer by temporarily providing stor-
age of the retailer's beer for a period not in excess of seven (7) days in 
the event that such storage is necessary to maintain the quality of such beer 
during a temporary loss or failure of the retailer's refrigeration equip-
ment. 
(6) A brewery, dealer or wholesaler may furnish or give to a re.tailer 
authorized to sell beer for consumption on the licensed premises, for sam-
pling purposes only, a container of beer containing not more than sixty-four 
( 64) ounces, not currently being sold by the retail~r, and which container is 
clearly marked "NOT FOR SALE--FOR SAMPLING PURPOSES ONLY. " 
'(7) The word "ale" or "malt liquor" may be substituted for "beer" on 
any sign used in connection with any advertising herein permitted, provided 
reference shall be to ale or malt liquor which has an alcoholic content not 
greater than the limitation prescribed in section 23-1002, Idaho Code. 
(8) Every violation of the provisions of this section by a dealer, 
brewer or wholesaler, in which a licensed retailer shall have actively 
participated shall constitute a violation on the part of such licensed 
retailer. 
Approved March 29, 2012. 
CHAETER 192 
(H.B. No. 519) 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO TAXATION; AMENDING SECTION 63-602W, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE 
THAT CERTAIN SITE IMPROVEMENTS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY TAXATION; 
AMENDING SECTION 63-301A, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR A REDUCTION IN 
VALUE TO BE ADDED TO THE NEW CONSTRUCTION ROLL FOR THE EXEMPTION FOR 
SITE IMPROVEMENTS AND TO PROVIDE CORRECT CODE CITATIONS; DECLARING AN 
EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 63-602W, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows : 
63-602W. BUSINESS INVENTORY EXEMPT FROM TAXATION -- BUSINESS IN-
VENTORY THAT IS A COMPONENT OF REAL PROPERTY THAT IS A SINGLE FAMILY 
DWELLING. The following property is exempt from property taxation: business 
inventory. For the purpose of this section, "business inventory" means 
all items of tangible personal property or other property, including site 
improvements, described as: 
(1) All livestock, fur-bearing animals, fish, fowl and bees. 
(2) All nursery stock, stock-in-trade, merchandise, products, fin-
ished or partly finished goods, raw materials, and all forest products 
subject to the provisions of chapter 17, title 63, Idaho Code, supplies, 
containers and other personal property which is held for sale or consumption 
in the ordinary course of the taxpayer' s manufacturing, farming, wholesale 
jobbing, or merchandising business. 
(3) Residential improvements never occupied. Once residential im-
provements are occupied as defined in section 63-317, Idaho Code, they shall 
be subject to the tax provided by section 63-317, Idaho Code. The provisions 
of section 63-602Y, Idaho Code, shall not apply to the exemption provided by 
this subsection. The exemption provided by this subsection applies only to 
000050
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improvements to real property, and only until first occupied. For purposes 
• • of this section, the term "residential improvements" means only: 
(a) Single family residences; or 
(b) Residential townhouses; or 
(c) Residential condominium units. 
The nonresidential portion of an improvement to real property that is used 
or is to be used for residential and nonresidential purposes does not qualify 
for the exemption provided by this section. If an improvement contains mul-
tipl~ residential uni ts, each such unit shall lose the exemption provided in 
this section when it becomes occupied. 
(4) Site improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads-and 
utilities, on real property held by the land developer for sale or consump- . 
tion in the ordinary course of the land developer's business until other im-
provements, such as buildings or structural components of buildings, are be-
gun or title to the land is conveyed from the land developer. An application 
is required for the exemption provided in this subsection. 
SECTION 2. That Section 63-301A, Idaho Code; be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
63-301A. NEW CONSTRUCTION ROLL. (1) The county assessor shall prepare 
a new construction roll, which shall be in addition to the property roll, 
which new construction roll shall show: 
(a) The name of the taxpayer; 
(b) The description of the new construction, suitably detailed to meet 
the requirements of the individual county; 
(c) A description of the land and its change in use, suitably detailed 
to meet the needs of the individual county; 
(d) The amount of taxable market value added to the property on the cur-
rent year's property roll that is directly the result of new construc-
tion or a change in use of the land or both; 
(e) The amount of taxabl.e market value added as provided in subsection 
(3) (g) of this section as a resul.t of dissol.ution of any revenue al.l.oca-
tion area; 
(f) The amount of taxabl.e market val.ue to be deducted to reflect the 
·adjustments required in paragraphs (f) (i) , (f) (ii) ..L and (f) (iii) and 
(f) (iv) of this subsection: 
(i) Any board of tax appeals or court ordered value change, if 
property has a taxable value lower than that shown on any new con-
struction roll in any one (1) of the immediate five (5) tax years 
preceding the current tax year; 
(ii) Any reduction in val.ue resulting from correction of val.ue im-
properl.y included on any previous new construction roll as a re-
sult of doubl.e or otherwise erroneous assessment; 
(iii) Any reduction in val.ue, in any one (1) of the immediate five 
(5) tax years preceding the current tax year, resulting from a 
change of land use cl.assificationL 
(iv) Any reduction in value resulting from the exemption provided 
in section 63-602W(4), Idaho Code, in any one (1) of the immediate 
five (5) tax years preceding the current tax year. 
(2) As soon as possible, but in any event by no later than the first Mon-
day in June, the new construction roll shall. be certified to the county audi-
tor and a l.isting showing the amount of value on the new const:ruction roll. in 
each taxing district or unit be forwarded to the state tax commission on or 
before the fourth Monday in Jul.y. _Provided however, the value shown in sub-
section (3) (f) of this section shall. be reported to the appropriate county 
auditor by the state tax commission by the third Monday in Jul.y and the val.ue 
sent by the county auditor to each taxing district. The value established 
pursuant to subsection (3) (f) of this section is subject to correction by the 
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state tax conanission until the first Monday in September and any such correc-
tions shall be sent to the appropriate county auditor, who shall notify any 
affected taxing districts. 
(3) The value shown on the new construction roll shall include tlie tax-
able market value increase from: 
'(a) Construction of any new s:tructure that previously did not exist; or 
(b) Additions or alterations to existing nonresidential structures; or . 
(c) Installation of new or used ma.nufactured housing that did not pre-
viously exist within the county; or 
(d) Change of l.and use classification; or 
(e) Property newly taxable as a result of loss of the exemption provided 
by section 63-602W(3) or (4), Idaho Code; or 
(f) The construction of any improvement or installation of any equip-
ment used for or in conjunction with the generation of electricity and 
the addition of any improvement or equipment intended to be so used, ex-
cept.property that has a value allocated or apportioned pursuant to sec-
tion 63-405, Idaho Code, or that is owned by a cooperative or municipal-
ity, as those terms are defined in section 61-332A, Idaho Code, or that 
is owned by a public utility, as that term is defined in section 61-332A, 
Idaho Code, owning any other property that is allocated or apportioned. 
No replacement equipment or improvements may be incl.uded; or 
(g) Increases in val.ue over the base value of property on the base 
assessment roll within an urban renewal revenue allocation area that 
:has been terminated pursuant to section 50-2909 (4), Idaho Code, to the 
extent that this increment exceeds the incremental val.ue as of December . / 
31, 2006, or, for revenue allocation areas formed after December 31, 
2006, the entire increment value. Notwithstanding other provisions of 
this section, the new construction roll shall not include new construc-
tion located within an urban renewal district's revenue allocation 
area, except as provided in this subsection (3) (g); or 
(h) New construction, in any one (1) of the inunediate five (5) tax years 
preceding the current tax year, al.l.owabl.e but never incl.uded on a new 
construction roll, provided however, that, for such property, the value 
on the new construction roll shall reflect the taxable value that would 
have been incl.uded on the new construction rol.l. for the first year in 
which the property should have been included. 
(i) Formerly exempt improvements on state college or state university 
owned land for student dining, housing, .or other education related pur-
poses approved 'by the state board of education and board of regents of 
the university of Idaho as proper for the operation of such state col-
lege or university provided however, such improvements were never in-
cluded on any previous new construction roll. 
(4) The amount of taxable market-value of new construction shall be the 
change in net taxable market val.ue that is attributabl.e directly to new con-
struction or a change in use of the I.and or l.oss of the exemption provided by 
section 63-602W(3) or (4), Idaho Code. :It shall not include any change in 
value of existing property that is due to external market forces such as gen-
eral or localized inflation, except as provided in subsection (3) (g) of this 
section. 
SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby 
declared to exist, this a~t shall be in full force and effect on and after its 
passage and approval, and retroactively to January 1, 2012. 
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SECTION 2 . EXEMPTIONS FROM OBJECT AND PROGRAM TRANSFER. LIMITATIONS. 
For fiscal year 2014, the Supreme Court is hereby exempted from the provi-
sions of Section 67-3511(1), (2) and (3), Idaho Code, allowing unlimited 
transfers between object codes and between programs, for all moneys appro-
priated to it for the period July 1, 2013, through June 30, 2014. Legislative 
appropriations shall not be transferred from one fund to another fund unless 
expressly approved by the Legislature. 
SECTION 3. NON-JUDICIAL EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION. The Legislature finds 
that investing in state employee compensation should remain a high priority 
even in tough economic times, and therefore strongly encourages agency di-
rectors, institution executives and the Division of Financial Management to 
approve the use of salary savings to provide either one-time or ongoing merit 
increases for deserving employees, and also target employees ·who are below 
policy compensation. Such salary savings could result from turnover and at-
trition, or be the result of innovation and reorganization efforts that cre-
ate savings. Such savings should be reinvested in employees. Agencies are 
cautioned to use one-time funding for one-time payments and ongoing funding 
for permanent pay increases. 
Approved April 3, 2013. 
CHAPTER 276 
(H.B. No. 242) 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO PROPERTY TAXATION; AMENDING SECTION 63-602W, IDAHO CODE, TO 
REVISE PROVISIONS RELATING TO SITE IMPROVEMENTS AS BUSINESS INVENTORY 
EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY TAXATION, TO PROVIDE THAT CERTAIN TRANSFERS SHALL 
NOT BE CONSIDERED A CONVEYANCE TO A THIRD PARTY, TO PROVIDE FOR A DE-
TERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF EXEMPTION, TO PROVIDE FOR APPLICATION FOR 
ASSESSMENT, TO PROVIDE FOR NOTIFICATION BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMIS-
SIONERS TO THE TAXPAYER AND COUNTY ASSESSOR RELATING TO ITS DECISION 
AND ASSESSMENT, TO PROVIDE FOR APPEAL, TO PROVIDE FOR NOTIFICATION OF 
CHANGE IN ELIGIBILITY AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; DECLARING AN 
EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
,SECTION 1. That Section 63-602W, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
63-602W. BUSINESS INVENTORY EXEMPT FROM TAXATION -- BUSINESS IN-
VENTORY THAT IS A COMPONENT OF REAL PROPERTY THAT IS A SINGLE FAMILY 
DWELLING. The following property is exempt from property taxation: business 
inventory. For the purpose of this section, "business inventory" means 
all items of tangible personal property or other property, including site 
improvements, described as: 
(1) All livestock, fur-bearing animals, fish, fowl and bees. 
(2) All nursery stock, stock-in-trade, merchandise, products, fin-
ished or partly finished goods, raw materials, and all forest products 
subject to the provisions of chapter 17, title 63, Idaho Code, supplies, 
containers and other personal property whieh that is held for sale or con-
sumption in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's manufacturing, farming, 
wholesale j ebbing, or merchandising business. 
(3) Residential improvements never occupied. Once residential im-
provements are occupied as defined in section 63-317, Idaho Code, they shall 
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be subject to the tax provided by section 63-317, Idaho Code. The provisions 
of section 63-602Y, Idaho Code, shall not apply to the exemption provided by 
thits subsection. The exemption provided by this subsection applies only to 
improvements to real property, and only until first occupied. For purposes 
of this section, the term "residential improvements" means only: 
(a) Single family residences; or 
(b) Residential townhouses; or 
(c) Residential condominium uni ts. 
The nonresidential portion of an improvement to real property that is used 
or is to be used for residential and nonresidential purposes does not qualify 
for the exemption provided by this section. If an improvement contains mul-
tiple residential uni ts, each such unit shall lose the exemption provided in 
this section when it becomes occupied. 
(4) Site improvements7 that are associated with land, such as roads and 
utilities, on real property held by the land developer, either as owner or 
vendee in possession under a land sale contract, for sale or consumption in 
the ordinary course of the land developer's business until other improve-
ments, such as buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or 
title ta :the land the real property is conveyed kem to a third party. For 
purposes of this subsection, a transfer of title to real property to a le-
gal entity of which at least fifty percent (50%) is owned by the land devel-
oper, the land developer's original entity or the same principals who owned 
the land developer's original entity shall not be considered a conveyance 
to a third party. For purposes of this subsection, the amount of the exemp-
tion shall be the difference between the market value of the land with site 
improvements and the market value of the land without site improvements as 
shall be determined by a comparative market analysis of a similarly situated 
parcel or parcels of real property that have not been improved with such site 
improvements contemplated by this subsection. In the case the market value 
of land without site improvements cannot be reasonably assessed because of 
the absence of comparable sales, an exemption value of seventy-five percent 
(75%) of the market value of land with site improvements shall be granted to 
that parcel. An application is required for the exemption provided in this 
subsection in the first year the exemption is claimed; in subsequent consec-
utive years no new application is required. The application must be made to 
the board of county commissioners by April 15 and the taxpayer and county as-
sessor must be notified of any decision and assessment of property by May 15. 
The decision or assessment of property, or both, of the board of county com-
missioners may be appealed to the county board of equalization no later than 
the fourth Monday in June. The applicant shall notify the board of county 
commissioners in wr"i. ting of any change in eligibility for the parcel by April 
15. 
SECTION 2. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby 
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its 
passage and approval, and retroactively to January 1, 2013. 
Law without signature. 
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REVISED REVISED REVISED REVISED REVISED REVISED 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS21234Cl 
This act amends IC 63-602W, BUSINESS INVENTORY EXEMPT FROM TAXATION and 
Section 63-301A, NEW CONSTRUCTION ROLL. 
All parcels held by l~nd developers have a taxable value and are subject to annual property 
taxes depending on current use. In the proposed bill, that portion of value created by the site 
improvements in the course of a land developer's business is exempt from property tax until a 
building begins or the title is conveyed from the land developer. 
The bill also provides that any reductioninvalu~_·as ~:.result of this act will be applied to the same 
new construction roll that had increased as a result o:fthe site improvements. This will prevent a 
tax shift to other property taxpayer properties. . . ., ; 
/"' .,, .. ;";:,. · .. : : . .. . , ,' 
Commercial, industri_aLahci r_e'sjdenti~l :Iarid ci~velopment'·provides multiple economic benefits; 
shovel ready parcel§ to'~tfra_9t new bU:sirtessesJo'the' state, enable existing bus.iness to expand, and 
increasing the yeiirly,tev~nu¢~ for:al\taxing districts.aci"osfthe st~te: Uiose :additional revenues 
will be providedlfo~efJ~;wfit~ servic~~ l:>egin{ :- :'. . . . ' . C. . :· -~~ .. \ _. : ' 
• . • • y '.~ ~; ; ' ;. ... R ~----- : • ''.t 
t -:~ .. ; ~¥ 
;;:ff;_:;,_j~\)~:"\ FISCAL -NOTE/_.=· 
,r ~ ~ v· 
. ,'...;,' 
~:. ,t • 
... 
: ..... 
. . ~ · ... 
• -I!':··- • • •• ·/~ ,- ··"·-
There is no•impactol),the·Genera:t Fund.·,. ·_ . 
' . ..: '• ,, - .~' . .: ,, .. "' 
,. 
Local Level · :· '., .1 ·,, :: , L . . ., , .. ' .. -
j:. ,,.... -~·~o..oi"' -···. -~ .... ,,,_., .... · ~¥ ., 
The fiscal im~1:tct on lq~~lgov~rh'niint :is ctifij.cult tQ cletertn_ine; Th~ fiscal impact. oftpis exemption 
could reduce tb.e·vahi.e'ofthe-New' Construction Roll-reported bythefodiVidual cptinties in 2012. If 
the value of the new cori~truction 'devdopid and subjecttp b¢i!ig r~ported· iiltbe New Construction 
Rolls is less than the. reduc,timlaia·result'of this.·-exempifon, :rev~nue available to the local taxing 
district would be lo~er.', oth~(factors will ·help 'balance the_poteritiai redu9ti6n; additional new 
construction as a result of. this· exemption and property giving up the agricultural exemption by 
discontinuing ineffective;'fartnirtg· because of this exemption. Any reduction will be temporary 
because this land will eventqally be utilized and fully taxed. 
····, ~ ,,. ' ~ .. _ . 
··,-+·;~-~- " ---
Contact: 
Name: Representative Stephen Hartgen 
Office: 
Phone: (208) 332-1000 
Statement of Purpose / fiscal Note 
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS22151 
This act amends IC 63-602W, BUSINESS INVENTORY EXEMPT FROM TAXATION. The 
State Tax Commissioners voted in November 2012 to allow the Site Improvement temporary 
administrative rule 620T to expire. They did not approve a permanent administrative rule with the 
recommendation that new legislation this session would provide the needed clarification. 
Idaho doesn't tax business inventory. In 2012, H 519, Site Improvements, was passed. H 519 
provides that the portion of additional value created by the site improvements on real property in the 
course of a land developer's business, investing their capital into raw land, is exempt from property 
taxation until a building begins or the property is conveyed from the land developer. Before this 
law, each county assessed the land developer's lot differently. Some counties made no adjustment 
the site improvements and kept the market value close to the raw land value until sold, while other 
counties assessed them at full retail value, before they were sold and required public services. 
In 2012, many of the developers who were granted this exemption received onlx a partial decrease, 
while some eligib.le land developers were denied the exemption completely. Section 63-602W(4) 
is being amended to provide clarification in determining eligibility for this exemption by defining 
land developer, when the real property is no longer eligible for the exemption and provides 
clarification in determining the value of the exemption. Some were denied an opportunity to 
appeal the exemption, so clarification is provided for the appeal process. This will provide for 
more uniform treatment across the state. 
Unlike most exemptions, these properties will eventually be taxed at full value as the marke 
improves. Land developers invest millions of dollars each year in new projects creating a greater 
tax base for all counties and Idaho needs shovel ready projects to provide for new growth. 
FISCAL NOTE 
There is no impact on the General Fund. 
Local Level 
The fiscal impact on local government will vary per county and per taxing district. Any reduction 
from this exemption is offset by the New Construction Rolls, therefore it would be difficult to 
estimate the fiscal impact. 
Contact: 
Representative Stephen Hartgen 
(208) 332-1061 
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Tuesday, March 19, 2013 
3:00 P.M. 
Room WW53 
Chairman Siddoway, Vice Chairman Rice, Senators Hill, McKenzie, Johnson, Vick, 
Bayer, Werk and Lacey 
The sign-in sheet, testimonies and other related materials will be retained with 
the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and will then be 
located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services Library. 
Chairman Siddoway called the Local Government and Taxation Committee 
(Committee) to order at 3:00 p.m. 
Senator Vick moved to approve the minutes from February 26, 2013. Senator 
Lacey seconded the motion. Motion carried by voice vote. 
Chairman Siddoway welcomed Representative Luke Malek to the podium to 
present H 138, relating to plats and vacations and acceptable methods of copying 
a plat. Representative Malek said this is a simple bill. He said it is about silver 
emulsion, which is common in film photography imaging. He said when a plat is 
recorded with the county, a copy is required as well. By current statute, that copy 
has to be made using silver emulsion , but silver emulsion has actually become quite 
rare. He said there are now other means for reaching the goals that processing 
procedure was meant to reach , which is longevity of an indelible image that would 
last throughout time. The provision in H 138 would allow for other means to be 
used to create an original plat filing copy at the time of recording with the counties. 
Representative Malek said this issue was brought to his attention by officials in 
Bonner County who had to do 300 plats but couldn't find any silver emulsion. He 
said he ran this by county clerks throughout the state, and they all seemed to be 
fine with the language. 
Senator McKenzie asked what kind of materials are used for a plat to be "coated 
with a suitable substance to assure permanent legibility" and how much it would 
cost. Representative Malek replied he can't name them specifically, but there are 
several different options that can be used that were discussed as the legislation 
was drafted. 
Senator Werk moved to send H 138 to the floor with a do pass recommendation . 
Senator Lacey seconded the motion. Motion carried by voice vote. 
Chairman Siddoway invited Representative Stephen Hartgen to the podium to 
present H 242, relating to property taxation and business inventory exempt from 
taxation. Representative Hartgen said he would give a brief overview and then 
defer his time to Brad Wills with Build Idaho. He asked the Committee to refer to 
the schematic that he said describes the purpose of the legislation. He said there 
are four stages that property goes through. First, it is agricultural or forested use, 
which is considered 'nonuse.' Next it is platted and the value is assigned and the 
typical taxes are quite low. 
EXHIBIT 
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In Stage 3, a developer would 'improve' the property, often placing infrastructure 
such as streets, roads, water, sewer, electrical , and such, the costs of which are 
borne by the developer. Then the land is sold off a bit at a time in the form of 
housing lots or commercial development, at which time it reaches its full value. 
Representative Hartgen said H 242 is a modification and clarification of H 519 that 
passed last year. It seeks to extend an exemption, not 'eliminate' an exemption , on 
the Stage 3 land that some counties were treating as fully developed, when really 
the land is vacant except for improvements. He said H 242 makes three changes 
to statute: 1) Clarification as to how the land is titled and that a transfer of title 
within the same ownership group would 'not' constitute a transfer for purposes 
of a sale, and thereby is 'not' taxed at a higher rate; 2) Assessment of the value 
of the property, which will be described further by Mr. Wills; and 3) Application 
process and how to handle appeals if they should arise. Representative Hartgen 
deferred to Mr. Wills. 
Brad Wills said he is with Build Idaho, which is an organization of land developers 
in Idaho, and he also represents the Idaho Building Contractors Association. He 
said the bill that passed last year had temporary rules on it, but there was not 
enough statutory clarification so there were implementation problems. Mr. Wills 
said the Idaho State Tax Commission decided to not present a permanent rule for 
this exemption and recommended that this exemption be clarified through the 
legislative process. 
Mr. Wills said even though a few counties, like Ada and Bonneville, did a good 
job implementing the legislation from last year, there are four problem areas that 
need clarification: ownership issues, valuation methods, application process and 
the appeal procedure. He said there was confusion regarding conveyance. He 
said the problem with valuation is that different methods were used: using only a 
percentage; or, valuating the land by first giving value to the bare ground without 
the site improvements and then giving value 'with' the site improvements, and the 
difference was the value of the exemption. He said the latter is what was intended 
with last year's legislation. 
Mr. Wills said there is new language to help with the application process. He said it 
would be redundant to have to reapply each year, because there were two triggers 
that would cause ineligibility for the exemption, as when a structure is started on 
the property or it is actually sold to a third party. The last problem led to specifying 
the appeal process. He said in Kootenai County last year, there were exemptions 
approved, but there was no opportunity to appeal the value they were given. He said 
the appeals process mirrors existing law. Mr. Wills said this bill provides enough 
clarification for counties to be able to appropriately implement the law this year. 
Chairman Siddoway asked Mr. Wills to address how they decided on the 
percentage of valuation for the exemption becoming 75 percent and if the counties 
were involved in that decision. Mr. Wills replied they had many discussions last 
year about the temporary rules on how to reach value and they could not provide 
the clarification. He said several counties, including Canyon and Kootenai , decided 
to use a percentage basis and not look at the raw land. Other counties, like Ada 
and Bonneville, did look at the raw land value and came up with different valuations. 
Mr. Wills said the counties were not part of the 75 percent valuation determination. 
He said in conversation with Canyon County Assessor Gene Keuhn and Ada 
County Assessor Bob McQuade, they discussed coming up with a percentage, 
but he said that does not treat everyone equally, because some counties do not 
increase the value for the exemption , so they would have to give a percentage 
based on something they hadn't already given. Mr. Wills said the idea came up to 
use comparative market value, which is what developers and home-builders asked 
the counties for, but the counties don't agree with limiting it to that. 
SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT & TAXATION COMMITTEE 
Tuesday, March 19, 2013-Minutes-Page 2 
000064
~ EXHIBIT 
J tr'f o~Y 
Mr. Wills said he added the idea that if they 'can't' because they don't have the 
"comps" (comparative market value) then they could use a percentage. He said 
Canyon County used 35 percent; Kootenai County used 75 percent; Ada County 
averaged 75 percent; Bonneville County averaged 87 percent; and, Twin Falls 
averaged 90 percent. He said the percentage is a default he would rather 'not' 
use, because he said the intent of the language last year was if land was fully 
developed or only raw land. He said he thinks that is truly the only way to come up 
with a fair value for the exemption. He said the counties did not come up with that 
75 percent number; he said 'he' came up with it by extrapolating the percentages 
counties around the state were using. He said half of all the exemptions last year 
were 75 percent or more. 
Chairman Siddoway asked about the transfer of ownership. He said it seemed 
that last year one of the big selling points of the bill was when the land, regardless 
of what "stage" it was in , was transferred to another entity, it would lose the 
exemption. He said now it appears that has gone by the wayside. Mr. Wills said 
Chairman Siddoway is correct about last year. He said the language says "title to 
the land is conveyed from the land developer." Mr. Wills explained the developer is 
the company that develops the land, invests the money and is able to carry it as 
business inventory. He gave an example: if a bank needed a developer to change 
ownership of property to one of their LLCs that was better funded , the developer 
can move that land from one entity to another without affecting the treatment of 
the inventory. He said if the developer went under and the bank took over the 
property, the exemption does not follow the land. He said that is still the case, so 
they needed to define how to allow the developer, in the course of his business, to 
move ownership from one entity to another. It is more of a distribution rather than a 
taxable transaction . No money is actually exchanged and there is no "sale." Mr. 
Wills said he and Alan Dornfest of the Idaho State Tax Commission came up with 
the language last December to define if a property is sold to a third party. The 
exemption does not stay with the property if the developer sells it in any way from 
himself: the exemption is lost. 
Chairman Siddoway asked about a situation he said could ralse concerns about 
"double dipping." He said he received a letter from a proponent of H 242 that 
described how a company could get tax benefits for making a change of ownership 
when they were the principle entity of both companies. For example, changing from 
Mudd Lake Builders, Inc. to Mudd Lake LLC. He said they would do that so they 
could get a tax break. He asked Mr. Wills to explain . 
Mr. Wills answered the tax benefit would not be a property tax benefit. He said 
a good example would be for estate plann ing for an older gentleman who moved 
property from personal account to an LLC that he owns. He said to do that, the 
man must convey and title it from one entity to the other, and he therefore would 
lose the exemption for that portion of the year. He is still the land developer and still 
holds the inventory on that land. Mr. Wills explained where the 50 percent comes 
in is in the IRS related party threshold , that anything more than that is a different 
entity, and as long as it is kept under 50 percent, that prevents the abuse of the 
exemption going to someone who does not deserve it. 
Senator Lacey said he was involved in this discussion and supported it last year. 
He said he has been a developer and is familiar with the costs involved , and part of 
the reason for the bill was the down economy. He said he's familiar with how much 
money is put in the ground that can't be seen until it is sold. He said this bill is for a 
developer who transfers property to an LLC that the developer owns. 
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Senator Lacey said he doesn't see in the bill where it precludes selling it to 
someone who paid the developer a higher value. He said when a developer puts 
thousands of dollars into the ground and sells it to another developer, the seller 
would charge for the work that was done, and that means to Senator Lacey that the 
value has gone up. He asked Mr. Wills if that seems correct to him. 
Mr. Wills said yes, that is a third party sale which means it is an unrelated party, 
one who is not related to the original person. That would be a conveyance of title 
that would preclude the exemption . 
Senator Werk asked about the time requirements for appeals. He asked if the 
requirement dates are the same as would apply to other taxpayers if going to the 
board of equalization. Mr. Wills answered that it mirrors the language of any 
exemption appeal process, so the dates are in statute, which are April 15, May 15 
and the fourth Monday in June. He said where it varies is they could appeal both 
the decision 'and' the valuation. 
Chairman Siddoway invited Brent Adamson , Boise County Assessor and Vice 
Chair of the Idaho Association of Counties (IAC) Legislative Committee, to the 
podium. He said he is here to oppose H 242 and provided a letter in opposition . 
(See Attachment 2.) He said he met with Mr. Wills and others to discuss corrections 
to last year's bill , but they realized they couldn't fix it in rule, and they came to an 
impasse. Mr. Adamson said they don't have a problem with the conveyance, as 
the new language means an original land developer may get to keep the exemption 
longer than they did with H 519. Mr. Adamson said they also didn't like the wording 
for the appeal process in the original draft, but that has been fixed and they do not 
have a problem with the appeal process in H 242. 
Mr. Adamson said the biggest concern is the 75 percent exemption , and they do 
not support the bill because of it. He said IAC did a survey among their counties 
after last year's assessment roll , asking how many applications were there, what 
was the average takeoff for site improvements, how did it go and what was the 
discussion. He said there was a minimum of four percent removed from current 
market value of the platted land to a maximum of 90 percent. He said the average 
was between 35 and 42 percent. He said Canyon County used the same process 
that Boise County used. They could not find a completely undeveloped platted 
lot that was sold to be able to apply market value, so instead, they went to the 
developer applicants and asked them how much they spent to help them determine 
the site exemption. He said every applicant, even those who did not qualify, 
provided him with all their data. 
Mr. Adamson said they took that data and figured out what site improvements cost 
the developers at the time the subdivision was platted. He said they calculated what 
that number was as a percentage to the value. He said they took the percentage, 
not the dollars but the percentage, and moved it forward to today's value. He said 
just moving a hard value does not address the issue that market values go up and 
down. He said obviously, markets have been going down, which necessitated the 
builders to come forward with this exemption . Mr. Adamson said the 75 percent 
exemption is rather high. He said, as Mr. Wills shared , that percentage may have fit 
half of the counties. He said his guess was that it may actually be 75 percent of the 
total 'parcels' and not total counties, but he would discuss that with Mr. Wills later. 
Mr. Adamson said he believes the 75 percent exemption should be given a sunset 
clause, or at least bring that figure down to take into consideration highs and 
lows in the market. He said either way, they want that number fixed , but the rest 
of the bill is fine. 
1 
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Senator Rice asked how many different ways the assessments are being done. 
Mr. Adamson answered that each county does set values differently, because it is 
difficult to find an equal-looking lot with equal amenities in Ada County that sells 
the same in Boise County, which is a difference between urban and rural, as well. 
He said when he did estimates, he arrived at about 33 percent as a calculation for 
takeoff of value. He said he moved that forward to current value and took that off, 
and that resulted in zero appeals granted. He said percentage-wise, Boise County 
took the largest hit in the percentage of the value of the loss. Mr. Adamson said 
the pictures provided of the four stages of value represents what 'that county' does, 
and there is not another county that does it that way. 
Senator Johnson gave·an example for Mr. Adamson to consider. He said, "If I 
have a development and on it there are two lots that are the same size, but one 
overlooks the river and the other is on the other side of the street. Is it safe to 
presume they'd have different market values, and if so, what would be the effect of 
the 75 percent value on those two lots." Mr. Adamson said, yes, it is safe to say 
that, which is another reason they don't like the 75 percent value, because it is not 
related to the market. He said 75 percent off an $80,000 lot is much different than 
75 percent off a $30,000 lot. Senator Johnson asked if it is fairly reasonable to 
assume the cost to develop those lots is approximately equal. Mr. Adamson said 
in consideration of improvements such as underground utilities, telephone poles 
and sidewalks, it would probably be identical. 
Senator Werk said it seemed the procedure for assigning a value without "comps" 
available could be promulgated by the Idaho State Tax Commission, if they 
were given the authority to do that. Mr. Adamson said he is not sure if the Tax 
Commission could do that. He said Idaho is a state driven by market values, so 
market value is an easy way to determine value. However, the comparative market 
values, "comps," are not always easy to get. He said absent market value, they 
have to do something else, and one thing they can do is look at cost. He said 
that can be done a lot more with commercial buildings than with residential. He 
said if developers want an exemption, they need to come to the assessor and tell 
them. The assessor will ask them for the cost, and the developers would provide 
that information. 
Vice Chairman Rice said he is struggling with the concept of just adding the cost 
of the improvements. He said developers buy land, develop the lots, put in the 
improvements, and sell the lots. He said it doesn't make sense for developers to 
sell the property only for the cost of the improvements, so there would not be lots 
that were being sold as just 'improved.' Vice Chairman Rice asked how that would 
be a fair assessment of the difference in value. Mr. Adamson said market value is 
just that: someone putting something up for sale and someone being willing to buy 
it. He said the problem is when there is only one or just a few lots in a subdivision, 
that doesn't dictate market value of the property. It is only "a sale." 
Mr. Adamson said they had many discussions with Mr. Wills about the intent of H 
519, and they struggled writing a rule that met the statute. He said they couldn't 
make something up, so they had to go with what the law said, and that is how they 
arrived at the practice of cost. 
Chairman Siddoway invited Steve Cope, President of SKC, to the podium. Mr. 
Cope said he has a project that was under water last year and still is this year. 
He said he spent many hours with Canyon County assessors having the same 
discussion as the one being heard today. He said there needs to be clarification of 
the statute, and he believes it should be based on market value. He said there were 
not a lot of good comparisons, but he did come up with some and put the market 
value of ten percent of the assessed value. He said his effort didn't carry any weight. 
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Mr. Cope said he disclosed his numbers to Canyon County, and the county only 
used 35 percent exemption. He said his number substantiated that his land was 17 
percent of value, so that should have substantiated an 83 percent exemption. He 
said when he left last year, he was thinking and still believes that 90 percent was 
what was presented in testimony last year, and he said he believes that to be a fair 
number, as it represents across the board, and it would still give the opportunity 
to have market value if there is a comparable sale. Mr. Cope said this legislation 
provides for 75 percent exemption if there is not a comparable sale. He said for the 
future, this is an excellent bill because it will give people like himself the ability to 
go forward with less risk with the product that is available for sale. He said he still 
thinks the exemption should be higher, but he can live with 75 percent and he's glad 
there is at lease something in writing to protect the original intent of the bill. 
Chairman Siddoway invited Jeremy Pisca, representing Idaho Building Contractors 
Association and the Idaho Association of Realtors , to the podium. Mr. Pisca said 
he thinks the discussion has gone off track a bit, since the bill doesn't have to do 
with "market value." He said it has to do with the amount of "exemptions." He said 
his personal involvement with the legislation was during negotiated rule-making 
with the Tax Commission after the passage of H 519. He said what was apparent to 
him was there were some assessors who did not want to move the ball and solve 
the issues. He said at one point they threw their hands in the air and said if they 
can't negotiate, then they will have to go back to the legislature and clarify the 
intent. He said he is baffled because the goal has not changed, which was to get a 
comparative market analysis. He said when his house gets assessed , assessors 
go and look at other properties of like kind to come up with a valuation. Mr. Pisca 
said if there is a 20 acre parcel with site improvements, compare that against a 20 
acre parcel without site improvements, and the difference in the that valuation is 
the amount of the exemption. He said he thought that seemed pretty simple, and 
he doesn't understand why some find that so difficult. 
Mr. Pisca said what they experienced was varying levels of difficulty in some 
counties, although not all counties. He said some counties very much met the spirit 
of the intent of the original legislation. He said his clients told him other counties 
were intentionally throwing up hurdles to make it more difficult to comply. He 
said they were told to open up their books, tell what they paid for asphalt, gravel , 
concrete, and all those things, none of which has any bearing on the amount of 
the exemption. He said different developers pay different costs, because some are 
more savvy than others, or maybe because one developer also owns a gravel pit 
and gets his gravel cheaper. 
Mr. Pisca said the only problem with this bill from the assessors' standpoint is 
that 75 percent exemption. However, he said , the legislation says 'first' to find a 
comparative market analysis and compare the property against similar properties. 
If other properties cannot be found , as may happen in some smaller counties that 
may not have the amount of volume for that comparison, 'only then' does the 
exemption go to the 75 percent rule. He said that is simply a fall back. 
Mr. Wills was invited back to the podium for a summary. Mr. Wills said he would 
stand for questions. Senator Johnson asked him about the transfer portion of the 
bill. He asked if an exemption goes from an LLC to a corporation , who retains the 
rights to the property, and when the property is sold in the future , who sells it, the 
land developer or the corporation. Mr. Wills answered only the landowner is eligible 
for an exemption ; it follows the physical owner of the property. The landowner 
and the company are the same person , so when it is sold , the last owner on the 
title is the one selling it. Senator Johnson asked when the land is sold , whose 
name is on it, the corporation or the LLC. 
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Mr. Wills said when the land is sold , the last owner with the title is from whom the 
title will be conveyed to the third party. Senator Johnson asked if a property is 
sold from party A to party B, who is party A. Mr. Wills answered a developer does 
not 'sell' a property from himself to himself; it could be an internal transfer or a 
"distribution ," but not a "sale." A "sale" is only to a third party, someone unrelated 
to oneself. Senator Johnson asked if a property is transferred to oneself to a 
different name, as in from ABC LLC to ABC Inc., and ABC Inc. is the entity with the 
title and then sells it to a third party, is it ABC Inc. that sells it or ABC LLC. Mr. Wills 
answered that ABC LLC and ABC Inc. are the same people, but the title would go 
from ABC Inc. to the new third party owner. 
Senator Werk asked about the conveyance or transfer of a property from an 
original entity or developer. He said statute requires that the owner retain at least 
50 percent of that ownership stake. If the developer picked up a property and did 
some extensive improvements, and Mr. Jones joins the company at 49.9 percent 
ownership stake and gave Mr. Smith a bundle of money, the value of the property 
and the exemption remains the same, even though Mr. Smith has seen a large 
realization of profit in that transfer. Senator Werk asked if he is understanding that 
correctly. Mr. Wills answered that a better example is a husband and wife who 
own something together and then get divorced . The husband is the original owner 
so the property goes with him. He said in Senator Werk's example, if a company 
owns an asset, and whether he sells 25 or 30 percent of it, it is unrelated to the 
exemption. As long as the ownership doesn't change more than 50 percent from 
the original owner, the property retains that exemption. As soon as that trigger is 
pulled, then the owner loses the exemption . 
Mr. Wills explained further. He said if a business owner sells 50 percent of the 
company to Senator Johnson and the other 50 percent to Senator Lacey, they now 
own the company, but no title of property has changed hands, only the company 
changed haods. Mr. Wills said they closed that loophole by including the language 
"original developers" who put in improvements. 
Vice Chairman Rice moved to send H 242 to the floor with a do pass 
recommendation . Senator Vick seconded the motion. Motion carried by voice 
vote. Vice Chairman Rice will carry the bill on the floor. 
Chairman Siddoway said Representative Mike Moyle was unable to attend 
today, so he invited Jay Larson , CEO and President of Idaho Technology Council 
(Council), to the podium, to present H 243, relating to sales taxation and application 
software accessed over the internet. Mr. Larson said the Council is an industry 
organization focused growing innovation and knowledge in a knowledge-based 
economy in Idaho. He said they represent about 40,000 jobs in Idaho companies. 
Mr. Larson said the discussion today is about "cloud services. " He said Rick Smith, 
who has years of tax law experience with Hawley Troxell, will speak more about 
that and Jeff Sayer, Director of the Department of Commerce, will share more about 
the importance about this industry and this legislation. Mr. Larson defined cloud 
services as when a customer pays a subscription for a service to a provider that 
has a server the customer can access for computing services , storage services, 
processing services and analytical services. The method by which they access it 
is over the internet or wireless service. Mr. Larson said the legislation has been 
carefully crafted as a "definition" and not an "exemption ," as recommended by 
dozens of industry companies and through extensive dialogue with the Idaho State 
Tax Commission (Commission). 
EXHIBIT --.. ,,,.. 
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HOUSE REVENUE & TAXATION COMMITTEE 
Tuesday, March 05, 2013 
9:00 A.M. 
Room EW42 
Chairman Collins, Vice Chairman Wood(35), Representatives Barrett, Moyle, 
Raybould, Denney, Anderson(31), Anderst, Dayley, Hartgen, Kauffman, Patterson, 
Trujillo, Burgoyne, Erpelding, Meline 
None. 
Brad Wills, Developers; Brent Adamson, Idaho Association of Counties; Gene 
Kuehn, Canyon County Assessor; N.L. Clayville, DFM, Steve Cope, SKC, Inc.; Mike 
Chakarun, Idaho State Tax Commission; Donna Yule, IPEA; Tyler Mallard, Risch 
Pisca; David Turnbull, Brighton Corporation; Brad Miller, Van Auker Properties; 
John Eaton, Realtors; Jayson Ronk, Idaho Association of Commerce & Industry; 
Jeremy Pisca, Risch Pisca. 
Chairman Collins called the meeting to order at 9:00 a.m. 
Rep. Burgoyne made a motion to approve the minutes of March 4, 2013. Motion 
carried by voice vote. 
Rep. Hartgen presented H 242 which would amend Idaho Code 63-602W related 
to Business Inventory Exempt From Taxation. This legislation would provide 
clarification in determining property tax exemption for site improvements made to 
real property, by developers, until the property is conveyed from the developer or 
building of a structure begins. Undeveloped land that moves into an improved stage 
by the developer, having no source of income or permanent structure, the land is 
then assessed as having an increased value. There is inconsistency throughout 
the various counties as to how the assessment is calculated. In cases where the 
market value of the land without site improvements cannot be determined, due to a 
lack of comparable value, the exemption value of 75% of market value of land with 
site improvements will be used. 
Rep. Hartgen introduced Brad Wills, Twin Falls land developer and representing 
120 various land developers in Idaho. Mr. Wills is also a member of Idaho Builders 
Association. Mr. Wills is seeking clarification of H 519 passed in 2012 and is in 
support of H 242. Idaho does not tax business inventory and a product is not taxed 
until the time of sale. Mr. Wills stated taxing land with underground improvements 
is the same as taxing inventory. He has met with county representation, assessors 
and developers and discussion focused on two major issues; defining a land 
developer and eligibility. Mr. Wills' position is that the exemption should be removed 
when the land is conveyed from the land developer to a third party or when a 
building is constructed. He stated there is a need for a clear understanding on 
how to value the exemption and how an appeal is handled. Currently, there is no 
consistency and each county is handling it differently. Generally, taking an appeal 
to the Board of Equalization (BOE) is a first step before an appeal can be heard by 
the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA). The taxpayer needs to have the option to appeal 
either the exemption itself or the value of the assessment with a consistent process. 
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In response to a question, Mr. Wills clarified that conveyance to a third party 
is transfer to an entity that is not the land developer. County assessors have 
communicated that this legislation is not clear and out of the 44 counties, some 
support this legislation and some do not. Mr. Wills believes that this legislation 
provides the clarification needed. Reps. Burgoyne and Anderson invoked Rule 
38 and stated they intend to vote. 
Mr. Wills responded to a question stating the appeal application goes to the county 
auditor or commissioner, not the assessor for initial appeal. Mr. Wills stated he has 
worked all of last year with the County Assessors Association and despite many 
conversations, they have agreed to disagree. 
Brent Adamson, Boise County Assessor, Vice Chair of IAC Legislative Committee, 
stated that assessors typically don't like any exemptions. In 2012 H 519 passed 
in spite of opposition by the county assessors. IAC and county assessors agree 
that the conveyance language does need to be changed to improve the current 
legislation. Bare land that has gone through the subdivision process has a different 
value than raw land. The assessment process is driven by statute. The arbitrary 
value of 75% exemption value is problematic, does not clarify current law, and 
creates more problems. Mr. Adamson feels the bill could be improved with a 
sunset clause. 
Gene Kuehn, Canyon County Assessor and Chair of Assessors Association Rules 
Committee testified in opposition to H 242. Mr. Kuehn stated the 75% is arbitrary 
and does not believe it is equitable. In response to a question regarding a tax shift 
from land in development to other taxpayers, especially for things like school bonds, 
Mr. Kuehn stated it does shift the tax burden. In Canyon County last year, there 
was $7 .2 million in value 'taken off the books' and shifted to other taxpayers. 
Appeals in valuation of property in Canyon County are permitted to go directly 
to the BOTA. Mr. Kuehn stated if there is property value on the books and that 
value is removed, the income generated through taxes paid will shift to other 
taxpayers. In response to a question, Mr. Kuehn clarified that even when an 
adjustment is made to the budget, a tax shift still occurs, but the percentage may 
be less. Farm land has a value and when sold the value doesn't change until the 
use changes. When the roads go in, lots are created, and building permits are 
granted, the land is now ready to be developed. With these changes, the land is 
now compared to other developed lots in order to come up with a cor:nparable 
value. Site improvements such as streets, curbs, gutter power are not individually 
assessed but are considered as having a contributory value. The improvements 
contribute value to the land, even if there is no building. 
Steve Cope, SKC Inc. spoke in support of H 242. Mr. Cope has previously gone 
through the appeal process with Canyon County and believes some kind clarity 
and rule is needed. SKC has had property assessed in excess of $75,000 per 
acre, even with the 30% exemption. That assessment does not reflect a realistic 
market value. Mr. Cope has been before both the BOE and BOTA with appeals and 
believes that there is a need to be able to limit the valuation of assessments. Mr. 
Cope stated in the past, even when taxing the value of land with entitlements, he 
has never paid more than $25,000 per acre, and that was in 'good times'. There is 
inconsistency between counties and Mr. Cope would like to see a straight market 
value, however, he feels he has not gotten anywhere in his year long discussions 
with Canyon County. 
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David Turnbull , President, Brighton Corp. spoke in support of H 242 and believes 
H 519 is working. He complimented Ada County for their efforts in working with 
developers. Ada County arrived at a 75% exemption on residential ground in 
development. Mr. Turnbull stated if property is assessed phase by phase, the 
valuation process gets complicated . He stated that conveyance is not sequential 
and that a third party is an unrelated party. If property is transferred to an unrelated 
party, that is when the exemption would cease. Mr. Turnbull believes that county 
assessors should apply and not set policy. If a reverse argument was used on 
the issue of tax shift, for years the homeowners exemption enjoyed by residential 
owners has essentially shifted the tax burden to businesses. Idaho should be 
looking for what is best to grow the general economy. 
Brad Miller, Van Auker Properties of Meridian, stated that Ada County did an 
excellent job in implementing H 519 but acknowledges that it does vary county by 
county. The market value of raw land and market value of finished lots is different. 
It is Mr. Miller's past experience that upon transfer of property from an individual to 
an LLC, all exemptions were lost due to the unclear language in the current law. Mr. 
Miller spoke to the issue of tax shift stating if the issue was finished lots, the tax shift 
argument could be made. However, it is more accurate to look at the future value, 
since the lots are in the development process. If lots sit vacant, there is no shift, 
as the assessed value is not being reduced. In response to a question, Mr. Miller 
stated with the changes in H 242, Van Auker Properties would be better off, as they 
would be eligible for exemptions previously lost. The goal is to have finished lots, 
that are ready to go and be sold quickly. If they are assessed at full value, they are 
less likely to have those lots ready for development since the tax burden would be 
greater. Mr. Miller responded to a question, saying it is his belief H 242 does not 
provide a new exemption but clarifies how the current exemption should work. 
Jeremy Pisca, attorney with Risch Pisca, and representing the Idaho Building 
Contractors Association spoke in support of H 242. Mr. Pisca stated simply 
because infrastructure like roads are in place does not automatically increase 
the value. Typically, there are not additional services provided because of the 
improvements. Some counties have implemented H 519 the way it was intended, 
and it is working for them. There are also a number of counties who did not 
implement in the same way, and this has caused problems. In attempting to get 
resolution , Mr. Pisca has met with the Idaho State Tax Commission and the 
assessors. Mr. Pisca stated in his opinion there was not an intent to help or clarify 
but just to delay. When there is no comparable market value, developers have been 
asked to 'open up their books' and show the amount of investment spent on site 
improvements. That is not the way valuation is assessed . 
In response to a question , Mr. Pisca stated he does not have an opinion on whether 
H 242 would violate current law. This is not an exemption that is intended to be 
more difficult and whether or not H 242 is passed, some clarification is essential. In 
response to a question, Mr. Pisca did clarify that once the site is built up or sold to 
a third party, the exemption goes away. The exemption would only be applied to 
bare land that has subsurface improvements in place. 
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VOTE OIN THE 
SUBSTITUTE 
MOTION: 
VOTE ON THE 
MOTION: 
ADJOURN: 
Tony Poinelli, Idaho Association of Counties, responded to a question regarding 
whether H 242 violates current Idaho Code 63-205 stating that Idaho is a market 
value state and specifying a percentage of the exemption would be a violation . 
Mr. Poinelli believes the 75% exemption was arrived at by taking an average of . 
statewide actual. 
Mr. Wills clarified that this legislation is a Business Inventory Exempt From 
Taxation, not a developers discount. Mr. Wills stated the 75% exemption rate did 
not come as a suggestion from the counties. 
Rep. Barrett made a motion to send H 242 to the floor with a DO PASS 
recommendation. 
Rep. Wood(35) made a substitute motion to HOLD H 242 in committee for further 
clarification. 
Rep. Anderst invoked Rule 38 and stated he intended to vote. 
Roll call vote was requested. Motion failed by a vote of 7 AYE, B_NAY, 1 
Absent/Excused. Voting in favor of the motion: Reps. Wood(35), Raybould, 
Denney, Dayley, Kauffman, Trujillo, Erpelding. Voting in opposition to the 
motion: Reps. Barrett, Anderson(31 ), Anderst, Hartgen, Patterson, Burgoyne, 
Meline, Collins. Rep. Moyle was absent/excused. 
Chairman Collins called for a vote on the original motion to send H 242 to the 
floor with a DO PASS recommendation. Motion carried by voice vote. Reps. 
Wood(35), Trujillo, Meline, and Kauffman requested to be recorded as voting 
NAY. Rep. Hartgen will sponsor the bill on the floor. 
There being no further business to come before the committee, the meeting was 
adjourned at 10:41 a.m. 
Representative Collins 
Chair $
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CASE NO. CV OC 2013-7673 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Did the Ada County Board of Equalization ("BOE") wrongfully deny the Petitioner, Jayo 
Development, Inc., the I.C. § 63-602W(4) "site improvements property tax exemption" for tax 
year 2012, which exemption was first adopted by the Idaho Legislature in 2012 and made 
effective retroactive to January 1, 2012? 
,•, 




. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which a court exercises free review. 
Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201, 204, 46 P.3d 18, 21 (2002). Statutory 
interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, giving the language its plain, obvious 
and rational meaning. International Ass 'n of Firefighters, Loe. No. 672 v. City of Boise City, 136 
Idaho 162, 169-170, 30 P.3d 940, 947-48 (2001). Where a statute is clear, the court must follow 
the law as written and consequently there is no occasion for application for rules of construction. 
Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 138-39, 804 P.2d 308, 311-12 (1990). A statute is ambiguous 
where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction. Porter v. Bd. of 
Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (2004). When a 
statute is found to be ambiguous, then the Court should consider not only the literal words of the 
statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the 
statute, and its legislative history in order to discern and implement the intent of the legislature. 
Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 881, 231 P.3d 524, 526 (2009). When the legislature has 
acted to clarify ambiguous language in a statute, then that clarifying language should be 
consulted by the court to determine the legislature's original intent in enacting the statute. State 
. v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120,123,294 P.3d 1132, 1135 (2012) (and cases cited therein). 
The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to "eliminate the necessity of trial 
where the facts are not in dispute and where existent and undisputed facts lead to a conclusion of 
law which is certain." Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441, 444, 690 P.2d 896 (1983). Summary 
judgment can be granted "if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the 
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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Smith v. Meridian Joint 
School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583 (1996); Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 
269, 923 P.2d 976 (1996). The opposing party "may not rest on the mere allegations or denials 
of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or otherwise pleaded in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e); 
Smith, supra. Further, the opposing party's case may not rest on mere speculation because a 
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. Cameron v. 
Neil, 130 Idaho 898, 950 P.2d 1237 (1997). A nonmoving party's failure to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which that 
party bears the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment in favor of that 
moving party. Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 842 P.2d 288 (Ct.App.1992); Smith, supra. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The "Site Improvements" Exemption Statute, As First Adopted In 2012, Did Not 
Require That Jayo Development Had To Have Installed The Improvements, Or 
That It Was The Original Developer, In Order To Be Entitled To That Exemption 
Subsection (4) ofl.C. § 63-602W, as originally enacted in 2012, Chapter 192 of the Laws 
of 2012, pp. 517-518, and made retroactive in its effect to January 1, 2012, simply declared as 
follows: 
63-602W. Business inventory exempt from taxation - Business 
inventory that is a component of real property that is a single family 
dwelling. - The following property is exempt from property taxation: business 
inventory. For the purpose of this section, ''business inventory'' means all items 
of tangible personal property or other property described as: 
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(4) Site improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and 
utilities, on real property held by the land developer for sale or consumption in 
the ordinary course of the land developer's business until other improvements, 
such as buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or title to the 
land is conveyed from the land developer. 
(Emphasis added). 
Subsection (4), as originally enacted in 2012, was entirely silent in respect to: (1) the 
identity of the entity or person who had installed the site improvements to which the exemption 
attached, and as to, (2) any time requirement concerning when those exemptions had been 
installed, in order to qualify for this site improvements property tax exemption. It is undisputed 
in this case that the site improvements at issue had been installed prior to the enactment of this 
exemption in 2012, and that Jayo Development, Inc. was the owner of those site improvements, 
by virtue of its ownership of the development lots at the time this exemption was first enacted in 
2012. 
The only requirement imposed on the face of subsection ( 4) at the time it was first 
enacted in 2012 was that the site improvements for which an exemption was claimed were "held 
!!Y the land developer for sale or consumption in the ordinary course of the land developer's 
business .... " (emphasis added). Indisputably, the site improvements for which the exemption 
was claimed in 2012 were in fact held by Jayo Development, Inc., as the "land developer" for 
sale or consumption in the ordinary course of Jayo's business at the time it made its claim for 
that exemption. In its own motion for summary judgment Ada County only disputes the fact 
Jayo Development, Inc., was not the actual entity that made or installed the site improvements on 
the 41 parcels that are at issue as the only factor that disqualifies it from being entitled to the site 
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improvements property tax exemption. See, Ada County Summary Judgment Memorandum at 
pg. 5. 
As a general rule, a newly enacted statute cannot be applied to conduct that occurred 
before that statute was enacted, unless the statute has been expressly declared retroactive by the 
legislature. J.C. § 73-101; and State v. Daicel Chemical Industries, Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 105, 
106 P.3d 428, 431 (2005). While subsection (4) was made retroactive, it was only made 
retroactive to January 1, 2012. Chapter 192 of the Laws of 2012, § 3 at pg. 519. Consequently, 
it does not apply to the allegedly disqualifying conduct upon which Ada County relies, which 
occurred before 2012. 
The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals, in upholding the Ada County Board of Equalization, 
stated that the Petitioner here, Jayo Development, Inc., "is not the type of land developer 
referenced in the statute." Final Decision and Or~er on l\1,ppeal at pg. 5. In support of this 
conclusion the Board of Tax Appeals reasoned as follows: 
Site improvements were added to the subject lots by Jayo Construction, Inc. 
sometime prior to 2008. Appellant a different legal entity did not take title to the 
subject parcels, and did not exist, until 2010. The last transfer to Appellant 
represented the fourth conveyance of the subject lots .... 
Final Decision and Order on appeal at pg. 5. Although tax exemptions are to be narrowly 
construed against the taxpayer, who must demonstrate a clear entitlement, Corporation of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 
415-16, 849 P.2d 83, 88-89 (1993), those exemptions are subject to a strict but reasonable rule 
of statutory construction. Id. 
There is no language on the face of subsection ( 4), as enacted in 2012, that supports any 
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requirement that the land developer that is requesting the exemption either "constructed" or 
"installed" those site improvements for which the exemption is being requested. Instead, the 
statute only declares that those "site improvements" must be, at the time the request for 
exemption is made, "held by the land developer for sale or consumption in the ordinary course 
of the land developer's business .... " (emphasis added). Once a land developer has qualified 
for the site improvements property tax exemption, there are then two triggering events by which 
th~t exemption expires. Once the building of the structural components of the project begins, or 
the land is conveyed from the land developer. 
Likewise, the statute provides no textual support for the interpretation that has been 
applied by the Ada County Board of Equalization and affirmed by the Idaho Board of Tax 
Appeals that this site improvements property tax exemption is in any way limited to: (a) only the 
original land developer, or (b) that it can only be claimed one time, and (c) that in all situations 
which may thereafter arise, this site improvements property tax exemption can never be claimed 
a second time by any subsequent land developer owner, regardless of actual use or purpose to 
which the land is being put which may otherwise qualify it for the site improvements exemption. 
Article VII, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution empowers the Idaho Legislature to, "allow such 
exemptions from taxation from time to time as shall seem necessary and just, . . . . " 
Notwithstanding the rule of strict construction that generally applies to the interpretation of tax 
exemptions, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that such exemptions must be given a 
"practical" construction. Idaho State Tax Com 'n v. Haener Bros., Inc., 121 Idaho 741, 746-47, 
828 P.2d 304, 309-310 (1992), citing to, Richardson v. State Tax Comm'n, 100 Idaho 705,'708, 
604 P.2d 719, 722 (1979). On its face, LC.§ 63-602W(4) provided a site improvements property 
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tax exemption to which Jayo Development, Inc. was entitled in 2012, and the Idaho Tax 
Commission erred in denying that exemption to Jayo, and should now be reversed on this appeal. 
B. The Legislature Never Intended For Land Developers Such As Jayo Development 
To Be Denied the Site Improvements Property Tax Exemption 
The 2013 amendments to the site improvements property tax exemption codified at LC. § 
63-602W(4) do not - on their face - apply to the decision of this appeal. Those amendments 
declared that they are retroactive to January 1, 2013. See, Chapter 276 of the Laws of 2013, § 2 
at pg. 715. Notwithstanding that fact, the underlying legislative purpose and effect in enacting 
those 2013 amendments to the subsection (4) site improvements property tax exemption. is 
extremely relevant to the decision of this appeal. 
The Idaho Legislature clarified that eligible "site improvements" included those held by 
either a land developer as owner or a vender in possession under a land sale contract. There is no 
requirement that only the original developer who made or installed the site improvements is 
eligible for the tax exemption. In addition, the Legislature further clarified that the exemption is 
only lost upon a conveyance to a "third party," and that any conveyance in which the same 
principals are primarily involved will not be considered such a third party conveyance. These 
clarifications eliminate the grounds upon which Jayo Development, Inc. was found to be 
ineligible for the exemption in 2012. 
A general and frequently applied rule of statutory construction is one which declares that 
when the legislature amends a statute it is presumed that a change in the law is intended. See 
e.g., Erickson v. Idaho Board of Registration of Professional Engineers, 146 Idaho 852,856,203 
P.3d 1251, 1255 (2009). That particular rule of statutory construction has no application 
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whatsoever to the Idaho Legislature's amendment of the site improvements property tax 
exemption in 2013. 
What the Idaho Legislature very clearly, and very unequivocally, expressed in its 2013 
amendment of I.C. § 63-602W(4), which was passed only one year after it first enacted that site 
improvements property tax exemption in 2012, was only a "clarification of its original intent," 
rather than any declaration of any intended change in the law. Authority for the interpretation of 
the 2013 amendments as clarifying existing law, rather than changing that law, is supported by 
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court both as issued late last year, and from as far back as 1921. 
See, State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 123, 294 P.3d 1132, 1135 (2012) ("[A] change to the 
application or substantive meaning of a statute is not the only reason for legislative amendment; 
the legislature also makes amendments to clarify or strengthen the existing provisions of a 
statute. Pearl v. Bd. of Prof'! Discipline of Idaho State Bd .. of Med., 13 7 Idaho 107, 113-14, 44 
P.3d 1162, 1168-69 (2002); State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 (1999); 
Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731, 735, 963 P.2d 1168, 1172 (1998); State ex rel. 
Wright v. Headrick, 65 Idaho 148, 156, 139 P.2d 761, 763 (1943)"); and In re Segregation of 
School Dist. No. 58from Rural High School District No. 1, 34 Idaho 222,200 P. 138 (1921). 
A review of both the House Revenue & Taxation Committee Minutes and the Senate 
Local Government & Taxation Committee Minutes, the relevant portions of which are attached 
to the Affidavit of Michael R. Jones, reveals that the intent behind the enactment of the 2013 
amendments to I.C. § 63-602W(4) was to clarify the operation of the original 2012 site 
improvements property tax exemption. (See e.g., "Mr. Miller responded to a question, saying it 
is his belief H 242 does not provide a new exemption but clarifies how the current exemption 
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should work." House Revenue & Taxation Committee, Tuesday March 05, 2013-Minutes-Page 
3). 
The most fundamental objective of statutory construction is to follow and to fulfill 
legislative intent. Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium or Community Center 
Dist., 146 Idaho 202,204, 192 P.3d 1026, 1028 (2008). Both the text of LC.§ 63-602W(4) and 
the clarifying amendments enacted in 2013 reveal that the Idaho Legislature's original intent in 
2012, when that section was first enacted creating the site improvements property tax exemption, 
was to provide that exemption to all developers who then held such property. There was no 
requirement that the owning developer had actually made that investment, or that the entity or 
person then owning the land was the same entity or person who might have previously owned the 
land, so long as the applicant qualified as a "developer." The clear Legislative intention was to 
provide much needed property tax relief to those developers who were actually holding land for 
anticipated future deyelopment during the "Great Recession" in the anticipation of better times, 
and not to provide only a very narrow benefit only to the original investing developer, who 
through no fault of his own may have been forced into several entity transformations as a result 
of the recent difficult economic times. 




This Court should reverse the decision of the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals and find that 
the Petitioner Jayo Development, Inc. was entitled to the site improvements property tax 
exemption granted under I.C. § 63-602W(4) for 2012. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of July, 2013. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ada County has based its July 24, 2012 Statement of Facts upon the "Stipulation of 
Facts" that was signed by both parties and admitted into evidence by the Idaho Board of Tax 
Appeals. In that statement of facts Ada County describes the land development ownership 
concernip,g Jayo Construction, Inc., ("Ja~o I") that existed between November 1979 ~d 
December 26, 2008; and the land development ownership concerning Jayo Construction LLC 
("Jayo 11") that existed between December 31, 2008 and August 19, 2010. It is undisputed that 
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as of January 1, 2012 - the date the site improvements property tax exemption that is at issue in 
this action went into effect - that the Petitioner, Jayo Development, Inc. was the owner of each 
of the identified parcels that are at issue in this case. 
As to these particular facts, Ada County is correct in its declaration that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact in this case that would preclude this Court's grant of 
summary judgment. The Petitioner Jayo Development, Inc. concurs in this statement as made by 
Ada County. The question which persists is whether any of these facts as stated by Ada County 
concerning matters that occurred before 2012 are of any particular relevance to the questions that 
are presented to this Court for decision in the application of the LC. § 63-602W(4) site 
improvements property tax exemption for 2012. Ada County has concluded Part A of its 
Statement of Pacts with the following declaration: 
As of January 1, 2012, Petitioner owned each of the Parcels, was in the business 
of land developing, and held the Parcels for sale or consumption in the ordinary 
course of its business. 
Ada County Statement of Facts at pp. 2-3. Because both parties to this action agree as to this 
single statement of fact, then all that is left for this Court to decide is the question of law as to the 
Petitioner Jayo Development, Inc.'s entitlement to the site improvements property tax exemption 
for the 41 lots that are at issue for the year 2012. 
Signed this 31 st day of July, 2013. 
Attorney for 
Jayo Development, Inc. 
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CASE NO. CV OC 2013-7673 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
ADA COUNTY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
' r ( 
. .,;. .. · ,, , 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
This matter is pending on de novo appeal before this Court from the April 4, 2013 
decision of the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals (hereinafter, "the Board"). The Board in its decision 
relied only upon the text of LC. § 63-602W(4) in declaring that the Petitioner, Jayo 
Development, Inc., was not entitled to the site improvement property tax exemption for 41 
separate subdivision lots that are located in seven different developments in Ada County. 
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Although the site improvements property tax exemption was not enacted until 2012, and there is 
no dispute that Jayo Development, Inc. is otherwise a qualified developer who owns those 41 
lots, the Board concluded that a "conveyance" by the prior developer who installed the 
improvement, even though occurring before the 2012 enactment of the statute, caused the 
exemption to be lost. See, Board Decision at pg. 6. 
Ada County has requested summary judgment on this de novo review on the basis that: 
(1) the Petitioner Jayo Development, Inc. did not install the site improvements, and (2) the 
exempt status of the parcels was lost when they were conveyed to a related party land developer 
entity in either 2005 or 2008. In addition, Ada County also revives the argument that the now-
lapsed Temporary Rule 620 should be applied to the determination of this appeal. 
As further argued below, Rule 620 was allowed to lapse for the very good reason that it 
was promulgated in excess of delegated legislative authority. When first enacted I.C. § 63-
602W(4) was only made retroactive to January 1, 2012 and on its face it contained no 
requirement that it was only applicable to developers who had actually installed the 
improvements. Problems in implementing I.C. § 63-602W( 4) became immediately apparent, and 
clarifying amendments were enacted in 2013, making it clear that developers, such as the 
Petitioner Jayo Development, Inc., were intended to benefit from that exemption from its initial 
enactment in 2012. Therefore, this Court should reverse the decision of the Idaho Board of Tax 
Appeals, and reject the Ada County Board of Equalization's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
As a matter of further background, it bears noting that Jayo Development has been granted 
the site improvements exemption for these very same lots for tax year 2013. 
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I.C. § 63-602W(4) Has No Retroactive Force To Events Prior To January 1, 2012 
As originally enacted in 2012 LC. § 63-602W( 4) declared as follows: 
(4) Site improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and 
utilities, on real property held by the land developer for sale or consumption and 
in the ordinary course of the land developer's business until other improvements, 
such as buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or title to the 
land is conveyed from the land developer. An application is required for the 
exemption provided in this subsection. 
(Emphasis added). Chapter 192 of the Laws of 2012, § 1 at pg. 518. An emergency was 
declared in § 3 of the Act making it retroactive only to January 1, 2012. On that date the 41 
parcels at issue were held as inventory by Jayo Development, Inc. as a developer, and have not 
been conveyed from Jayo Development, Inc. since that time. Nonetheless, the Ada County 
Board of Equalization and the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals have applied this statute to deny Jayo 
Development, Inc., the benefit of the site improvements exemption by retroactively applying this 
statute to events that occurred well before January 1, 2012. These actions violate the general 
prohibition against the retroactive application of statutes that is stated in LC. § 73-101: 
73-101. Codes not retroactive. - No part of these compiled laws is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
See generally, Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427,431,224 P.3d 494,498 (2010). In 
the absence of statutorily-granted authority, neither the Ada County Board of Equalization, nor 
the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals had the right to deny the site improvements exemption to Jayo 
Development, Inc. as based upon conduct and transactions that occurred before the effective date 
of that statute. 
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B. Temporary Rule 620, As Promulgated, Was In Excess Of Authority 
The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals expressly disclaimed any reliance upon now-lapsed 
temporary rule 620. "Where the Board has relied solely on the terms of the statute in its 
determination that Appellant does not qualify for the site improvements exemption, we need not 
decide Appellant's claim that Temporary Rule goes beyond the scope of the statute." See, Board 
Decision at pg. 6. Ada County's argument in support of its motion for summary judgment in this 
case is based almost exclusively upon the terms of the now-lapsed Temporary Rule 620. The 
distinction comes down to the fact that the site improvements exemption as enacted by the 
Legislature does not require the developer to have made the improvements to the parcels while 
Temporary Rule 620 added that requirement. Therefore, Ada County's entire argument in 
opposition to Jayo Development Inc.'s request for the site improvements property tax exemption 
comes down to just this one point: "In this case, although Petitioner meets three of the four 
requirements of Rule 620 [footnote omitted), Petitioner's Parcels are not eligible for site 
improvements exemption because Petitioner did not make or cause to be made the site 
improvements on the Parcels." See, Ada County SUlillli.ary Judgment M~mo at pg. 5 
(bracketed reference to, "footnote omitted," and underlined/bold emphasis, added). 
A simple distinction exists between LC. § 63-602W(4) and the now-lapsed Temporary 
Rule 620. The statute, which became operative as of January 1, 2012 contained no requirement 
that a developer entitled to that exemption had to have made or installed the site improvements. 
Temporary Rule 620 added that requirement, and in doing so acted in excess of its delegated 
authority. It is a long-standing rule of law in Idaho - especially as applied to Idaho Tax 
Commission Rules - that a court will not enforce an administrative regulation that is in effect a 
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rewriting of the statute. See e.g., Moses v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 118 Idaho 676, 680-81, 
799 P.2d 964, 968-69 (1990) and the cases cited therein. Therefore Ada County's reliance upon 
the language of now-lapsed Temporary Rule 620, which pervades almost the entirety of its 
summary judgment argument, should be categorically rejected. 
C. Temporary Rule 620, Has Now Lapsed, And Is Of No Further Authority 
As stated in footnote 4 at pg 6 of Ada County's summary judgment brief, on November 
28, 2012 the Idaho State Tax Commission voted to allow Temporary Rule 620 to expire. 
Considering that this rule was only first promulgated in April 2012 after the enactment of LC. § 
63-602W(4), it had a very short life, even as made retroactive January 1, 2012. 
A general rule of appellate review is that an appellate court must apply the law that is in 
effect at the time it renders its decision. Grant v. City of Twin Falls, 120 Idaho 69, 72, 813 P.2d 
880, 883 (1991), citing to, Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281, 89 S.Ct. 518, 526, 21 
L.Ed.2d 474 (1969). Based upon both the 2013 amendments to I.C. § 63-602W(4), which 
expressly declared a legislative purpose to clarify the original 2012 legislative intent in enacting 
LC.§ 63-602W(4), and the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals express disclaimer of any reliance upon 
Temporary Rule 620, it now seems quite anomalous indeed for Ada County to resurrect the now-
lapsed Temporary Rule 620 as the primary basis upon which it argues for the denial of the site 
improvements property tax exemption to Jayo Development, Inc. As already argued above, that 
rule was adopted in excess of statutory authority. As argued in the final section below, the 2013 
clarifying amendments established the legislature's original intent to make this exemption 
available to entities such as Jayo Development, Inc., beginning at the time of its first adoption in 
2012. Therefore, this Court should categorically reject Ada Counties reliance upon Temporary 
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Rule 620 to deny Jayo Development the 2012 tax exemption. 
D. The 2013 Clarifying Amendments Establish Jayo's Entitlement To The Exemption 
This matter is on de novo appeal from the decision of the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals. 
The Board at pp. 5-6 of its decision relied only upon the provisions of I.C. § 63-602W( 4) in 
denying the site improvements exemption to Jayo Development, Inc. for 2012. In doing so the 
Board relied upon actions that occurred prior to the enactment of the statute in 2012, which have 
already been addressed in Part A of this argument. The Board also relied upon several 
conveyances between entities that occurred prior to the enactment of the statute in 2012 as being 
disqualifying concluding that, "A plain reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that a 
conveyance from the land developer causes the exemption to be lost." See, Board Decision at 
pg. 0. 
In addition to the issues that have been raised on this appeal, other concerns, such as the 
amount at which this site improvements exemption should be set, had also arisen during the first 
year of its implementation in 2012. The 2013 amendments to I.C. § 63-602W(4) also addressed 
these other, unrelated issues, and because that portion of the amendment was quite lengthy, and 
is not at issue here, it has not been included in the quotation of the amendatory language that was 
added to I.C. § 63-602W(4) in 2013 as is set out immediately below: 
(4) Site improvements that are associated with land, such as roads and 
utilities, on real property held by the land developer, either as owner or vendee 
in possession under a land sale contract, for sale or consumption in the ordinary 
course of the land developer's business until other improvements, such as 
buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or the real property is 
conveyed to a third party. For purposes of this subsection, a transfer of title 
to real property to a legal entity of which at least fifty percent (50%) is 
owned by the land developer, the land developer's original entity or the same 
principals who owned the land developer's original entity shall not be 
considered a conveyance to a third party .... 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
ADA COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 6 
000094
(Underlined/bold language added by 2013 amendment). The Idaho Legislature by the addition 
of this language to LC. § 63-602W(4) has now made it unmistakably clear that there never was 
any intent to limit the site improvements property tax exemption to only those land developers 
who had made the original improvement. Consequently, Jayo Development, Inc., as the 




Ada County's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 31 st day of July, 2013. 
ichael R. Jones 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
Jayo Development, Inc. 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a telephonic hearing on the Petitioner's Motion for. 
Summary Judgment in the above-captioned matter is set for August 28, 2013, at 1 :30 p.m. 
(Mountain Time), at the Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court, 253 3rd Avenue 
North, Twin Falls, Idaho. Parties may participate by telephone by dialing the number l-215-
446-0193 and when prompted entering participant code 406128, followed by the # sign. If you 
have trouble connecting telephonically for any reason please call 1-208-736-3011. 
DATED Awe,. 7. NJ);; 
J 
District Judge 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING ON PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT • 1 -
S:\ORDERS\Civil Cases\Jayo Develop v. AdaCty Bd ofEquallzation\Noticc ofHearing (MSJ Il).docx 
•\ 
000097
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of August, 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Michael R. Jones 
Michael R. Jones, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7743 
508 North 13th Street 
Boise, ID 83707 
Jana Gomez 
Nancy Werdel 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho ,,,11 • ""••,, 
,,,,, '.t 4 TH Ju.-'•,,,. 
,l' "~~••••••••• ~/n 1'~ 
"" ("'v •• • \.:, --
"" '-,J • •• "'-r.. --
---'4---l'--+f---<:n:!ii,,F,..,~~f THE- S 1',<1.., \ ('" \ 
• - • 'Ii'. C, • =~: :-= • E- • - OF - • c,:, •· 
: r/J • • -~ = 
.,... • I •.:ti• '=- p •. DAHO : ~-~· ~...:. . '")~ ~-..,, ••• • •• "'y.:, 
~- -f~ •••••••• .c:4. .... #,.. '() ~~ ... ,, 
•,,, PoR ADA cO ,,,, ,,,,,, ...... ,,, 
000098
,j 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
JANA B. GOMEZ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Civil Division 
200 West Front Street, Rm. 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 287-7700 
Idaho State Bar No. 8186 
NO·-----=~-.,...,..-:---
AM ____ F_1~~:2:,() {_p 
AUG 1 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STACEY LAFFERTY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 









Case No. CV-OC-2013-7673 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Respondent, the Ada County Board of Equalization, by and through its 
attorney of record, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Division, and submits this 
Memorandum in Response to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. ARGUMENT 
For the reasons explained below, Petitioner, Jayo Development, Inc., has failed to meet 
its burden and establish that the decision made by the Board of Tax Appeals was erroneous. 
Accordingly, the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully requests that this Court deny 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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A. Ada County was bound by Rule 620, which expressly required Jayo 
Development, Inc. to have made or caused to be made the site improvements. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Petitioner fails to address the complete state of the 
law as it was in 2012; the law by which the Ada County Board of Equalization was bound. 
Although Petitioner addresses the facial requirements of the Site Improvement Exemption 
Statute, LC. § 63-602W(4) (2012) (amended 2013) ("Statute"), it completely fails to 
acknowledge even the existence, yet alone the legal implication, of State Tax Commission Rule 
620, see IDAHO ADMIN. CODER. 35.01.03.620 (2012) ("Rule 620"). 
Petitioner argues that, on its face, the Statute does not require that Petitioner have made 
the site improvements. Pet'r Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 3-7. In actuality, the Statute could be read to 
include such a requirement, depending on how the phrase "the land developer" is interpreted.1 If 
"the land developer" refers to the land developer that is applying for the exemption, then it is 
possible that, on its face, the Statute does not require the applicant developer to have made the 
site improvements. However, if "the land developer" refers to the land developer that actually 
made the site improvements, then the Statute would require that Petitioner have made the site 
improvements on the Parcels at issue. 
Such uncertainty in the Statute was conclusively resolved, for tax year 2012, by the State 
Tax Commission through its promulgation of Rule 620, a point which Petitioner entirely fails to 
1 The pla_in text of the Statute exempts from property taxation: 
[s]ite improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and utilities, on real 
property held by the land developer for sale or consumption in the ordinary course of the 
land developer's business until other improvements, such as buildings or structural 
components of buildings, are begun or title to the land is conveyed from the land 
developer. 
J.C.§ 63-602W(4) (2012) (emphases added). 
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address in its Motion. The State Tax Commission, pursuant to its statutory authority to 
administratively construe property tax laws, see I.C. § 63-105A(14), construed the Statute to 
mean that the developer applying for the exemption must have "made or caused to be made the 
site improvements on the land .... " IDAHO ADMIN. CODER. 35.01.03.620.03.c. Because Rule 
620 was never judicially overruled, the Rule was applicable to Petitioner's applications for site 
improvement exemptions and was binding upon the Ada County Board of Equalization. See I.C. 
§ 63-105A(l 4) (" ... until judicially overruled, such administrative construction shall be binding 
upon ... all others acting under [property tax law]" (emphasis added)). 
By Petitioner's own admission, it did not make or cause to be made the site 
improvements on the Parcels. See Stip. Facts ~ 8 attached to Gomez Aff. as Ex. A. 
Consequently, the Ada County Board of Equalization was bound by Rule 620 to deny 
Petitioner's applications for tax exemptions. Thus, the Ada County Board of Equalization 
respectfully requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. Strict construction of the Statute requires that Jayo Development, Inc. have 
made or caused to be made the site improvements on the Parcels. 
In addition to the express requirements of Rule 620, the well-established principle in tax 
exemption cases of strict construction also compels construing the Statute to require that the 
applicant developer have made or caused to be made the site improvements. See Hous. Sw., Inc. 
v. Wash. County, 128 Idaho 335, 337-38, 913 P.2d 68, 70-71 (1996) ("Statutes granting tax 
exemptions must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the state." (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added)); Bistline v. Bassett, 47 Idaho 66, 272 P. 696, 697 (1928) ("An alleged 
grant of exemption will be strictly construed. It must be in terms so specific and certain as to 
leave no room for doubt." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). Given that there are two 
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possible and plausible interpretations of the phrase "the land developer," as described above, the 
Statute must be strictly construed against Petitioner and in favor of the Ada County Board of 
Equalization. Accordingly, this Court should construe the phrase "the land developer" to mean 
the land developer that actually made the site improvements. Such strict construction of the 
Statute comports with the directive of the Idaho Supreme Court mandating strict construction of 
tax exemption statutes. 
Because Petitioner did not make or cause to be made the site improvements, it does not 
meet the requirements of the Statute, strictly construed, and thus is not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Accordingly, the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully requests that this 
Court deny Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
C. The 2013 amendments to the Statute and the legislative reasoning behind 
those amendments are wholly inapplicable to this case. 
Petitioner further discusses in its Motion for Summary Judgment the 2013 amendments to 
the Statute and cites 2013 legislative committee meeting minutes detailing hearings that were 
held on House Bill 242. Despite Petitioner's admission that "[t]he 2013 amendments ... do not 
- on their face - apply to the decision of this appeal," Pet'r Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 7, 
Petitioner goes on to argue that the legislative reasoning behind the 2013 amendments should be 
applied to the Statute as it existed in 2012. Such a retroactive application of the legislative 
reasoning behind the 2013 amendments to the Statute would be contrary to law. 
To begin with, statutory amendments are not to be applied retroactively in the absence of 
clear legislative intent to give the amendments retroactive effect. See Atencio v. Joint Jerome 
Sch. Dist. #261, 837 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163-64 (D. Idaho 2011) (holding that the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 did not apply retroactively, in part, "because of the absence of 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - PAGE 4 OF 7 
g:\jbg\jayo - boise heights\district court pleadings\sj response memorandum.doc 
000102
congressional intent to give the amendments retroactive effect") (citations omitted)); Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 836-40 (1990) (holding that an amended 
postjudgment interest statute was not retroactively applicable to judgment entered before the 
effective date of the amended statute because "the plain language of both the original and 
amended versions of [the postjudgment interest statute] evidences clear congressional intent that 
the amended [statute] is not applicable to judgments entered before its effective date"). It 
logically follows that the legislative reasoning behind such statutory amendments should, 
likewise, not be applied retroactively. 
Here, the Idaho Legislature expressly made the 2013 statutory amendments retroactive to 
January 1, 2013; the amendments were not made retroactive to January 1, 2012. 2013 Idaho 
Sess. Laws 715. Thus, the Legislature clearly intended for the amended statute to apply from 
January 1, 2013 forward. It logically follows that the legislative reasoning behind the 2013 
statutory amendments should also only be applied from January 1, 2013 forward. There is no 
legal authority that allows application of either the amended statute or the legislative reasoning 
behind the amended statute to be applied retroactively to the 2012 Statute. The Legislature did 
not intend for the 2013 amendments to affect exemption decisions that were made in 2012. 
Accordingly, such amendments, and the legislative reasoning behind those amendments, are 
wholly inapplicable to Petitioner's applications for exemptions and should not be considered by 
this Court. 
Finally, at the time of its decision, the Ada County Board of Equalization did not have the 
ability to read legislators' minds in order to know what the Legislature "actually intended" when 
it enacted the Statute. To the contrary, the Ada County Board of Equalization only had the 
Statute and Rule 620 on which to base its decision. Based on the state of the law, as it existed in 
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2012, the Ada County Board of Equalization properly denied Petitioner's applications for 
exemptions. 
Legislative hindsight does not entitle Petitioner to judgment as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully requests that this Court deny 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has failed to meet its burden and establish that it 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Ada County Board of Equalization 
respectfully requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this \5~ day of August 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: 
Jrui;B. Gomez 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CASE NO. CV OC 2013-7673 
REPLY MEMORANDUM ON 
PETITIONER JAYO 
DEVELOPMENT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. The Decision Of The Idaho Board Of Tax Appeals Did Not Rely Upon The 
Language Of The Now-Lapsed Temporary Rule 620, But Instead Only 
Invoked The Language Of The Exemption Statute Itself In Support Of Its 
Decision · 
Ada County has opened its response argument in opposition to the Petitioner Jayo 
Development's motion for summary judgment with a declaration that Jayo has not established 
I 
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that the decisio1:1 made by the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals was erroneous, but thereafter, Ada 
County does not again either refer to the basis for, or the reasoning that the Board of Tax 
Appeals relied upon, in arriving at its decision, which underlies this Court's de novo appellate 
review. Jayo Development has in fact directly addressed Ada County's reliance upon the now-
lapsed Temporary Rule 620, but has done so in the response that it has made to Ada County's 
own motion for summary judgment. 
The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals, in its decision, made it clear that it was relying only 
upon its own interpretation of the conveyance language of the statute itself, and was not basing 
its decision upon any language that was contained in the now-lapsed Temporary Rule 620: 
Where the Board has relied solely on the terms of the statute in its 
determination that Appellant does not qualify for the site improvements 
exemption, we need not decide Appellant's claim that Temporary Rule 620 goes 
beyond the scope of the statute. 
Idaho Board of Tax Appeals Final Decision and Order, page 6 (April 4, 2013) (emphasis added). 
Moreover,_ the Board of Tax Appeals Hearing Officer did not have any judicial authority 
to find an agency Rule, such as Rule 620, as being unconstitutional. This Court is not so 
constrained and can find Rule 620 unconstitutional, if required. However, we believe the issue 
may be moot since the Rule 620 is no longer in force. 
Both Ada County, in the arguments it has made on this appeal, and the Idaho Board of 
Tax Appeals, in the reasoning underlying the decision upon which this appeal is based, have 
engrafted language onto this exemption statute that simply was not included by the Idaho 
Legislature when I.C. § 63-602W(4) was first enacted in 2012, a fact which has become apparent 
as a result of the clarification amendments that the Legislature provided in 2013. Both the 
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interpretation of the statute that is now urged by Ada County on this appeal, and the 
interpretation of the statute that was adopted by the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals in its decision 
that is now subject to this Court's de novo appellate review, were rejected by the Idaho 
Legislature when it adopted the 2013 clarification amendments. 
When LC. § 63-602W(4) was first adopted in 2012 it simply provided the following site 
improvement property tax exemption: 
( 4) Site improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and 
utilities, on real property held by the land developer for sale or consumption and 
in the ordinary course of the land developer's business until other improvements, 
such as buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or title to the 
land is conveyed from the land developer. An application is required for the 
exemption provided in this subsection. 
Chapter 192 of the Laws of 2012, § 1 at pg. 518 (emphasis added). 
The plain - and unambiguous - construction of this statutory language refers only to "site 
improvements" that are "held by the land developer," and refers only to the prospective loss of 
this tax exemption, when "title to the land is conveyed from the land developer." (emphasis 
added). There is nothing on the face of this statute that creates the exception argued for by Ada 
County - "held by the land developer [ that actually made the site improvements]." (bracketed 
language added by Ada County). Nor is there anything on the face of this statute that creates any 
required retroactive operation -which necessarily underlies the Board of Tax Appeals decision -
to land conveyances that occurred at any time before the exemption statute was first enacted in 
2012. The conveyances upon which the Board disqualified Petitioner Jaye's application for the 
tax exemption occurred in 2008 and 2010. See, Idaho Board of Tax Appeals Final Decision and 
Order, page 2 (April 4, 2013). 
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Both Ada County and the Board of Tax Appeals have interpreted this statute to create 
ambiguities - allegedly subject to further interpretation by administrative rule - where no such 
ambiguities exist on the face of the statute as first enacted by the Legislature in 2012. There is 
no requirement that the tax exemption is only available to the land developer who actually made 
the site improvements. Instead, the Legislature simply chose to extend that tax exemption for 
those site improvements "held by the land developer." Likewise, if the Legislature had intended 
retroactive application of the title conveyance provision, then it could have included a past tense 
form - was conveyed or has been conveyed. Instead the Legislature only invoked the 
prospective application of this requirement - is conveyed. See, I. C. § 73-101. 
In addition, when the text of the 2013 clarification amendments is reviewed, the 
Legislature described those "conveyances," which are of the same character as those that were 
engaged in by Jayo's predecessors and that are at issue on this appeal, that are not to be included 
within the exclusion language of this tax exemption statute. The Legislature specifically stated: 
For purposes of this subsection, a transfer of title to real property. to a legal entity 
of which at least fifty percent (50%) is owned by the land developer, the land 
developer's original entity or the same principals who owned the land developer's 
original entity shall not be considered a conveyance to a third party. 
See, Chapter 276 of the Laws of 2013, § 1 at pg. 715 (emphasis added). 
The decision that the State Board of Tax Appeals made below, and the course of action 
that Ada County has argued that this Court should follow on this appeal, both suffer from the 
same fl~w. These actions rely upon an interpretation of law - either of the statute itself, or by 
reliance upon a promulgated administrative rule - that is an unconstitutional rewriting · of the 
statute that results in the usurpation by the agency of non-delegable legislative authority. The 
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Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly overturned such agency efforts as being in excess of 
administrative authority, and as being unconstitutional. See e.g., Moses v. Idaho State Tax 
Commission, 118 Idaho 676, 680-81, 799 P .2d 964, 968-69 (1990),· and the cases cited therein. 
In the response memorandum it submitted to Ada County's motion for summary 
judgment Jayo had argued that an appellate court is to apply the law that is in effect at the time 
that the court renders its appellate decision. Grant v. City of Twin Falls, 120 Idaho 69, 72, 813 
P.2d 880, 883 (1991), citing to, Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281, 89 S.Ct. 518, 526, 
21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969). Consistent with this particular rule there is another corresponding 
principle that also applies to the argument that Ada County has diligently pursued on this appeal 
as to the continued application of the now-lapsed Temporary Rule 620. It is a fundamental rule 
of appellate review that a court will not decide a question that has become moot. Committee for 
Rational Predator Management v. Department of Agriculture, State of Idaho, 129 Idaho 670, 
672, 931 P.2d 1188, 1190 (1997) ("It is well-established that this Court does not decide moot 
cases."). "An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is 
capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief." Edwards v. Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 154 Idaho 511, 515, 300 P.3d 43, 47 (2013). Temporary 
Rule 620 is now an acknowledged nullity. See, Ada County's Opening Brief on Motion for 
Summary Judgment at pg. 6, fu. 4. Consequently it is now beyond the scope of this Court's 
authority on this appeal to either uphold, or to strike down, that now-lapsed Temporary Rule 620. 
That rule no longer exists. That issue is moot. 
As noted in the opening paragraphs of this reply memorandum, the Idaho Board of Tax 
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Appeals declined to place any part of its decision upon the now-lapsed Temporary Rule 620. 
Likewise, when confronted with the immediate problems that arose in the implementation of this 
2012 site improvements tax exemption the Idaho Legislature, in enacting the 2013 clarification 
amendments, completely rejected any reliance upon the now-lapsed Temporary Rule 620. When 
considered in this context, it now seems ill-advised for Ada County to continue to argue that this 
Rule, whi.ch essentially attempted to re-write the 2012 statute, should play any role whatsoever in 
the interpretation and application of site improvement property tax exemption codified at LC. § 
63-602W(4). 1 Therefore, Ada County's reliance upon that rule should be rejected by this Court. 
B. The Intent Underlying The 2013 Clarification Amendments Should Be 
Applied To The Determination Of The Petitioner Jayo's Entitlement To The 
Site Improvement Property Tax Exemption For The 2012 Tax Year 
In its opening argument on this motion for summary judgment the Petitioner Jayo 
Development argued that the 2013 amendments to LC. § 63-203W(4) should be applied 
according to the rules of statutory construction that apply to "clarification amendments." State v. 
Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 123, 294 P.3d 1132, 1135 (2012) ("[A] change to the application or 
substantive meaning of a statute is not the only reason for legislative amendment; the legislature 
also makes amendments to clarify or strengthen the existing provisions of a statute. Pearl v. Bd. 
of Prof'l Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 137 Idaho 107, 113-14, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168-69· 
(2002); State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 (1999); Stonecipher v. 
Although Ada County cites to I.C. § 63-105A(14) several times, it should be 
noted. that this rule of "administrative construction" only applies to the State Tax Commission, 
and on its face, this statute can have no binding effect on a decision to be made by the judiciary 
as to the validity of an agency's reliance upon any particular construction of an administrative 
rule. 
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Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731, 735, 963 P .2d 1168, 1172 (1998); State ex rel. Wright v. Headrick, 
65 Idaho 148, 156, 139 P.2d 761, 763 (1943)"); and In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 
from Rural High School District No. 1, 34 Idaho 222, 200 P. 13 8 (1921 ). 
In 2013 the Idaho Legislature did nothing more than declare how it had intended its 
original enactment of the site improvement tax exemption in 2012 to be applied from the time of 
that original enactment. Consequently, those 2013 amendments only clarified - rather than 
altered or changed - how that exemption was to have been applied from the time of its original 
enactment in 2012. On this basis, the effect of those 2013 amendments should be applied in both 
granting and interpreting the site improvement exemption as originally granted in 2012. 
In response to this argument Ada County has raised the question of why the Idaho 
Legislature simply didn't exp~essly declare that the 2013 clarification amendments were 
retroactive to January 1, 2012, if in fact that was the legislature's express intent? This is a fair 
question, which deserves a straightforward response. 
This appeal involves only two of the questions that were addressed by the 2013 
clarification amendments: (1) Who is a land developer entitled to the site improvement property 
tax exemption? and, (2) When is that exemption lost as the result of a "conveyance?" Another 
question that was raised and addressed by the 2013 clarification amendments was the issue 
concerning the "amount" of the exemption. Apparently Idaho's counties had adopted a variety 
of rates for the exemption. See, Exhibits E & F to the Affidavit of Michael Jones. In response, 
the Idaho· Legislature in 2013 adopted the following unifonn standard: 
For purposes of this subsection, the amount of the exemption shall be the 
difference between the market value of the land with site improvements and the 
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market value of the land without site improvements as shall be determined by a 
comparative market analysis of a similarly situated parcel or parcels of real 
property that have not been improved with such site improvements contemplated 
by this subsection. In the case the market value of land without site 
improvements cannot be reasonably assessed because of the absence of 
comparable sales, an exemption value of seventy-five percent (75%) of the market 
value ofland with site improvements shall be granted to that parcel. 
See, Chapter 276 of the Laws of 2013, § 1 at pg. 715. Because of the potential effect on the 
actual tax assessments and collections that were made for the year 2012, as based upon each 
individual county's determination of the "amount" of the site improvement exemption for that 
year, a legislative declaration that the above-stated language would be retroactive to January 1, 
2012 might have created substantial questions as to the actual basis for the individual counties' 
2012 property tax assessments and collections. 
Notwithstanding this legislative deference to the settled tax assessments and collections 
for tax year 2012, the Petitioner Jayo does not by any means retreat from its primary argument 
that the Legislature's actions in 2013 in respect to the determination of both qualified land 
developers, and as to the conveyances which result in a loss of the site improveinent 
exemptions, were undertaken as a clarification of, rather than a change to, the original legislative 
intent in enacting the 2012 site improvement exemption. 
Jayo's argument in this respect is not an exercise in "legislative hindsight," as has been 
suggested by Ada County in its response brief. Instead the Petitioner Jayo's argument can be 
summarized as being primarily based upon the actual language of the 2012 statute, which 
establishes that the site improvements in question were "held by" Jayo, as a land developer, 
which had not engaged in any conveyance of that property that would result in a loss of that 
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exemption. The additional overlay that is based upon the effect of the 2013 clarification 
amendments simply makes this outcome clear, and also serves as a rejection of the interpretation 




The Petitioner Jayo's motion for summary judgment should be granted on the basis that it 
was entitled to site improvement property tax exemption provided in LC. § 63-602W(4), and the 
corresponding motion for summary judgment by the Respondent Ada County should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted thi~ay of August, 2013. 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
Jayo Development, Inc. 
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ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ) 
) 
. Respondent. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-OC-2013-7673 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ADA COUNTY 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Respondent, the Ada County Board of Equalization, by and through its 
attorney of record, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Division, and submits this 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Ada County Board of Equalization's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
I. ARGUMENT 
Both the Site Improvement Exemption Statute, LC. § 63-602W(4) (2012) (amended 
2013) ("Statute"), strictly construed, and Idaho State Tax Commission Rule 620, IDAHO ADMIN. 
CODE R. 35.01.03.620 (2012) ("Rule 620"), require that Petitioner have made or caused to be 
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made the site improvements on the Parcels in order for the Parcels to be eligible for site 
improvement exemptions in 2012. Because Petitioner, admittedly, did not make or cause to be 
made the site improvements, Petitioner's Parcels are not eligible for site improvement 
exemptions for tax year 2012. Additionally, Petitioner has failed to raise any substantive legal 
argument that would prevent this Court from finding that the Ada County Board of Equalization 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Ada County Board of Equalization 
respectfully requests that this Court grant such Board's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A. This Court is to determine this case in a trial de novo. 
Throughout its Memorandum in Opposition, Petitioner repeatedly discusses the legal 
grounds upon which the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals ("BT A") based its decision affirming the 
Ada County Board of Equalization. Petitioner appears to argue that this Court must look at the 
reasoning employed by the BTA and decide this case based on such reasoning. Petitioner's 
argument is legally unsound. 
Petitioner appealed this case pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-3812, which specifically 
states that the appeal "shall be heard and determined by the [district] court ... in a trial de novo . 
. . . " LC. § 63-3812(c) (emphasis added). A "trial de novo" signifies "[a] new trial on the entire 
case-that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law-conducted as if there had been no trial 
in the first instance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1544 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, although this Court may agree with the BTA, this Court is not bound by the BTA's 
legal reasoning. To the contrary, this Court is directed by statute to consider this case entirely 
anew. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- PAGE 2 OF 9 
g:\jbg\jayo - boise heights\district court pleadingslrespondent's reply memo.doc 
000117
B~ Rule 620 applies tQ this case in full force and effect. 
In its Memorandum in Opposition, Petitioner argues that this Court should not apply Rule 
620 to this case because that Rule was allowed to expire earlier this year. 1 Pet'r Memo. Opp'n 
Ada County Mot. Summ. J. 5-6. In support of this argument, Petitioner restates the general rule 
that "an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision." Id at 5 
(quoting Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969)). However, Petitioner 
notably fails to explain the. meaning and actual application of that general rule. Despite 
Petitioner's suggestion, the general rule does not, in any way, prohibit this Court from applying 
Rule 620 to the case at hand. 
The general rule does not stand for the proposition that an appellate court is to 
automatically look at and apply the law in effect (or, in this case, not in effect) at the time the 
appellate court renders its decision. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 
827, 846-47 (1990) (Scalia, J. concurring) ("As I have mentioned, Thorpe derived from Schooner 
Peggy the 'general rule ... that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it 
renders its decision.' [ citation omitted]. Of course it does not stand for that at all-or at least 
not in the sense that Thorpe implied." (emphasis added)). Rather, the general rule "stands for the 
proposition that when Congress [ or a state legislature] plainly says . . . that current law rather 
than pre-existing law governs the rights of parties, then courts 'must apply' that current law." Id 
(emphasis in original). In other words, a statute or regulation that is amended or enacted between 
the initial and the appellate decision is only to be applied by an appellate court if there is clear 
legislative intent to that effect. See Atencio v. Joint Jerome Sch. Dist. #261, 837 F. Supp. 2d 
1 Idaho Code section 67-5226(3) explains that temporary agency rules expire at "the conclusion of the next 
succeeding regular session of the legislature unless the rule is approved, amended or modified by concurrent 
resolution .... " 
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1158, 1163-64 (D. Idaho 2011) (holding that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 did not apply 
retroactively, in part, "because of the absence of congressional intent to give the amendments 
retroactive effect") (citations omitted)). 
It follows that in the absence of such clear legislative intent, a court must apply the law as 
it was at the time of the conduct in question. Such practice comports with "[ e ]lementary 
considerations of fairness" and "gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their 
actions." Landgraf v. US! Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994). 
Here, to begin with, it is unclear whether the general rule even applies to this case. 
B.etween the initial decision of the Ada County Board of Equalization and this appellate Court's 
decision, Rule 620 was not newly-promulgated, amended, or judicially overruled. Instead, Rule 
620 was simply allowed to expire. Petitioner has not cited any case law holding that appellate 
courts are to take into account the expiration of an administrative regulation when making a 
decision on appeal. Thus, it is doubtful that the general rule even applies to this case in regards 
to the expiration of Rule 620. 
Even if the general rule did apply to this case, Petitioner has failed to cite any expression 
of legislative intent, yet alone a clear expression of such intent, indicating that the Idaho 
Legislature intended for the expiration of Rule 620 to have retroactive effect on decisions made 
by the BTA and county boards of equalization for tax year 2012. Because the Legislature never 
indicated that it intended such a bizarre result, Rule 620 applies to this case in full force and 
effect. Accordingly, this Court must apply the law, including Rule 620, as it was in 2012 when 
the Ada County Board of Equalization denied Petitioner's tax exemption applications. 
Further, Idaho assessors and county boards of equalization cannot be expected to monitor 
changes in the law and apply those changes retroactively unless specifically instructed to do so by 
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the Legislature, the rule-making body, or the courts. Retroactive application of amended tax 
laws would necessarily entail the review of potentially hundreds of prior years' exemption 
applications. The impact of retroactively exempting previously-taxed parcels would create chaos 
for taxing jurisdictions, which rely on yearly tax rolls in planning their budgets. In short, 
decisions on property tax exemptions, which are made on a year-to-year basis and which generate 
the annual tax ~olls, require finality for the benefit of counties and taxpayers alike. 
For these legal and policy reasons, this Court should apply the more properly-stated 
general rule that an appellate court must apply the law that was in effect at the time the conduct 
in question occurred unless there is clear legislative intent that current law is to govern on appeal. 
Applying this properly-stated general rule, it is evident that Rule 620 fully governs this case. 
C. The State Tax Commission promulgated Rule 620 pursuant to its authority 
to administratively construe property tax laws. 
Petitioner also argues in its Memorandum in Opposition that Rule 620 "was promulgated 
in excess of delegated legislative authority." Pet'r Memo. Opp'n Ada County Mot. Summ. J. 2, 
4-5. Petitioner makes this bold claim without providing any supporting evidence. 
To the knowledge of the Ada County Board of Equalization, Rule 620 was never 
challenged, yet alone found by any court of law to have been promulgated in excess of the State 
Tax Commission's statutory authority to administratively construe property tax laws. See I.C. § 
63-105A(14). To the contrary, the State Tax Commission promulgated Rule 620 pursuant to its 
statutory authority and duty to "make administrative construction of property tax law." Id.; see 
also 12-5 Idaho Admin Bull. 85-87 (May 2, 2012) (citing, in part, Idaho Code section 63-105A 
as authorization for the State Tax Commission's adoption of temporary Rule 620). 
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Further, contrary to Petitioner's claim that the State Tax Commission added a 
requirement to, and thereby effectively re-wrote, the Statute, Pet'r Memo. Opp'n Ada County 
Mot. Summ. J. 4-5, the State Tax Commission, in actuality, merely construed the Statute as 
directed to do so by the Idaho Legislature. See I.C. § 63-105A(14) (directing the State Tax 
Commission "[t]o make administrative construction of property tax law"). As explained in the 
Ada County Board of Equalization's Memorandum in Response to Petitioner's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the phrase "the land developer" is capable of two interpretations-the land 
developer that applied for the exemption or the land developer that actually made the site 
improve~ents.2 Mem. Resp. Pet'r Mot. Summ. J. 2-3. The State Tax Commission, acting 
wholly within its statutory authority to construe property tax laws, reasonably construed the 
phrase "the land developer" to mean the land developer that actually made the site 
improvements. Such administrative construction of the Statute was accomplished pursuant to, 
not in excess of, the State Tax Commission's authority. 
Unless Petitioner is able to provide evidence to the contrary, its claim that the State Tax 
Commission promulgated Rule 620 in excess of its authority is pure speculation and opinion that 
should not be given credence by this Court.3 
2 The Statute exempts from property taxation: 
[s]ite improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and utilities, on real property held 
by the land developer for sale or consumption in the ordinary course of the land developer's 
business until other improvements, such as buildings or structural components of buildings, are 
begun or title to the land is conveyed from the land developer. 
J.C. § 63-602W(4) (2012) (emphases added). 
3 Additionally, the case at bar is not the proper avenue for challenging the validity of Rule 620. See LC. § 67-5278 
(stating that the validity of a rule may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment, and tµat the agency must 
be made a party to the action). 
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D. Petitioner's Parcels are not eligible for site improvement exemptions; thus, 
the question of whether such exemptions were lost as a result of prior 
conveyances is immaterial. 
Petitioner further appears to argue that past conveyances of the Parcels cannot be taken 
into account and used as a basis to deny Petitioner's applications for tax exemptions. Pet'r 
Memo. Opp'n Ada County Mot. Summ. J. 3. Petitioner argues that doing so would violate Idaho 
Code section 73-101, which prohibits applying statutes retroactively, unless the legislature 
expressly so declares. Id. 
In the view of the Ada County Board of Equalization, the fact that the Parcels were 
conveyed multiple times prior to Petitioner taking title to the Parcels is an ancillary issue to this 
case. Conveyance of a parcel relates to how a site improvement exemption is lost. Conversely, 
the actual issue at hand is whether Petitioner's Parcels are eligible for site improvement 
exemptions, which is determined, in part, by who made or caused to be made the site 
improvements. See IDAHO ADMIN. CODER. 35.01.03.620.03.c (listing four requirements that a 
land developer must prove in order to be eligible for a site improvement exemption). 
Accordingly, Petitioner's argument related to the retroactive application of the conveyance 
portion of the Statute is of no consequence. 
E. The 2013 amendments to the Statute and the legislative reasoning behind 
those amendments are wholly inapplicable to this case. 
Lastly, Petitioner argues that, by amending the Statute, the Idaho Legislature made it clear 
that it never intended for the site improvement tax exemption to apply only to land developers 
that made the site improvements. Pet'r Memo. Opp'n Ada County Mot. Summ. J. 6-7. 
Petitioner, therefore, argues that the 2013 amendments establish that Petitioner is entitled to the 
exemption. Id. at 6. 
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The amended Statute and the legislative reasoning behind those amendments are wholly 
inapplicable to this case and should not be considered by this Court. The Ada County Board of 
Equalization fully explains this precise argument in its Memorandum in Response to Petitioner's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, section LC, pages four through six. In consideration of 
efficiency, the Ada County Board of Equalization requests that this Court consider the above-
identified argument in reply to Petitioner's argument. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The Ada County Board of Equalization has established that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact in this case and that the Board is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully requests that this Court grant 
such Board's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 8J!:9 day of August 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: 
.ia_;iC Gomez 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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8y ANNAMARIE MEYER 
D!PUTV . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE .OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 




) Case No. CV-OC-2013-7673 
) 
) 
) ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR 







Michael R. Jones, Michael R. Jones, PLLC, Boise, Idaho, attorney for Petitioner. 
Jana B. Gomez, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Civil Division, Ada County Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office, Boise, Idaho, attorney for Respondent. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
Thi.~ case originated when Petitioner Jayo Development, Inc. filed a Petition in the 
above-captioned matter seeking judicial review of a final order of th~ Idaho Board of Tax 
Appeals ("Board"). The final order under review is the Board's Final Decision and Order issued 
on April 4, 2013, affirming the Ada County Board of Equalization's denial of the Petitioner's 
site improvements exemption applications for tax year 2012. The Petitioner contends that the 
Final Decision and Order is contrary to law in several respects and requests that this Court 
' ' 
reverse the same. The Petitioner further requests that this Court find it is entitled to the site 
improvements property tax exemption granted under Idaho Code § 63-602W( 4) for 2012 with 
respect to certain real property it owns ip, Ada County, Idaho. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDG:MENT - 1 -
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B. - Course of proceedings and statement of facts. 
1. The Petitioner is an Idaho corporation formed in February 2010. 
2. On June 3, 2010, the Petitioner acquired title to the following seventeen parcels of 
real property located.in Ada County, Idaho: R9473780210, R9473780230, R9473780560, 
R9473790020,R9473790030,R9473790180,R9473790200,R9473790210,R9473790230, 
R9473790240,R9473790250,R9473790260,R9473790470,R9473790480,R9473790490, 
R9473790500, and R9473790510. 
3. On August 19, 2010, the Petitioner acquired title to the following twenty-four 
parcels ofreal property located in Ada County, Idaho: R1013520065, R1471950020, 
R147950040,R1471950640,R1471950710~R3369320170,R3369320180,R3369320420, 
R3369320430,R3369321070,R8037540070,R8037540100,R8037540110,R8037540170, 
R8037540220, R8037540230, R8037540270, R8037540290, R8037540570, R8037540590, 
R8177360070, R8177360080, R8177360100, and R8177360110. 
4. The seventeen parcels acquired by the Petitioner on June 3, 2010, and the twenty-
• V 
four parcels acquired by the Petitioner on August 19, 2010, will be referred to collectively herein 
as "the Parcels." 
5. The-Parcels are subdivision lots located in several different real estate 
developments. During the 2012 taxable year, the Parcels were held by the Petitioner for sale or 
consumption in the ordinary course of its business. 
6. Prior to. the Petitioner's acquisition of the Parcels, the Parcels were improved with 
site improvements, such as utilities, roads, sidewalks and curbs. The site improvements were 
undertaken by a prior owner of the Parcels, Jayo Construction, Inc., in or around 2008. After 
mesne conveyances, the Parcels were subsequently acquired by the P_etitioner as set forth above 
in 2010. Douglas Jayo, who is the sole shareholder.of the Petitioner, was also the sole 
shareholder of Jayo Construction, Inc. at the time the site improvements were made. . . . 
7. In 2012, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012), creating 
the site improvements tax exemption at issue in this proceeding. The statute has been 
subsequently amended, but the 2012 version of!he statute provided as follows: 
The following property is exempt from property taxation: business inventory. For 
the purpose of this section, ''busin,ess inventory" means all items of tangible 
personal property or other property, including site improvements, described as: 
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(4) Site improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and utilities, 
on real property held by the land developer for sale or consumption in the 
ordinary cours~ of the land developer's business until other improvements, such as 
buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or title to the land is 
conveyed from the land developer. An application is required for the exemption 
provided in this subsection · 
Idaho Code § 63-602W( 4) (2o"l2). 
8. The Petitioner timely filed site improvements exemption applications with respect 
to the Parcels with the Ada County Assessor for the 2012 tax year. 
9. On May 24, 2012, the Ada County Assessor issued his Notice of Exeniption 
Denial, denying the Petitioner's site improvements exemption applications. The Petitioner 
appealed to the Ada County Board of Equalization and then to the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals, 
both of whom affirmed the Assessor's exemption denial. The basis for the denial was that the 
Petitioner was not entitled to the exemption since it was not the land developer that made the site 
improvements at issue. 
10. On April 30, 2013, the Petitioner filed its Petition/or Judicial Review asserting 
that the Board's Final Decision and Order is contrary to law in several respects and requests that 
this Court reverse the same. The Petitioner further requests that this Court find that it is entitled 
to the site improvement property tax exemptio~ granted under Idaho Code § 63-602W( 4) for 
2012 with respect to the Parcels. 
11. On July 24, 2013, the Respondent filed its Motion/or Summary Judgment along 
with supporting documents. The Petitioner filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting docunients:on July 31, 2013. Response and reply briefing was subsequently 
submitted by both parties and hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment was held before 
this Court on August 28, 2013. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of review. 
Summary judgment is proper if the plea.dings, depositio~s, and admissions on file,_ 
together with the affi~vits, if any, show that there is no genuine. issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56. The burden of 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 -
S:\ORDERS\Civil Cases\Jayo Develop v. Ada CtyJ3d ofEqualization\Order on Motions for Swnmary. Judgmentdocx 
000127
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party. Id. When 
a court considers a motion for summary judgment, all facts are to be liberally construed in favor 
of the nonmoving Pa.ctr, and the court mu~ draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in 
that party's favor. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 p·.2d 851, 854 
(1991). However, when an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as 
the trier of fact is. entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed 
evidence properly before it and grant summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences. P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,237, 159 
P.3d 870, 874 (2007). The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment 
does not change the applicable standard ofreview. Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 
P.3d·102, 107 (2010). 
B. The Petitioner is not entitled to an Idaho Code § 63-602W( 4) site improvements 
exemption with respect to the Parcels for tax year 2012 as a matter of law. 
There are no material facts in dispute in this matter. Rather, the disagreement in this case 
concerns the proper interpretation ofidaho Code§ 63-602W(4). Under Idaho law, statutory 
interpretation "must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." Ver ska v. 
Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). If the statutory 
language is unambiguous, "the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given 
effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of sta~tory construction." St. Luke's 
Reg. Med Ctr. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada f;ounty, 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). 
A statute is ambiguous where "the meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds 
might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 
Idaho 356,358, 63 P.3d 482, 484 {2003). "However, ambiguity is not established merely 
because different possible interpretations are presented to a court/' Id. Further, "a statute is not 
ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it." Ada 
County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351,354,298 P.3d 245, 
248 (2013). 
If an ambiguity exists in a statute specifically regarding tax exemptions or deductions, the 
~aw is to be ''construed strongly against the taxpayer." Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 
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150 Idaho 417,420,247 P.3d 644,647 (2011). "Tax exemptions are generally disfavored-they 
are never presumed and cannot be extended by judicial construction." Id. As a result, a tax 
payer must show a clear entitlement to an exemption. Ada County Bd of Equalization v. 
Highlands, Inc., 141 Idaho 202,206, 108 P.3d 349, 353 (2005). 
i. The Petitioner is not entitled to a site improvements exemption under the 
plain and unambiguous language of Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012). 
The statute at issue in this proceeding is Idaho Code § 63-602W( 4) (2012), which 
provides W?- exemption from property taxation under certain conditions. For the 2012 tax year, 
that statute read as follows: 
The following property is exempt from property taxation: business inventory. For 
the purpose of this section, ''business inventory" means all items of tangible 
personal property or other property, including site improvements, described as: 
(4) Site improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and.utilities, 
on real property held by the land developer for . sale or consumption in the 
ordinary course of the land developer's business until other improvements, such 
as buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or title to the land is 
conveyed from the land developer. An application: is required for the exemption 
provjd~d in this subs_ection. 
LC. § 63-602W(4) (2012).1 The statute was expres_sly mad~ re~oactive to January 1, 2012. 
2012 Idaho Session Laws 519. 
1 In 2013, Idaho Code§ 62~603W(4) was amended by the Legislature to_read as f~llows: 
The following property is exempt from property taxation: business inventory. For the purpose of 
this section, "business inventory" means all items of tangible personal property or other property, 
including site improvements, described as: 
(4) Site improvements that are associated with land, such as roads and utilities, on real property 
held by the land developer, either as owner or vendee in possession under a land sale contract, for 
sale or consumption in the ordinary course of the land developer's business until other 
improvements, such as buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or the real 
property is conveyed to a third party1 For purposes of this ~ubsection, a transfer of title to real 
property to a legal entity of which at least fifty perc~nt (50%) is owned by the land developer, the 
land aeveloper's original entity or the same principals who owned the land developer's original 
entity shall not be considered a conveyance to a third party. For purposes of this subsection, the 
amount of the exemption shall be the difference between the market value of the land with site 
improvements anq. the market value of the land without site improvements as shall be determined 
by a comparative market analysis of a similarly situated parcel or parcels of real property that have 
not been improved with ·such site im.provemen,:S contemplated by this subsection. In the case the 
market value of land without site improvements cannot be reasonably assessed because of the 
absence. of comp~able sales, an exemption value of se_venty-five percent (75%) of the market 
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The Petitioner asserts that the statute provided a site improvements exemption to any land 
developer holding land improved with site improvements for sale or consumption in the ordinary 
course of its business, even if that land developer did not make the site improvements. The 
Court rejects the Petitioner's interpretation. As an initial matter, the legislature's use of the term 
''the" to qualify the term "land developer" contravenes the Petitioner's argument. Had the 
legislature intended the exemption to apply to all land developers holding property improved 
with site improvements; irrespective of whether that developer made the site improvements, it 
would have used the term "a land developer" in the statute. However, the legislature's use of the 
term ''the land developer" conn9tes its intent to grant the exemption to a single entity - the land 
developer that makes the site improvements. 
Furthermore, .~e statute provides that the exemption i~ lost when "title to the land is 
conveyed from the land developer." Clearly, under the plain and unambiguous language of the 
statute the site improvements exemption, once gained, is lost when the land developer that 
gained the exemption conveys away title. The exemption does not, under the plain language of 
the statute, run with the land as suggested by the Petitioner in the event title is conveyed to 
another land developer. To so hold would be contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of 
the stati.lte, which focuses only on the fact that title is conveyed away, and not on to whom title is 
conveyed. 
In this case, it is undisputed the site improvements at.issue were undertaken by Jayo 
Construction Inc., a predecessor in title to the .Parcels, well before the Petitioner acquired title to 
' . 
the Parcels after a series of mesne conveyances. Under the plain and unambiguous language of 
Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012), the site improvements exemption could only accrne to Jayo 
Construction, Inc., and would have been lost when Jayo Construction, Inc. conveyed away title 
to the Parcels. The exemption did not run with the land to the Petitioner. The fact that all 
conveyances of the Parcel occurred prior to the ~tatute's effective date does not alter the 
·value of land with site improvements shall be granted to that parcel. An application is required for 
the exemption provided in this subsection in the first year the exemption is claimed; in subsequent 
consecutive years .no new application is required. The application must be made to the board of 
county commissioners by Aprll 15 and the taxpayer and county assessor must be notified of any 
decision and assessment of prope,:ty by May 15. The qecision or assessment of property, or both, 
of the boai:d of coUlity commissioners may be appealed to the county board of equalization no later 
than the fourth Monday in June. The applicant shall notify the board of county commissioners in 
writing of any change in eligibility for the parc~l by April 15. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUM:MARY JUDGMENT 




application, intent or effect of the st_atute. Therefore, the Court holds as a matter oflaw that 
under the plain language ofldaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012) the Petitioner is not entitled to a 
site improven:ients exemption with respect to the Parcels for the 2012 tax year. 
ii. Even if the statute was ambiguous the Petitioner would not be entitled to tbe 
site improvements exemption. 
There is an applicable agency rule that is entitled to deference in this matter. Shortly 
following the enactment ofidaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012), the Idaho State Tax Commission 
promulgated IDAPA 35.01.03.620:04 which further addressed the loss of the site improvements 
exemption: 
04. Loss of the Exemption for Site Improvements. The exemption for site 
improvements provided in Section 63-602W(4), Idaho Code, shall be lost when 
construction of any buildings or structural components of buildings is begun or 
when title to the land is conveyed from the land developer at any time following 
the installation of the site ~provement~. 
a. Conveyance. Any change in ownership conveying title to land by deed or 
court ord¢r shall be considered a conveyance and loss of this exemption. 
b. Timing. Site improvements losing this exemption shall be subject to 
asses~ment and taxation in accordance with the change of status provisions of 
Section 63-602Y, Idaho Code. 
(hereinafter, "Rule 620").2 Even though the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals did not rely upon this 
Rule in affirming the holding of the Ada County Board of Equalization and the assessment of the 
Ada County Assessor, this Court reviews this matter de novo and will therefore address the Rule. 
LC.§ 63-3812(c). 
In determining the appropriate level of deference to be given to an agency construction of 
a statute, the Idaho Supreme Court has directed that courts must follow a four-prong test. J.R. 
Simplot Co. 1 Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 84~, 862,820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (1990). 
Under the first prong; ihe court must determine if the agency has been entrusted with the 
responsibilitr to administer the statute at issue. Id. In this case the first prong is met. The Idaho 
State Tax Commission is entrusted with the authority to promulgate rules implementing the 
provisions of the Idaho Code·relating to property tax laws. I.C. §§ 63-105 & 63-lOSA The 
2 Like Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012)1 Rule 620 was made retroactive to January 1, 2012. 
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second prong requires .that the agency interpretation must be reasonable: J.R. Simplot Co., Inc., 
120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219. For the reasons set forth by this Court earlier in this opinion, 
the Court fmds the Commission's interpretation ofldaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012) to be 
reasonable, and that the Rule can be construed consistently with the plain language of the statute. 
The third prong requires the court to determine that the statutory language does not 
expressly treat the precise question at issue, noting that"[ a]n agency construction will not be 
followed if it contradicts the clear expressions of the legislature .... " J.R. Simplot Co., Inc., 120 
Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219. In this case, Rule 620 does not contradict Idaho Code§ 63-
602W(4) (2012). The statute provides the exemption is lost when "title to the land is conveyed 
from the land developer." Rule 620 simply clarifies the term conveyance as "[a]ny change in 
ownership conveying title to land by deed or court order shall be considered a conveyance and 
loss of this exemption." 
The fourth prong requires the court to look for rationales underlying deference. The 
rationales to be considered include: 
(1) the rationale requiring that a practical interpretation of the statute exists, (2) 
the rationale requiring the presumption of legislative acquiescence, (3) the 
rationale requiring· agency expertise, ( 4) the rationale of repose, and ( 5) the 
rationale req~g contemporaneous agency interpretation. 
Canty v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 138 Idaho 178, 184, 59 P.3d 983, 989 (2002). "If the 
underlying rationales are absent then their absence may present 'co~ent reasons' justifying the 
court in adopting a statutory construction which differs from that of the age.ncy." J.R. Simplot 
Co., 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P .2d at 1219. When only some of the rationales are present, the court 
must balance the supporting rationales, as all are not weighted equally. Id. "If one or more of 
the rationales underlying the rule are present, and no 'cogent reason' exists for denying the 
agency some deference, the court should afford 'considerable weight' to the agency's statutory 
interpretation." Id. 
The first rationale is that the agency interpretation is practical. It is practical to interpret 
the statute as granting the exemption to the land developer that invests the necessary capital to 
make the site improvements. It is further prac9-cal to construe the statute as directing that the 
exemption is lost when the developer that makes the site improvements conveys away title, 
irrespective of to whom title is conveyed. Therefore, this ·Court finds Rule 620 to be practical. 
The second rationale asks ifthere is legislative acquiescence. The second rationale is absent in 
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this case as the legislature amended Idaho Cod·e § 63-602W(4) (2012) in 2013. The third 
rationale asks whether.the agency has expertise. The Idaho State Tax Commission has expe1tise 
· in the field of state tax laws, therefore the third rationale is met. The fourth rationale of repose is 
absent in this case. Rule 620 was allowed to expire in 2013, and as noted above, the statute it 
was promulgated to construe was amended in 2013. Last, the fifth ri;itionale requires that the 
agency interpretation be contemporaneous with the passage of the legislation. The fifth rationale 
is met in this case. The Idaho State Tax Commission's interpretation ofldaho Code § 63-
602W( 4) (2012) :via the passage of Rule 620 was contemporaneous with the passage of the 
statute. 
Therefore, the first three criteria of the four-prong test set forth by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in JR. Simplot Co., Inc., 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1206 are met in this case. Among 
the five rational~s considered under the fourth prong, three ·are present. Balancing all relevant 
rationales, this Court finds no cogent reason exists for denying th~ Idaho State Tax 
Commission's interpretation deference in this matter. As a result, this Court will afford 
considerable weight to Rule 620. The language of Rule 620 is plain and unambiguous. Under 
Rule 620, the site improvements exemption, once gained, is lost when the land developer that 
gained the exemption conveys away title. And, a conveyance is"[ a]ny change in ownership 
conveying title to land by deed .... " Under Rule 620, the site improvements exemption in this 
case could only accrue to Jayo Construction, Inc., and would have been lost when Jayo 
Construction, Inc. conveyed away title to the Parcels. The exemption did not run with the land to 
the Petitioner. Therefore, even if the statute were found to be ambiguous Rule 620 operated to 
clarify as opposed to contradict the express terms of the statute. As such, the Petitioner would 
not be entitled to a site improvements exemption with respect to the Parcels for the 2012 tax year 
. . 
as a matter oflaw. 
C. The Petitioner's argument that this Court should apply the law in existence at the 
time of its decision ~s unavailing. 
In relatio~ to Rule 620, the Petitioner cites Grant v. City ofT}Vin Falls, 120 Idaho 69, 72, 
813 P.2d 880,883 (1991) and Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268,281 (1969) for the 
proposition that a court µmst apply the law that is in effect at the time it renders its decision. The 
Petitioner contends that this Court cannot rely upon Rule 620 in its analysis since that Rule, 
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although in force during the 2012 tax year, expired in 2013 and is no longer effective at the time 
of this Court's decision. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Grant held that a U.S. Supreµie Court decision that was 
handed down by the Court after the trial in the Idaho matter, but before the hearing before the 
Idaho Supreme Court,.would be applied retroactively to the facts of that case. Grant, 120 at 73, 
813 P.2d at 884. In reaching its decision, the Court provided "the general rule ... is that an 
appellate court must apply the law in effect at t}ie time it renders its decision." Id. at 72, 813 
P.2d at 883 (citing Thorpe v. Housing Auth.. 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969)). However, the Court in 
Grant addressed adjudicative retroactivity only, and did not address legislative or.regulatory 
retroactivity. Idaho law is clear that statutes are not to be applied retroactively unless expressly 
so declared. LC. § 73-101. Administrative rules are treated in the same fashion as statutes,_ and 
as a result are not to be applied retroactively unless expressly so declared. cf Brandon Bay, Ltd. 
Partnership v. Payette County, 142 Idaho 681, 683, 132 PJd. 438, 440 (2006) ("Administrative 
rules are subject to the same principles of statutory construction as statute"); Huyett v. Idaho 
State Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 908, 104 P.3d 946, 950 (2004) ("IDAP A rules and regulations are 
traditionally afforded the same effect of law as statutes"). 
While the current version ofldaho Co4e § 63-602W(4) was expressly made retroactive 
by the legislatur~, it was only made to apply "retroactively to January ·1, 2013." As a result, this 
Court must apply the version of the statute in effect during the 2012 tax year (i.e., Idaho Code§ 
63-602W(4) (2012)) tq the facts of this case. It follows that the Court must also apply the 
version of the administrative regulation in effect during the 2012 t~ year (i.e., Rule 620) since 
the new regulation ( or in this case the lack thereof) has not expressly been made retroactive to 
the time period pertinent to the facts of this case. 
D. The 2013 amendments to Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4) do not affect the interpretation 
of the original statute. 
The Petitioner argues the purpose of the 2013 amendments to Idaho Code § 63-602W(4) 
was to clarify the intended application of the site improvement exemption as opposed to making 
a substantive change t<? existing law. The Petitioner argues the 2012 version of the statute should 
therefore be interpreted consistent with the 2013 ~endments to the statute. This Court 
disagrees. 
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As a preliminary matter, the 2013 amended version of the statute is consistent with the 
2012 version to the extent that the site improvement exemption is not intended to run with the 
property. In both versions of the statute,.eligibility for the exemption is eliminated once title to 
the land is conveyed to a third party. The 2013 amendments still apply eligibility for the 
exemption to ''the" land developer as opposed to "a" land developer. The 2013 amended version 
therefore did not change the intent that the exemption apply to the land developer who made the 
site improvements. 
The two versions of the statute vary with respect to the types of conveyances to third 
parties affecting the exemption eligibility. Under the 2012 version of the statute, any 
conveyance of title to a third party :from the land developer eliminates· the exemption. The 2013 
amendments qualify the types of conveyances considered to be conveyances to a third party. 
However, the particularized qualifications set forth in the.2013 amendment go beyond mere 
clarification of the intent of the original version of the statute. The Court would have to in effect 
write the express conditions into the otherwise unambiguous provision of the original enactment. 
See Kimbrough, 150 Idaho at 420,247 P.3d at 647 (tax exemptions cannot be extended by 
judicial construction). The original enactment became e:ifecti.ve January 1, 2012. Had the 
Legislature intende~ that the 2013 amendments be applied to_the original enactment to clarify the 
exemption, the Legislature could have expressly made the amendments retroactive to January 1, 
2012, instead of January 1, 2013. 
m. 
ORDER 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. 
2. 
The Respondent's Motion for· Summary Judgment is granted. 
The Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is. denied. 
Dated ct / I I l 1 3 --_,~--.1,~--
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 4thday of October, 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Michael R. Jones, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7743 
508 North 13th Street 
Boise, ID 83707 
Jana Gomez 
Nancy_Werdel 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Bo_ise, ID 83702 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Respondent. 











Pursuant to the Order on Motions for Summary Judgment entered by this Court in the 
above-captioned matter concurrently with this Judgment, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Final Decision and 
Order issued by the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals on April 4, 2013, is affirmed. 
Dated ct/ l 1 / 1 '!, 
JUDGMENT - 1 -
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Michael R. Jones 
MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7743 
508 North 13th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 707. 
Telephone: (208) 385-7400 
· Facsimile: (208) 389-9103 
ISB No. 2221 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Jayo Development, Inc. 
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By DAYSHA OSBORN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 













CASE NO. CV OC 2013-7673 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
RULE59(e) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., by and through its counsel 
of record, Michael R. Jones, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) submits this MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION of the Court's September 11, 2013 Judgment on Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Petitioner will submit a supporting memorandum within 14 days of this motion 
as provided by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(C). Oral argument is requested. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of September, 2013. 
' 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION-PAGE 1 
ttomey for Petitioner 
ent, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 24th day of September, 2013, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION upon the Respondent by the 
method indicated and addressed as follows: 
Jana Gomez 
Nancy Werdel 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Rm 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7719 
Email: jgomez@adaweb.net 
nwerdel@adaweb.net 
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[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[XJFacsimile Transmission 
[ ]Other _______ _ 
000140
Michael R. Jones 
MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7743 
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ISB No. 2221 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CASE NO. CV OC 2013-7673 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
STATUS OF THE CASE 
This Court, on de novo appellate review of the decision of the Idaho State Board of Tax 
Appeals, on September 11, 2013 granted the Respondent, Ada County Board of Equalization's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Prior to requesting further appellate review before the Idaho 
Supreme Court the Petitioner, Jayo Development, Inc., has filed a Rule 59(e) Motion for 
Reconsideration of this Court's September 11, 2013 summary judgment decision. This 
memorandum is" submitted in support of that motion. 
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memorandum is submitted in support of that motion. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
1. Whether this Court's finding that LC.§ 63-602W(4) is plain and unambiguous on its face 
then mandates a finding that the agency cannot then further interpret that unambiguous 
statute by the adoption of an administrative rule? 
2. Whether this Court's reliance upon the legislature's use of the definite article "the," 
instead of the indefinite article, "a," in the structuring of the language of LC. § 63-
602W( 4) results in the impermissible reliance upon "implied" language ("the land 
developer who made the site improvements."), which does not otherwise appear on the 
face of the statute itself, in the interpretation of that statute? 
3. Whether this Court erred in both its first and fourth findings by construing LC. § 63-
602W( 4) so as to violate the "Uniformity" provision of § 5, Art. VII of the Idaho 
Constitution? 
4. Whether this Court's construction of LC.§ 63-602W(4) violates the equal protection? 
III. 
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND 
Only the 2012 tax year site improvement exemptions were placed directly at issue on this 
de novo appeal to the district court. The total amount of the denied site improvement 
exemptions for the 41 lots at issue was about $64,000. As stated at pg. 2 of Jaye's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Ada County's Motion for Summary Judgment, Jayo has been granted this very 
same site improvement exemption for each of these eligible lots for the tax year 2013, which 
grant supposedly was made in apparent reliance upon the 2013 legislative amendments to LC. § 
63-602W( 4). But in reading, and then in attempting to fully understand the implications this 
Court's September 11, 2013 decision, it has now become abundantly clear to Jaye's legal 
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counsel that if the 2013 site improvement tax exemptions had also been at issue on this appeal, 
then this Court also would have denied those site improvement tax exemptions to Jayo 
notwithstanding the 2013 legislative amendments. This conclusion is based primarily upon the 
analysis of this Court that is provided in the concluding two paragraphs of its opinion on page 11 
of its decision, in which the following declaration is made: 
As a preliminary matter, the 2013 amended version of the statute is 
consistent with the 2012 version to the extent that the site improvement 
exemption is not intended to run with the property. In both versions of the statute, 
eligibility for the exemption is eliminated once title to the land is conveyed to a 
third party. The 2013 amendments still apply eligibility for the exemption to 
"the" land developer as opposed to "a" land developer. The 2013 amended 
version therefore did not change the intent that the exemption apply to the 
land developer who made the site improvements. 
The two versions of the statute vary with respect to the types of 
conveyances to third parties affecting the exemption eligibility. Under the 2012 
version of the statute, any conveyance of title to a third party from the land 
developer eliminates the exemption. The 2013 amendments qualify the types of 
conveyances considered to be conveyances to a third party. However, the 
particularized qualifications set forth in the 2013 amendment go beyond mere 
clarification of the intent of the original version of the statute. The Court would 
have to in effect write the express conditions into the otherwise unambiguous 
provision of the original enactment. See Kimbrough, 150 Idaho at 420, 247 P.3d 
at 647 (tax exemption cannot be extended by judicial construction). The original 
enactment became effective January 1, 2012. Had the Legislature intended that 
the 2013 amendments be applied to the original enactment to clarify the 
exemption, the Legislature could have expressly made the amendments 
retroactive to January 1, 2012, instead of January 1, 2013. 
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, at pg. 11 (emphasis added). 
In blunt assessment, laid out here only as a matter of stark economic analysis, Jayo 
Development probably could have simply weighed the cost of a further appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court against any potential benefit to be realized from its evaluation of the probability 
of success on that appeal in the context of only the amount which was at issue concerning just 
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the 2012 site improvement exemptions, and then probably determined that the resulting risk-
benefit ratio did not justify an appeal. But now the potential issue appears to be much larger. 
Jayo Development has understood from the time the Legislature created the site 
improvement exemption in 2012, through the corrective amendments that were enacted in 2013, 
that it was a member of that broad class of "developers" expressly intended by the Idaho 
Legislature to be the primary beneficiaries of that tax exemption. Jayo Development's 
understanding in this respect arises from its direct involvement in the legislative process leading 
to the enactment of the law in both years. 
The Petitioner Jayo Development's understanding of this Court's September 11, 2013 
decision is that the site improvement exemption not only does not apply to Jayo for tax year 
2012, under the originally enacted statute, but that if put at issue, Jayo would not have qualified 
for that exemption for tax year 2013 under the current version of the law, or for any year 
thereafter. Under this interpretation of the statute, the stakes are now such that Jayo 
Development really has no choice other than to appeal. 
A portion of this Court's analysis in its September 11, 2013 decision was based upon 
questions that had not been previously addressed in the briefing of the parties, or in the decisions 
of the administrative agencies. Therefore, the Petitioner Jayo Development respectfully asks this 
Court to reconsider several issues arising from its September 11, 2013 decision. These are not 
the only issues that Jayo may raise on any subsequent appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, but 
they represent questions that Jayo believes deserve additional consideration before any appeal to 
that Court. 
IV. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The purpose served by a motion for reconsideration is to allow the reviewing court an 
opportunity to correct errors of both fact and law that have occurred in proceedings that would 
otherwise necessitate an appeal. First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 266, 805 
P.2d 468, 471 (1991) and First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 603, 570 P.2d 276, 281 
(1977). 
The Idaho Civil Court Rules contain two separate and distinct rules that govern motions 
for reconsideration. Rule l l(a)(2)(B) is primarily directed at interlocutory orders and judgments, 
and a motion under that rule can be brought at anytime, including up to 14 days after the entry of 
final judgment. Rule 59( e) is directed to the reconsideration of final judgments, and although the 
word "reconsideration" does not actually appear in that rule, it has long been treated as such a 
motion. Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 538 n. 4, 567 P.2d 1284, 1289 n. 4 (1977). 
In Noreen v. Price Development Co., 135 Idaho 816, 819-820, 25 P.3d 129, 132-33 
(Ct.App.2001) the Idaho Court of Appeals summarized the different standards of review that 
apply to a motion for reconsideration under Rule l l(a)(2)(B) (interlocutory orders), and under 
Rule 59(e) (final judgments). The primary distinction is that in deciding a motion presented 
under Rule ll(a)(2)(B), a party can, but is not required to, present new or additional facts in 
support of that motion. See Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 
800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990); and Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472-73, 147 P.3d 100, 
104-05 (Ct.App.2006). Whereas, a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), cannot, by its 
very nature, permit the presentation of new evidence, but instead must "be directed to the status 
of the case as it existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the judgment is based." 
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City of Pocatello v. State of Idaho, 152 Idaho 830,837,275 P.3d 845, 852 (2012). 
: In this case the Court's September 11, 2013 Judgment granting the Respondent's motion 
for summary judgment served as an adjudication of the entire matter and was a final judgment. 
As such, only a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is appropriate in this case. Boise 
Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners LTD, 154 Idaho 99, 106-07, 294 P.3d 1111, 1118-19 
(2013). Therefore, the Petitioner, Jayo Development, Inc. submits this requests for 
reconsideration on the existing record and current status of this case. 
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration rests in the sound discretion of 
the court. Carnell v. Barker Management, Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 329, 48 P.3d 651, 658 (2002). 
The court's exercise of discretion is governed by the following three factors: (1) whether the 
issue presented involves an exercise of discretion; (2) a determination the legal standards which 
apply to the specific choices that are presented to the court that are within the outer boundaries of 
that exercise of that discretion and; (3) the application of reason by the court in the making of its 
decision in the exercise of its discretion. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 
Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
V. 
RECONSIDERATION ARGUMENT 
A. If I.C. § 63-602W(4) Is "Plain and Unambiguous" On Its Face, Then An Agency Is 
Bound By, And May Not Further Interpret That Statutory Language 
The Court's Part "B" analysis, containing subparts "i" and "ii," appear to be in conflict. 
The Court's initial determination is that the statute in question, LC. § 63-602W(4), is "plain and 
unambiguous." Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at pp. 5-7. But then the Court in the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION -PAGE 6 
000146
second part of its analysis, in part ii, applies the State Tax Commission's Administrative Rule 
620, Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at pp. 7-9, even though any reliance upon that 
Rule is contra-indicated by the Court's initial conclusion that the statute itself is "plain and 
unambiguous." 
The rule of statutory construction that applies when a statute has been determined by the 
court to be plain and unambiguous, is that there then is no occasion for that court to either 
consult, or to follow and apply, any agency regulations on a question that already has been 
plainly and unambiguously addressed by the statute itself. City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 
123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993) ("[T]he court must follow express written 
language of the legislature over any agency regulations."); Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) ("We have consistently held that 
were statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should 
not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature."). 
In Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, l 07 Idaho 854, 693 P .2d 1056 (1984) 
the Supreme Court rejected such an attempt at rewriting a statute through agency interpretation: 
LC. § 63-3022(1) allows a state taxpayer to deduct expenses that are 
defined as itemized deductions by federal law. The section does not require the 
taxpayer to have actually taken the deduction. Idaho Income Tax Regulation 
22(f) clearly indicates this. The Tax Commission's interpretation of§ 63-3022(1) 
is nothing more than an attempt at rewriting the statute. Neither the Tax 
Commission nor the courts have such authority. See C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 
169 and cites therein. The Tax Commission's function is to enforce the law as 
written. And as written, it is clear that plaintiff was within the law in doing what 
she did. 
107 Idaho at 856, 693 P .2d at 1058 (italicized emphasis in original). See also, Hamilton v. 
Reeder Flying Service, 135 Idaho 568, 572, 21 P.3d 890, 894 (2001); Rim View Trout Co. v. 
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Higginson, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992); and J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State 
Tax Comm., 120 Idaho 849,861,820 P.2d 1218 (1991) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress." citing to, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). 
In sum, if it is this Court's finding that LC. § 63-602W(4) is plain and unambiguous, then 
no resort to, or reliance upon Rule 620 was required, and this Court's analysis and reliance upon 
that administrative rule was unnecessary to the decision of this case. 
B. The Court's Alleged Grammatical Interpretation ofl.C. § 63-602W(4) 
Impermissibly Relies Upon Implied Language That Does Not Appear on the Face of 
the Statute Itself 
This Court's reliance upon the grammatical construction of the statute certainly 
represenfs one accepted means of statutory construction. Ada County Prosecuting Attorney v. 
2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 354, 298 P.3d 245, 248 (2013). At page 6, and 
again at page 11, of its decision the Court states that the Legislature's apparent intentional use of 
the definite article "the" in LC. § 63-602W(4) in modifying "land developer," indicated that the 
Legislature's intent to limit the site improvement property tax exemption to, "the land developer 
that makes [who made] the site improvements." The Court points out that if the Legislature had 
instead used the indefinite article, "a" in modifying "land developer," then the Legislature's 
manifested intent would have been to extend that exemption "to all land developers holding 
property improved with site improvements, irrespective of whether that developer made the site 
improvements, .... " See, Order On Motions for Summary Judgment, at pg. 6. 
The problem that seems apparent in relying upon this rule of grammatical construction in 
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support of the Court's conclusion in this case is that it necessarily requires reliance for its 
conclusion upon language that simply does not appear on the face of the statute - "the land 
developer who made the site improvements." The Court has not pointed to any statutory 
definition of "the land developer," that supports its construction of this phrase as being limited to 
only those individuals or entities who actually made the site improvements, nor is there any 
evident legislative history that the Legislature had this particular distinction in mind when it 
adopted this site improvement exemption in 2012. In the absence of this support, the 
grammatical construction within this statute of the phrase, "held by the land developer for sale or 
consumption in the ordinary course of the land developer's business," could be just as easily 
construed to mean "the" land developer who "held" that site improvement at the time the 
exemption is applied for, regardless of whether that improvement was acquired by direct 
investment, or by direct transfer. In either situation, the Court's bottom-line rationale is satisfied 
that, "It is practical to interpret the statute as granting the exemption to the land developer that 
invests the necessary capital to make the site improvements." See, Order on Motions for 
Summary Judgment at pg. 8. 
Ultimately, what seems to have gotten lost within this technical analysis of this statute is 
that the land developers who were in fact the likely intended beneficiaries of this site 
improvement tax exemption, were those who somehow survived the worst housing downturn in 
anyone's memory. That survival was not without loss or sacrifice. Partners, investors, and 
sometimes entire businesses were lost. A lot of development land held as "inventory'' was 
foreclosed upon and lost. Business entities changed, both voluntarily and involuntarily. In this 
case, as is likely in many others, "the developer" who invested the capital to make the site 
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improvements, and who hung on, was Doug Jayo, both as Jayo Construction, Inc., and as Jayo 
Development., Inc. See, Court's Statement of Pacts, ,r 6, at pg. 2. 
While it is acknowledged that a grammatical distinction does in fact exist between the 
definitive article "the," as referring to a specific or identifiable subject, and the indefinite article 
"a," as referring to any member of a particular class, this Court's application of that rule to reach 
the conclusion that "the land developer" only means,"the land developer who made the site 
improvements," does not appear to be at all supported by the context of the statute. The Court 
can only reach its desired conclusion by adding that language to the statute by implication. As a 
general rule, courts should not imply language in a statute that does not appear there. See, 2A 
Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47:38 Insertion of words. A court does 
not have the power to construe an unambiguous statute to say something that it does not say. 
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,895,265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011). The 
power to change a statute is legislative and belongs only to the state legislature. Idaho State 
Board of Accountancy v. League Services, Inc., l 08 Idaho 157, 159, 697 P .2d 1171, 1173 (1985); 
and Ingard v. Barker, 27 Idaho 124, 135, 147 P. 293, 296 (1915) ("It would be clearly beyond 
the right of this court to make judicial amendments to the statute in question by adding words 
thereto."). 
Applying only the unambiguous language of the statute itself, Jayo Development, Inc. 
was the land developer who held the qualifying real property at the time the § 63-602W( 4) site 
improvement tax exemption was enacted in 2012. Jayo Development, Inc. then held, and 
continues to hold, that property as business inventory that is entitled to the site improvement tax 
exemption. This Court is requested to reconsider its decision, denying Jayo Development that 
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site improvement tax exemption. 
C. Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4), as Construed by the Court, Violates the Uniformity 
Provision of Article VII, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution 
If the same identical facts, as have been presented to this Court by the stipulation of the 
parties on this de novo appeal, were again presented to this Court, but were only altered so that 
all of the allegedly disqualifying property transfers occurred after the effective date of the 
original enactment of this 2012 exemption, as between an original land developer identified by 
way of example as "Mayo Construction," and an ultimate owner identified as "Mayo 
Development," then under this Court's analysis Mayo Development would retain the site 
improvement tax exemption. When compared to the contrasting status that was conferred upon 
Jayo Development by this Court's September 11, 2013 decision, it appears that this Court's 
construction of LC. § 63-602W(4) violates the uniformity provisions of Section 2 and 5, Article 
VII of the Idaho Constitution, as applied to Jayo Development, Inc. These two sections of the 
Idaho Constitution declare as follows: 
§ 2. Revenue to be provided by taxation - The legislature shall provide 
such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax by valuation, so that every 
person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or 
its property, except as in this article hereinafter otherwise provided . ... 
§ 5. Taxes to be uniform - Exe~ptions 
All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the 
territorial limits, of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and 
collected under general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as shall 
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal: provided, 
that the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as 
shall seem necessary and just, and all existing exemptions provided by the laws of 
the territory, shall continue until changed by the legislature of the state: provided 
further, that duplicate taxation of property for the same purpose during the same 
year, is hereby prohibited. 
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(Emphasis added). 
There is a strong presumption in favor of constitutionality and a challenger must clearly 
establish the invalidity of the statute. School Dist. No. 25, Bannock Co. v. State Tax Comm., 101 
Idaho 283, 290, 612 P.2d 126, 133 (1980). A party can challenge the constitutionality of a 
statute only "as applied," rather than on its face. Evans v. State Tax Comm., 95 Idaho 54, 501 
P.2d 1054 (1972). To prove a statute is unconstitutional as applied, a party need only show that 
as applied to that party's conduct the statute is unconstitutional. American Falls Reservoir Dist. 
No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 870, 154 P.3d 433,441 (2007). 
The Petitioner, Jayo Development, acknowledges that the above-cited uniformity 
provisions do not apply as to properly exempted property, itself, as stated in Simmons v. Idaho 
State Tax Comm., 111 Idaho 343, 723 P.2d 887 (1986): 
Idaho Const. art. VII, § 2, requires that property tax be proportionate to the value 
of the property, "except in this article hereinafter otherwise provided." Section 5 
of the same article otherwise provides for the uniform levy of property taxes upon 
the same class of subjects within the same taxing district, "provided, that the 
legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as shall 
seem necessary and just. ... " This exemption applies to both Sections 2 and 5 of 
article VII of the Idaho Constitution. Property legislatively exempt from taxation 
need not comply with either of the uniform assessment and taxation requirements 
of Sections 2 and 5. 
111 Idaho at 346-47, 723 P.2d 890-91. 
The issue presented here instead goes to the threshold question of whether the 
constitutional uniformity clauses are violated by the method by which exempt property is 
determined, not whether the exempt property itself is subject to those uniformity clauses. In 
2012, when the site improvement property tax exemption was enacted Jayo Development, Inc. 
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facially appeared to qualify, being the land developer who-then held those improvements in the 
ordinary course of its business, awaiting either construction of residences, or the sale of that 
property to third parties. Yet, as based upon transactions that had occurred in 2008 well before 
the exemption 2012 statute was enacted, Jayo Development was disqualified from claiming those 
exemptions. 
If the constitutional standard of uniformity is that property of the same class within the 
same taxing district is to be treated proportionally the same, then that standard - as applied to 
Jayo Development - is violated by this Court's interpretation of LC. § 63-602W(4). Returning 
again to the brief example set out at the beginning of this section, Mayo and Jayo both are land 
developers, both hold undeveloped residential property of the same character with built site 
improvements, that satisfy the requirements of the tax exemption statute. Mayo receives the 
exemption, Jayo does not. Setting aside this Court's statutory interpretation distinction, as based 
upon "the land developer who made the site improvements," there appears to be no other basis 
upon which to distinguish these two land developers in respect to their qualification for this site 
improvement tax exemption. Consequently, the uniformity provision appears to be violated as 
applied to Jayo Development, Inc., and this Court is requested to reconsider its decision on that 
basis. 
D. This Court's Construction of I.C. § 63-602W(4) Violates Equal Protection 
Equal protection analysis in respect to tax classifications is subject to the rational basis 
test. Tarbox v. State Tax Commission, 107 Idaho 957, 959-960, 695 P.2d 342, 344-345 (1985) 
("The rational basis test 'requires "that legislation classify persons it affects in a manner 
rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives.""'). In addition, in the context of tax 
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exemptions, consideration must be given to the fact that such exemptions are to be construed 
against the taxpayer, Kimbrough v. Idaho Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 420, 247 P.3d 
644, 647 (2011), and that the right to such tax exemptions must be established by clear 
entitlement. Ada County Board of Equalization v. Highlands, Inc., 141 Idaho 202,206, 108 P.3d 
349, 353 (2005). 
The core issue throughout this case has been the alleged distinction between the original 
land developer who actually made the site improvements that are the subject of this tax 
exemption, and a successor land developer to now "holds" those very same site improvements as 
business inventory, but who acquired them by either direct purchase or by some means of 
business transformation ( change of entity). The taxing authorities have adhered to the position -
and to this point this Court has sustained that position - that only the original land developer who 
actually made the site improvements is entitled to that tax exemption, while any land developer 
who subsequently acquires, and continues to hold as business inventory that same site 
improvement, has no entitlement to that tax exemption. 
If the primary supporting rationale is that the benefit of the exemption should be limited 
to the land developer that invests the necessary capital to make the site improvements, then it 
should be recalled that this tax exemption has been classified as a "business inventory'' tax 
exemption. By way of example, suppose a hardware store that is entitled to a business inventory 
tax exemption has purchased a $100,000 in inventory. The store itself is valued at $25,000 and 
also has a business good will value of $25,000, for a total value of $150,000, including its 
purchased inventory. Why wouldn't a purchaser of that hardware store business, who has paid 
the owner $150,000 for that business, thereafter be entitled to the business inventory tax 
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exemption? Although he is not the original purchaser of the inventory, he has certainly paid for 
the value of that inventory when he purchased the store! 
So in the context of equal protection's rational basis test, and as based upon the language 
of the 2012 statute: 
(4) Site improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and 
utilities, on real property held by the land developer for sale or consumption in 
the ordinary course of the land developer's business until other improvements, 
such as buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or title to the 
land is conveyed from the land developer. 
(Emphasis added). What rational basis supports the determination of any meaningful distinction 
between the investment that is made by the original land developer and that which is made by the 
acquiring land developer? What rational basis supports a meaningful distinction between the 
original land developer and a successor, whether by merger, acquisition, or by change in entity? 
In these instances has there actually been a conveyance of the land title from the land developer? 
As to the facts of this case, there has never been any dispute that all that ever occurred 
was a change in entity of what has always been in essence a single-owner family corporation. 
The source of the site improvement investment that is at issue for these particular tax exemptions 
does not exist in some now-far-removed person or entity that is not a party to this action. 
Instead, the source of the site improvement investment that is at issue for these particular tax 
exemptions is, and always has been, Doug Jayo, who has at all times been the principal member 
and actor for the contending entities whose standing and status has been at issue in this case. 
In sum, there is no apparent rational basis to deny Jayo Development, Inc. the 2012 site 
improvement tax exemption under the plain and unambiguous reading of LC. § 63-603W(4), and 
this Court is request to grant reconsideration on that basis. 




For all the reasons stated and argued above, the Petitioner, Jayo Development, Inc., 
requests reconsideration of this Court's September 11, 2013 denying its motion for summary 
judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of October, 2013. 
Mic11ae1R.Jon 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Jayo Development, Inc. 
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Case No. CV-OC-2013-7673 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW, Respondent, the Ada County Board of Equalization, by and through its 
attorney of record, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Civil Division, and submits this 
Memorandum in Response to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 
I. SCOPE OF REVIEW 
The only issue on appeal to the District Court is whether the Ada County Board of 
Equalization properly denied Jayo Development, Inc. ("Petitioner") site improvement tax 
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exemptions for the Parcels1 in tax year 2012 pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-602W(4) (2012) 
(amended 2013) ("Site Improvement Exemption Statute") as it then existed. The issue of 
whether this Court would have denied site improvement tax exemptions to Petitioner pursuant to 
the amended 2013 site improvement exemption statute is not on appeal, despite Petitioner's 
conjecture of such in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration.2 Mem. Supp. 
Mot. Recons. 2-4. Nor is such issue even appealable as the Ada County Board of Equalization 
granted Petitioner's 2013 site improvement tax exemption applications. See id. at 2. 
With the proper scope of review in mind, in order to prevail on its Motion for 
Reconsideration, Petitioner must demonstrate that both grounds of this Court's Order on Motions 
for Summary Judgment are in error. See Macleod v. Reed, 126 Idaho 669, 671, 889 P.2d 103, 
105 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[W]here a judgment of the trial court is based upon alternative grounds, 
the fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may be disregarded if 
the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds."). Because Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that either ground is in error, the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully 
requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 
1 Forty-one parcels are at issue in this case. The parcels are subdivision lots located in seven different developments. 
The parcel numbers at issue are: Rl013520065, Rl471950020, Rl471950040, Rl471950640, Rl471950710, 
R3369320170, R3369320180, R3369320420, R3369320430, R3369321070, R8037540070, R8037540100, 
R8037540110, R8037540170, R8037540220, R8037540230, R8037540270, R8037540290, R8037540570, 
R8037540590, R8177360070, R8177360080, R8177360100, R8177360110, R9473780210, R9473780230, 
R9473789560, R9473790020, R9473790030, R9473790180, R9473790200, R9473790210, R9473790230, 
R9473790240, R9473790250, R9473790260, R9473790470, R9473790480, R9473790490, R9473790500, and 
R94 73 790510 ("Parcels"). 
2 Notwithstanding the fact that Petitioner's 2013 tax exemption applications are not on appeal in this case, Ada 
County is at a loss as to why Petitioner believes that "it [is] now ... abundantly clear ... that if the 2013 site 
improvement tax exemptions had also been at issue on this appeal, then this Court also would have denied those site 
improvement tax exemptions to Jayo notwithstanding the 2013 legislative amendments." Mem. Supp. Mot. Recons. 
2-3. Ada County does not read the Court's ruling in such manner and does not agree with Petitioner's 
unsubstantiated conclusion. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
This Court held that Petitioner was not entitled to site improvement exemptions in respect 
to the Parcels for tax year 2012 under the plain and unambiguous language of the Site 
Improvement Exemption Statute. Order Mots. Summ. J. 5-7. In the alternative, this Court held 
that even if the Site Improvement Exemption Statute were ambiguous, Petitioner would not have 
been entitled to site improvement exemptions per Idaho State Tax Commission ("State Tax 
ComnHssion") Rule 620, see IDAHO ADMIN. CODER. 35.01.03.620 (2012) ("Rule 620"). Order 
Mots. Summ. J. 7-9. Petitioner has not shown that either of these alternate bases for the Court's 
ruling is in error. 
A. The Court did not improperly rely on implied language when it held that 
"the" land developer referred to the single, specific entity that made the site 
improvements. 
In response to the Court's holding that Petitioner was not entitled to site improvement 
exemptions for tax year 2012 under the plain and unambiguous language of the Site 
Improvement Exemption Statute, Petitioner argues that the Court improperly relied on implied 
language that does not appear on the face of the Site Improvement Exemption Statute. Mem. 
Supp. Mot. Recons. 8-11. In particular, Petitioner argues that the Court, without aid of a 
statutory definition or legislative history, improperly interpreted "the land developer" to mean the 
single entity that made the site improvements. Id. Petitioner argues that the context of the Site 
Improvement Exemption Statute does not support the Court's construction. Id. Petitioner would 
rather the Court interpret "the land developer" to mean "the land developer who held the site 
improvements at the time the exemption is applied for." Id. at 9. 
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For tax year 2012, the Site Improvement Exemption Statute read as follows: 
Site improvements, that are associated with land, such as roads and utilities, on 
real property held by the land developer for sale or consumption in the ordinary 
course of the land developer's business until other improvements, such as 
buildings or structural components of buildings, are begun or title to the land is 
conveyed from the land developer. 
LC.§ 63-602W(4) (2012) (amended 2013) (emphases added). 
Looking at the context of the Site Improvement Exemption Statute, as Petitioner suggests, 
the definite article "the" in describing "land developer" is used repeatedly and, in every instance, 
pointedly references a single, specific entity: the land developer who holds the property, the land 
developer's business, and land conveyed from the land developer. Had the Idaho Legislature 
used the indefinite article "a" in the Statute to describe "land developer," such change in wording 
would have truly conveyed a different meaning and would have indicated that the Legislature 
intended the exemption to apply to any land developer who held real property upon which site 
improvements had been made. However, because the Legislature chose to use the definite article 
"the" to describe "land developer," the Court's reading of the Site Improvement Exemption 
Statute is consistent with the plain language of the Statute, and the context of the Statute entirely 
supports the Court's analysis. 
Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that this ground of the Court's ruling is 
in error, and the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully requests that this Court deny 
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 
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B. The Idaho State Tax Commission was not prohibited from adopting Rule 620 
even though this Court· found that the language of the Site Improvement 
Exemption Statute was plain and unambiguous. 
In response to the Court's alternate holding that even if the Site Improvement Exemption 
Statute were ambiguous, Petitioner would not have been entitled to site improvement exemptions 
per Rule 620, Petitioner appears to argue that the State Tax Commission was prohibited from 
adopting an administrative rule interpreting the Site Improvement Exemption Statute because 
this Court found such Statute to be plain and unambiguous on its face.3 Mem. Supp. Mot. 
Recons. 6-8. 
As the Court noted in its ruling, the State Tax Commission is entrusted with the authority 
to promulgate rules implementing the provisions of the Idaho Code relating to property tax laws. 
However, the State Tax Commission is not charged with only implementing rules to clarify 
ambiguous language. Rather, Idaho Code section 63-105A(14) charges the State Tax 
Commission with the power and duty to "make administrative construction of property tax law 
whenever necessary or requested by any officer acting under such laws .... " J.C. § 63-105A(14) 
(emphasis added). Further, under its general powers and duties, enumerated in Idaho Code 
section 63-105(2), the State Tax Commission is vested with the power to "make, adopt and 
' 
publish such rules as it may deem necessary and desirable to carry out the powers and duties 
imposed upon it by law .... " Id. at§ 63-105(2) (emphasis added). 
The State Tax Commission's rulemaking authority is broadly stated, and nothing limits 
such authority to the construction of property tax laws that are deemed "ambiguous." Rather, 
., 
3 Petitioner "appears" to make this argument based on its argument title, "If I.C. § 63-602W(4) Is "Plain and 
Unambiguous" On Its Face, Then An Agency Is Bound By, And May Not Further Interpret That Statutory 
Language." Mem. Supp. Mot. Recons. 6. However, Petitioner's ensuing argument does not further elaborate or 
support such argument. See id. at 6-8. 
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when the State Tax Commission found it "necessary and desirable" to promulgate rules 
implementing the Site Improvement Exemption Statute, it did so. The fact that this Court, nearly 
a year later, deemed the language of such Statute to be "plain and unambiguous" does not 
support a finding that the State Tax Commission acted improperly or without authority in 
promulgating a rule related to the Site Improvement Exemption Statute. 
Further, despite Petitioner's citation to case law regarding statutory construction, 
Petitioner entirely fails to explain how such case law relates to the case at bar. See Mem. Supp. 
Mot. Recons. 6-8. Although perhaps implied, Petitioner has not argued that Rule 620 altered the 
clearly expressed intent of the Idaho Legislature. 4 See id. Instead, Petitioner simply concludes 
that "if it is this Court's finding that LC.§ 63-602W(4) is plain and unambiguous, then no resort 
to, or reliance upon Rule 620 was required, and this Court's analysis and reliance upon that 
administrative rule was unnecessary to the decision of this case." Id. at 8. 
Petitioner seems to miss the fact that the Court's ruling in regards to Rule 620 was an 
alternate ground, as indicated by the Court's title to section !LB.ii of its Order on Motions for 
Summary Judgment: "Even if the statute was ambiguous the Petitioner would not be entitled to 
the site improvement exemption." Order Mots. Summ. J. 7 (emphasis added). Petitioner has not 
cited to any authority holding that a court is prohibited from making alternative rulings. 
4 If Petitioner were to make such an argument, it is the position of the Ada County Board of Equalization that Rule 
620 is consistent with the language of the Site Improvement Exemption Statute and does not alter such Statute. 
Rather, Rule 620 simply instructs, guides, directs, and assists county assessors and boards of equalization as to how 
to implement the Site Improvement Exemption Statute. As such, Rule 620 is consistent with the State Tax 
Commission's authority pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-105A(6). See I.C. § 63-105A(6) ("To instruct, guide, 
direct and assist the county assessors and county boards of equalization as to the methods best calculated to secure 
uniformity in the assessment and equalization of property taxes, to the end that all property shall be assessed and 
taxed as required by law."). 
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Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Court's alternate ground is in 
error, and the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully requests that this Court deny 
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 
C. Petitioner is prohibited from introducing new legal theories in its Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
1. The Court's ruling does not give rise to Petitioner's new legal theories. 
In its Motion for Reconsideration, Petitioner raises two new legal theories: the 
uniformity provisions of the Idaho Constitution and equal protection. Although Petitioner frames 
these issues as new issues that arise due to the Court's construction of the Site Improvement 
Exemption Statute, in reality, these are newly discovered legal theories that Petitioner could have 
raised earlier in its summary judgment briefings. 
For example, the basic premise for Petitioner's new equal protection theory is that if a site 
improvement exemption is extended to the land developer who made the site improvements, then 
it should also be extended to a land developer who purchased the already-improved land-the 
exemption should not be denied just because the purchasing land developer did not make the site 
improvements. This is an issue that Petitioner could have raised earlier. Throughout the 
summary judgment briefings filed by the Ada County Board of Equalization, the Board plainly 
argued that Petitioner was not entitled to site improvement exemptions because it did not make 
or cause to be made the site improvements upon the Parcels. In response, Petitioner could have 
argued that such construction of the Site Improvement Exemption statute violated considerations 
of equal protection, but Petitioner failed to do so. 
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Accordingly, although Petitioner implies that its new legal theories arise due to the 
Court's ruling, Petitioner's new arguments are actually new legal theories that could have been 
advanced earlier. 
2. Discovery of new legal theories does not constitute valid grounds for a 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
By asserting that application of the Site Improvement Exemption Statute violates the 
uniformity provisions of the Idaho Constitution and equal protection, Petitioner raises new issues 
not previously addressed by this Court. Therefore, the Court must treat the relief sought by 
Petitioner as a motion for relief under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b ), instead of Rule 59( e ). 
Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that where a 
"motion for 'reconsideration' raises new issues, or presents new information, not addressed to 
the court prior to the decision which resulted in the judgment, the proper analogy is to a motion 
for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b )"). 
Pursuant to Rule 60(b ), Petitioner must show good cause and specify the particular 
grounds upon which relief may be afforded. See id. Inasmuch as Petitioner has not alleged 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, 
misrepresentation, misconduct, or a void judgment, the only possible basis for relief under Rule 
60(b) would be subsection ( 6), which provides for "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." IDAHO R. C1v. P. 60(b)(6). However, Rule 60(b)(6) "was not 
intended to allow a court to reconsider the legal basis for its original decision." First Bank & 
Trust v. Parker Bros., Inc., 112 Idaho 30, 32, 730 P.2d 950, 952 (1986). 
In First Bank, the bank sought to use Rule 60(b) as a vehicle for presenting an unjust 
enrichment claim for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. Id. The court noted that this 
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was simply "a different legal theory of why the bank should prevail," and held that because 
"[d]iscovery of new legal theories does not constitute grounds for bringing a 60(b) motion," the 
bank was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b )( 6). Id. 
Petitioner, similar to First Bank, has apparently discovered two new legal theories upon 
which to base its continued claim for relief-the uniformity provisions of the Idaho Constitution 
and equal protection. However, under First Bank, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on either of 
those claims under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). Accordingly, the Ada County 
Board of Equalization respectfully requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
D. The premise of Petitioner's new uniformity theory is flawed. 
If this Court allows Petitioner to proceed with its new legal theories, then the Ada County 
Board of Equalization alternatively offers the following arguments disputing such new theories. 
Petitioner's new and confusing uniformity theory begins with a premise that is beyond the 
scope of this case, unsubstantiated, and incorrect. Accordingly, Petitioner's ensuing argument is, 
likewise, faulty. Petitioner hypothetically argues: 
If the same identical facts, as have been presented to this Court by the stipulation 
of the parties on this de nova appeal, were again presented to this Court, but were 
only altered so that all of the allegedly disqualifying property transfers occurred 
after the effective date of the original enactment of this 2012 exemption, as 
between an original land developer identified by way of example as "Mayo 
Construction," and an ultimate owner identified as "Mayo Development," then 
under this Court's analysis, Mayo Development would retain the site 
improvement tax exemption. 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Recons. 11. 
The Ada County Board of Equalization does not agree with Petitioner's analysis of this 
hypothetical situation. If "Mayo Construction" made the site improvements on a parcel prior to 
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January 1, 2012, owned the parcel as of January 1, 2012, and then, for example, sold the parcel to 
"Mayo Development" on March 1, 2012, then the Ada County Board of Equalization, acting 
pursuant to the 2012 Site Improvement Exemption Statute, would have granted the exemption to 
Mayo Construction for January and February 2012 but denied the exemption to Mayo 
Development for the remainder of tax year 2012. It is unclear how Petitioner arrives at the 
conclusion that Mayo Development would retain the site improvement exemption according to 
this Court's analysis. 
Because the premise of Petitioner's new uniformity argument is flawed, it follows that the 
rest of Petitioner's uniformity argument is also faulty. Accordingly, Petitioner's new uniformity 
theory does not constitute a ground upon which reconsideration should be granted, and the Ada 
County Board of Equalization respectfully requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
E. Application of the Site Improvement Exemption Statute does not violate 
Petitioner's right to equal protection. 
Petitioner incorrectly argues that no rational basis exists for granting a site improvement 
exemption to an original land developer while denying the same exemption to an acquiring land 
developer. See Mem. Supp. Mot. Recons. 13-15. One rational basis for the Site Improvement 
Exemption Statute could be to encourage land developers to make site improvements to their yet-
unoccupied parcels so that such parcels would be ready for development and construction, as 
needed. In other words, the exemption could be intended to encourage land developers to install 
site improvements, not merely to hold parcels upon which site improvements have already been 
made. Such basis is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of having 
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"shovel-ready" parcels for development and, thus, the Site Improvement Exemption Statute does 
not violate Petitioner's right to equal protection. 
Accordingly, Petitioner's new equal protection theory does not constitute a ground upon 
which reconsideration should be granted, and the Ada County Board of Equalization respectfully 
requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that either ground of 
this Court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment is in error. Accordingly, the Ada County 
Board. of Equalization respectfully requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
\] ~ DATED this___. __ _,___ day of October 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: 
ja:;B.G6mez 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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Memorandum. Petitioner will respond to Respondent's Memorandum during oral argument on 
I 
Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration. 
Dated: October 22, 2013. 
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Jana Gomez 
Nancy Werdel 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Rm 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7719 
Email: jgomez@adaweb.net 
nwerdel@adaweb.net 
[ ]U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ]Other _______ _ 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, . 
Respondent. 
) Case No. CV-OC-2013-7673 
) 
) 









FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. On September 12, 2013, this Court issued an Order on Motions for Summary 
Judgment ("Order") in the above-captioned matter. The facts and course of proceedings set 
forth in the Order are incorporated herein by reference and will not be repeated. 
2. On September 24, 2013, the Petitioner filed a Motion/or Reconsideration asking 
the Court to reconsider its Order. The Respondent filed a Response brief in opposition on 
October 17, 2013. 
3. A hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration was held before this Court on 
October 24, 2013. 
n. 
ANALYSIS 
Although styled as a Motion for Reconsideration, the Petitioner's Motion seeks relief 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59( e ). The decision to grant or deny a Rule 59( e) 
motion is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 
P.3d 754, 760 (2q07). ;Tue Petitioner does not ask this Court to consider new facts or evidence 
' 
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on reconsideration.· Rather, the Petitioner moves the Court to consider several new legal 
arguments directed to the Court's Order. The Court will address each in turn. 
A. The Court did not err by basing its decision on alternate grounds. 
In its Order, the Court found that t~e Petitioner is not entitled to a site improvements 
exemption under the p~ain and unambiguous language of Idaho Code § 63-602W( 4). In the 
alternative, the Court found that even if the statute was found to be ambiguous, the Petitioner 
would still not be entitled to the exemption, given the deference afforded by the Court to IDAP A 
35.01.03 .. 620.04 (hereafter, "Rule 620"). The Petitioner argues on reconsideration that the Court 
erred in engaging in the ambiguity analysis given that it first found the statute to be 
unambiguous. The C~urt disagrees. In engaging in the ambiguity analysis, the Court merely 
provided an alternate ~ound for its ruling. The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized that a 
trial court may support its judgment on alternate grounds. See e.g., Fischer v. Fischer, 92 Idaho 
379,382,443 P.2d 463,466 (1968) (providing that where a judgment of the trial court is based 
upon alternate ground~, "this court must uphold the finding and judgment of the trial court if it is 
capable of being upheld on any theory"). In Canty v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 138 Idaho 
178, 59 P.3d 983 (2002), a case involving the application of two tax credit statutes, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held the statutes were unambiguous. However, tp.e Court went on to conclude 
that "even if the statut~~ are interpreted as beip.g ambiguous the result is the same" based on the 
Tax Commission's int~rpretation of the statutes. Id. at 183, 59 P.3d at 988. Similarly, in this 
case, by including the ~ternative ground in its Order, the Court simply established that whether 
. . 
the language ofldaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012) is found to be ~biguous or unambiguous, the 
end result for the Petitioner is the same. 
B. The Court did not err in its plain language interpretation of Idaho Code § 63-
602W(4) (2012). 
The Petitioner next argues that the Court's plain language interpretation of Idaho Code§ 
63-602W( 4) (2012) is pontrary to the plain language of the statute. The Petitioner does not 
present new argument _here. Rather, the Petitioner ~imply rehashes its assertion that the plain 
language of the statute:must be interpreted to provide a site improvements exemption to any land 
! 
developer holding land improved with site improvements for sale or consumption in the ordinary 
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course of its business, ~ven if that land developer did not make the site improvements. For the 
reasons already set for: by this Court in its Order on pages five through seven, the Court rejects 
the Petitioner's interpretation. The Petitioner also argues that the Court's interpretation of the 
2012 version of the statute could affect the Petitioner's eligibility for the site improvement 
exemption under the 2013 version of the statute. As an initial matter, the Petitioner's 
applications for exemption for the 2013 tax year, if any, are not before this Court, and the 
Court's ruling does not address the application of the 2013 version of the statute. However, the 
Court notes that 2013 amendment to the statute qualifies the types of transfers that affect the 
eligibility of the exemJ,Jtion. Therefore, it is not inconsistent with this Court's interpretation that 
a transfer which eliminated the exemption under the 2012 version of the statute may not 
eliminate the exemption under the ~013 amendment, depending on the nature of the transfer. 
C. The Court's ·construction of Idaho Code § 63-602W(4) (2012) does not violate 
Sections 2 or 5 of Article VII of the Idaho Constitution. 
The Petitioner ~gues that this Court's construction ofldaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012) 
violates Section 2 and 5 of Article VII .of the Idaho Constitution. Those constitutional provisions 
provide as follows: 
§ 2. Revenue to be provided by taxation. The legislature shall provide such 
revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax by valuation, so that every person or 
corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property, 
except as in this article hereinafter otherwise provided. The legislature may also 
impose a license tax, both upon natural persons and upon corporatiqns, other than 
municipal, doing business in this state; also a per capita tax: provided, the 
legislature may exempt a limited amount of improvements upon land. from 
taxation. 
§ 5. Taxes to -be uniform--Exemptions. All taxes shall be uniform upon the 
same class of subjects within the territorial limits, of the authority levying the tax; 
and shall be levied and collected under general laws, which shall prescribe such 
regulations as _shall secure a just valuation fqr taxation of all property, real and 
personal: prov1ded, that the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation 
from time to time as shall seem necessary and just, and all existing exemptions 
provided by the laws ·of the territory, shall conti,nue until changed by the 
legislatur~ of the state: provided further, that duplicate taxation of property for the 
same purpose 4uring the same year, is hereby prohibited. 
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Idaho Const. Art. VII,_§§ 2 & 5. The Petitioner asserts this Court's interpretation ofldaho Code 
§ 63-602W( 4) (2012) violates the above provisions requiring that property be taxed at a uniform 
rate. 
' 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that the above-quoted constitutional provisions 
do not apply as to legislatively exempted. property: 
Idaho Const. art. VII, § 2, requires that property tax be proportionate to the. value 
of the property, "except in this article hereinafter otherwise provided." Section 5 
of the same article otherwise provides for the uniform levy of property taxes upon 
the same class of subjects within the same taxing district, "provided, that the 
legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as shall 
seem necessary and.just .... " This exemption applies to both Section 2 and 5 of 
article VII of the Idaho Constitution. Property legislatively exempt from taxation 
need not comply with either of the uniform assessment and taxation requirements 
of Section 2 and 5. 
Simmons v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 111 Idaho 343, 346-47, 723 P.2d 887, 890-91 (1986) 
(emphasis added). Th~ Court further held that the framers of the Idaho Constitution intended 
"that the legislature have broad discretion in making property tax exemptions," and that under 
. . 
that discretion property may be wholly or partially exempt. Id. at 348, 723 P .2d at 892. 
In this case, th~ legislature acted within its broad discretion when it created the property 
tax exemption at issue here by enacting Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012). Since the exemption 
was properly legislatively ~nacted, it "need not comply with either of the uniform assessment 
and taxation requirem~nts of [Idaho Const., Art VII] Section 2 and 5." Simmons, 111 Idaho at 
347, 723 P.2d at 891. '.fhis Court's construction of the statute was made pursuant to, and is 
consistent with, the st~tute's plain and unambiguous language. Therefore, the exemption under 
. Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012), as construed by this Court, does not violate Section 2 or 5 of 
Article VII of the Idaho Constitution. 
D. The Court's ~onstruction of Idaho Code § 63-602W(4) (2012) does not violate the 
Equal Protecqon Clause. 
The Petitioner argues that this Court's construction ofldah_o Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012) 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.1 When undertaking an equal protection analysis, the Court' 
identifies the classific~tion under attack, articulates the standard under which the classification 
1 The Petitioner does not specify whether its Equal Protection Argument is made under the Idaho Constitution, U.S. 
Constitution, or both. 
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will be tested and determines whether the standard has been satisfied. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi 
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 395, 987 P.2d 300, 307 (1999). Different levels of scrutiny apply to 
equal protection challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Mowrey, 134 Idaho 7 51, 
754, 9 P. 3d 1217, 1220 (2000). Strict scrutiny applies to fundamental rights and suspect c!asses. 
Id. Intermediate scrutiny applies to classifications involving gender and illegitimacy. Id. 
Ratiop.al basis scrutinY, applies to ~1 other challenges. Id. at 754-55, 9 P.3d at 1220-21. 
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has directed that legislative acts are presumed to be 
constitutional, with any doubt concerning interpretation of a statute being resolved in favor of 
finding the statute constitutional. Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258,261,954 P.2d 676, 
679 (1998). 
In this case, the Petitioner asserts that this Court's construction ofldaho Code § 63-
602W(4) (2012) discrimiriates against the following class: land developers who although hold 
land improved with sit_e improvements for sale or consumption in the ordinary course of 
business, did not them~elves improve the land with site improvements. The classification at 
issue does not proceed along suspect lines or infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights. 
Nor does it involve isspes of gender or illegitimacy. Therefore, the Court applies rational basis 
scrutiny to the equal protection challenge in this matter. Under both.the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions, a classwcation will pass rational basis scrutiny "if it is rationally related to a 
legirln:ate government purpose and if there is any conceivable state of facts which will support 
it." State v. Doe, 155 ~daho 99, 104, 305 P.3d 543, 548 (Ct. App. 2013). 
In this case, Idalia Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012) does further legitimate state interests, such 
as encouraging developers who hold undeveloped parcels to improve those parcels with site 
improvements by inve~ting their capital into the land. Since the properties that qualify for the 
exemption will eventu~ly be taxed at full value under the statute, the statute also furthers the 
legitimate government interest of creating a greater tax base for counties and creating shovel 
ready projects to provi_de for new growth. Statement of Purpose, RS21234Cl HB519 (2012). 
The Court therefore finds that Idaho Code§ 63-602W(4) (2012) is rationally related to legitimate 
government purposes.· Accordingly, the Court holds that its construction ofldaho Code§ 63-
602W(4) (2012) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Idaho or United States 
Constitutions. 
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. Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Petitioner's Motion for 
ReconsideraNon is heteby denied. 
Dated O c.J ~ ~ '1: '\ 2 C> 13 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 1 sr day of November, 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
JANA GOMEZ 
NANCY WERDEL 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE, ID 83702 
MICHAEL R. JONES 
P.O. BOX 7743 
508 NORTH 13TH STREET 
BOISE, ID 83 707 
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Michael R. Jones 
Michael R. Jones, PLLC 
508 N. 13th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 385-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9103 
Email: mrjones@mrjonespllc.com 
ISB No. 2221 
Attorney for Appellant 
Jayo Development, Inc. 
: \ \ ~ ttS F~g~-------
DEC - 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE RUDZINSKI 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
/ 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Appellant, 
vs. 
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Respondent. 
Civil No. CV OC 2013-7673 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
(Class: L.4- Filing Fee $109) 
TO: The above named Respondent, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, and its 
attorneys, Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorneys Jana Gomez and Nancy Werdel, 
Ada County Courthouse, 200 W. Front Street, Rm. 3191, Boise, Idaho 83702, and to the 
Clerk of the above entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., appeals against the 
I 
above-named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court, from the October 29, 2013 Order of the 
' 
Fourth District Court, in and for the County of Ada, Denying Jayo Development's Motion for 
Reconsideration of that Court's September 12, 2013 Order Granting the Ada County Board of 
Equalization's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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2. That the Appellant Jayo Development, Inc. has a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and the judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable judgment 
under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(t), LA.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant Jayo 
Development, Inc., then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on 
appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal: 
a. Whether Jayo Development, Inc. was a qualified land developer who was 
entitled to claim the "site improvement" property tax exemption, as based 
upon the unambiguous language of LC. § 63-602W( 4) at the time that tax 
exemption was originally enacted in 2012? 
I 
b . .i Whether the district court erred in its statutory interpretation concerning 
the legislature's choice of the definite article "the," instead of the 
indefinite article, "a," in the wording of LC. § 63-602W( 4), so as to 
exclude Jayo Development from daiming the "site improvement" property 
tax exemption, which interpretation required the district court to 
impermissibly rely upon "implied" language, ("the land developer who 
made the site improvements"), that neither appears on the face of the 
statute itself, nor finds any textual support in any other part of that law? 
c. Whether the State Tax Commission exceeded its statutorily-delegated 
authority by adopting Administrative Rule 620 to further interpret LC. § 
63-602W(4)? 
d. Whether the Ada County Board of Equalization, by the application of Rule 
620, wrongfully denied the site improvement property tax exemption to 
Jayo Development, Inc. in 2012? 
e. Whether the district court erred in construing LC. § 63-602W(4) so as to 
violate the "Uniformity" provision of §§ 2 & 5, Art. VII of the Idaho 
Constitution? 
f. Whether the district court's construction of LC. § 63-602W(4) violates the 
equal protection clause of both the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions? 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion or all of the record. 
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5. No reporter's transcript of the proceedings below is requested. 
6. The Appellant Jayo Development, Inc. requests that following documents to be 
included in the agency's record in addition to those automatically included under 28, I.A.R. 
a. The "Stipulation of Facts," as signed by the parties on October 25, 2012, 
and admitted in evidence before the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals. 
I 
b. Ada County Board of Equalization's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (7 /24/13). ! 
C. Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(7/24/13). 
d. Memorandum m Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (7/24/13). 
e. Statement of Facts in Support of Motion of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (7 /24/13). 
f. Notice of Telephonic Hearing on Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (7/30/13). 
g. Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/28/2013 01:30 p.m) to be 
heard in 5th District. 
h. Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (7/31/13). 
i. Affidavit of Michael R. Jones (7/31/13). 
j. Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (7 /31/13). 
k. Statement of Facts in Support of Jayo Development Inc.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment (7/31/13). 
I. Jayo Development's Memorandum in Opposition to Ada 
County's Motion for Summary Judgment (7/31/13). 
m. Notice of Telephonic Hearing on Petitioner's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (08/08/13). 
n. Memorandum in Response to Petitioner's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (08/15/13). 
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o. Reply Memorandum on Petitioner Jayo Development's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (08/21/13). 
p. Reply Memorandum in Support of Ada County Board of 
Equalization's Motion for Summary Judgment (08/22/13). 
q. Motion for Reconsideration (09/24/13). 
r. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
(10/08/13). 
' 
s. Memorandum m Response to Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration (10/17 /1_3). 
t. Reply Motion for Reconsideration (10/22/13). 
u. The transcript and agency record lodged with the district 
court (05/09/13), and to be submitted to the Supreme Court in accordance 
with LA.R. 3 l(a)(2). 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
No transcript has been requested. 
I 
b. That the clerk of the administrative agency has been paid the estimated fee 
for preparation of the transcript, if one has been requested. 
No transcript has been requested. 
I 
c. That the clerk of the court/agency has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record. 
d. That the required filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
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• 
DATED this 5th day of December, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this c:{'*day of December, 2013, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following in the manner described below 
Idaho Board of Tax Appeals 
3380 Americana Terrace, Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Jana Gomez 
Nancy Werdel 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 










IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAYO DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 41668 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Agency Record of the Board of Tax Appeals, filed May 24, 2013. 
2. CD recording of the hearing before the Board of Tax Appeals. 
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Court this 18th day of February, 2014. 
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Supreme Court Case No. 41668 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
MICHAEL R. JONES 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: FEB 18 2014 --------
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the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction as, and is a true and correct record of the 
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